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Abstract
Margin-trading and short-selling activities in the Chinese stock market are unique in that
only part of stocks are eligible for margin-trading and short-selling and the list of stocks that
are eligible for margin-trading and short-selling changes over time. In addition, daily data on
margin trading and short selling activities are available for each individual stock.
Taking advantage of this market design and using daily data from March 2010 to the end of
2016, I firstly show that stocks’ eligibility on margin trading and short selling contributes to
improvement in stock liquidity as measured by effective spread and Amihud’s (2002)
Illiquidity Ratio. Secondly, to differentiate the impacts of margin trading and short selling, I
find that margin-trading enhances liquidity while short selling impairs liquidity. In addition, I
prove that the detrimental effect of short-selling on liquidity is due to it increases the adverse
selection risk of the relevant stocks. Results suggest that short-sellers are informed traders as
short-selling have predictive power on returns. In addition, short-selling in stocks with
highest information asymmetry level tend to have the strongest negative impact on stock
liquidity. Thirdly, I also demonstrate the asymmetry impacts of margin-trading and
short-selling in different market conditions. At poor market conditions, stocks eligible for
margin-trading and short-selling tend to have lower liquidity rather than higher liquidity.
Furthermore, margin-trading activity hinders liquidity but short-selling improves liquidity.
Hence, the impacts of margin trading and short selling on liquidity reversed during the
market downturns. My finding helps to reconcile the discrepancy between many literature
findings and regulators’ policy of short selling ban during market crisis period.
I also examine the impacts of margin trading and short selling on the lead-lag relations in
liquidity and return between stocks eligible for margin-trading and short selling and other
stocks. Firstly, applying the Vector Autoregression (VAR) models on minute data, I find a
strong lead-lag relation in both liquidity and return between eligible stocks and ineligible
stocks. That is, liquidity and returns for eligible stocks lead those of the ineligible stocks.
This lead-lag effect persists under different market conditions. In addition, the lead-lag effect
in liquidity is stronger when investors are facing constrained funding liquidity which
supports the theoretical model of Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2009) which suggests the
interaction between funding liquidity and stock liquidity. Secondly, only margin trading has
significant impacts on the lead-lag relations. To explain why the margin trading would have
impact on lead-lag effects, I proposed three possible mechanisms (i.e., deleverage channel,
cross-asset learning channel, and information diffusion channel) and use mediation analysis
to test the importance of each mechanism. I found that the deleverage channel accounts for
58.24% (70.73%) of the impacts from margin trading on lead-lag effect in liquidity (return).
The information diffusion channel only explains 2.28% (0.86%) of total effect that margin
trading has on lead-lag effect in liquidity (return). The cross asset learning channel can
explain 39.58% (28.41%) of the impacts of margin trading on lead-lag in liquidity (return).
Our study provides the first empirical evidence in literature on the lead-lag relation in
liquidity. In addition, it is the first paper that demonstrates the existence of return lead-lag
relation at intraday level. Finally, it highlights the role that margin trading played in forming
such lead lag relations in both liquidity and return.
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“As a method to enhance the innovation of credit trading mechanism in the
Chinese security market, margin trading and short selling could enhance the market
trading and investing activities.”1 Fulin Shang, the chairman of the Chinese
Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC), believed that introducing leverage
trading could contribute to the Chinese stock market. As two leverage trading
activities, margin-trading and short-selling have usually played essential roles in
stock markets; they affect stock’s liquidity, price discovery, and market efficiency.
Margin-trading is a financing service in which security companies lend funds for
investors to buy stocks. When investors short-sell stocks, they just sell those that
have been borrowed from security companies. Both leverage trading activities need
to use stocks and capital as collaterals and pay back fund and stocks on time to
security companies. Despite margin trading and short selling behaviours being
relatively new to the Chinese market, they have been widely performed in most
developed countries’ stock markets for around a century already, and have served
different market participants for specific aims. For investors, they use margin-trading
for profit in upward market trends and short-selling for profit in declined ones.
Market makers offer traders capital or stocks inventory to fulfil market-making
functions. Portfolio managers also use short selling as part of hedging strategy to
diversify potential risks. Amongst these purposes, the latter two do not anticipate
1 Fulin Shang, the chairman of the Chinese Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC), answered the questions




manipulating stock prices. However, the first purpose of short-sellers gaining profit
from stock price decrease has drawn the most attention from media and the public.
Some regulators and media have blamed short-sellers for causing market crash and
exacerbating liquidity dry up during the financial crisis. During the 1930s, U.S.
regulators had stated that short-selling leads to stock market crash, and had posed
several bans and regulations on short-selling, with attempts to stabilise the market
(Jones, 2012). More recently, regulators have ascribed price drops during the 2008
financial crisis to uncurbed short selling behaviour2. The United States and several
European countries have imposed urgent bans on short-selling in order to stabilise
the market.
On the contrary, theoretical models and empirical findings from various
literature are inconsistent with regulators’ standpoint. Most researchers have
proposed that short-selling is not harmful to the stock market. Their attitudes toward
it are positive; they believe that the trading mechanism can actually improve the
completeness of the market. It has been predicted from theoretical models that bans
on short-sale can inflate the price from its fundamental value, reduce price efficiency,
and hamper stocks’ liquidity (Miller, 1997; Jarrow, 1980; Diamond and Verrecchia,
1987). Researchers have also empirically proved that short-selling contributes to
market stabilisation, correct stock overpricing, and market liquidity improvement
(Akbas et al., 2008; Balasubramanian, 2008; Boehme et al., 2006; Boehmer et al.,
2008; Beber and Pangano, 2013; Boehmer et al., 2013). They have argued that
short-sale bans are either ineffective or even harmful to market quality, whilst
impairing the price discovery process (Lioui, 2009; Saffi and Sigurdsson, 2011;




Battalio and Schultz, 2011; Beber and Pagano, 2013; Boehmer et al., 2013; Alves et
al., 2016; Helmes et al., 2017).
As for margin-trading’s impact on the stock market, it has drawn less attention
from various literature or regulators as compared to short-selling. Most research have
focused only on the impact of changes in margin requirement, whilst only few have
concentrated on margin-trading’s direct impact on stock’s liquidity. Seguin (1990)
find that margin eligibility improves the market depth. Recently, Kahraman and
Tookes (2017) investigate the India stock market and find that stocks eligible for
margin-trading have higher liquidity.
Liquidity is a vital factor of the stock market. There are several liquidities: asset
liquidity, market liquidity, financial market's liquidity, and financial institution’s
liquidity. An asset’s liquidity can be regarded as the ease to convert the asset into
legal tender like cash. Market liquidity, compared to asset liquidity, is a broader
concept. It is the ease to trade an asset quickly at a reasonable price without any
impact of new information on the asset’s fundamental value. Financial market’s
liquidity is measured by the substitutability among different assets traded in the
particular financial market, and how liquid each asset is. On the other hand, financial
institution’s liquidity depends on the ease of a financial institution that can cover
mismatch between its assets and liabilities and to settle its obligations (Sarr and
Lybek, 2002). Among these four types of liquidities, this thesis focuses on a stock’s
market liquidity, and it is also the main focus of many studies when referring to
liquidity.
The liquidity can influence both firms and investors in several aspects. For firms,
a stock’s liquidity impacts their capital structure and dividend payout policies
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(Frieder and Martell, 2006; Banerjee, Gatchev, and Spindt, 2007; Lipson and Mortal,
2009). It has been also argued that ownership structure and corporate governance are
correlated to stock’s liquidity (Heflin and Shaw, 2000; Lipson and Mortal, 2004;
Lerner and Schoar, 2004; Brockman, Chung, and Yan, 2009; Cheung et al., 2015).
More importantly, liquidity even affects investment opportunities through cost of
capital (Butler, Grullon, and Weston, 2005; Becker-Blease and Paul, 2006). For
investors, the importance of liquidity is evident as liquidity directly influences the
profitability of investments or trading strategies. Liquidity is regarded as a source of
investment risk for investors, which may affect stock returns (Amihud and
Mendelson, 1986b; Pastor and Stambaugh, 2003; Liu, 2006; Bekaert, Harvey, and
Lundblad, 2007; Baradarannia and Peat, 2013) and asset pricing (Amihud and
Mendelson, 1986a). When institutional investors make stocks investment decisions,
they also take a stock’s liquidity into consideration (Chung and Zhang, 2011).
Meanwhile, on an aggregate market level, market liquidity may determine the cost of
raising external capital (Butler, Grullon and Weston, 2005) and affect investors’
confidence in security markets (Chordia et al., 2001). It largely influences the stock
market’s efficiency in financial resources allocation.
Both margin-trading and short-selling could affect stock’s liquidities. Theoretical
models like Miller (1977) and Diamond and Verrecchia (1987) predict that imposing
bans on short-selling could hinder the liquidity of stocks. Many empirical studies
also support the prediction of these theoretical models and find that short-sale bans
during the market crash period could actually decrease the liquidity (e.g. Beber and
Pangano, 2013; Boehmer et al., 2013). Moreover, the work of Kahraman and Tookes




In China, margin-trading and short-selling are relatively new issues upon which
few investigations have been conducted. Amongst these studies, most research have
focused on the impact of such issues on returns and volatilities. For example, using
two-year data of 285 stocks, Chang et al. (2014) find that price efficiency increases
and volatility decreases when stocks are eligible for margin-trading and short-selling.
In addition, short-selling activities are proved to be correlated with price efficiency
enhancement and have the predictive power of future returns. However, they find no
evidence to show that margin trading also has such predictive power. Findings from
Chen et al. (2016) support margin-trading and short-selling’s role to improve price
efficiency. Similar results from Xiong et al. (2017) also suggest that price efficiency
has been increased when stocks became eligible for short-selling. More recently, Li
et al. (2018) utilise Propensity Score Matching (PSM) approach and monthly
short-sale turnover, and find that short-selling improves both price efficiency and
stock’s liquidity.
This thesis will extend previous studies by including more stocks, expanding the
sample period and utilising higher frequency data to further examine the impacts of
margin-trading and short-selling on liquidities in China’s stock market. This thesis is
also different from previous literature like Sharif et al. (2014) and Li et al. (2018)
which investigating the effect of margin-trading and short-selling on stock’s liquidity
in the ways of exploring the effect of margin-trading and short-selling. In their
studies, they either only focus on the impact of lifting bans on margin-trading and
short-selling, or just simply ascribe the liquidity improvement to short-selling while
ignore the effect of margin-trading and reasons behind. Using a larger sample size
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consisting of daily high-frequency data for stocks listed in A-share markets from
March 2010 to December 2016, this study can provide more accurate and
comprehensive understanding of the impact of margin-trading and short-selling on
market liquidity. Although margin-trading and short-selling had been initiated in
China only from 2010 such that this study’s time span may be shorter than
comparative studies on the U.S. market, relevant data to be obtained are still believed
to be sufficient to examine this question: to what extent does each activity
(margin-trading and/or short-selling) influence stocks’ liquidities in the Chinese
market?
Moreover, the sample set already contains all eligible stocks for margin-trading
and short-selling. Indeed, applying data from the Chinese market can help better
understand the effect of margin-trading and short-selling than those using samples
from the U.S. First, the Chinese stock market has very unique institutional settings
and one of which is the gradual ban lifting process. Not all stocks in the Chinese
stock market are eligible for margin-trading and short-selling; only those in a
designated list can be sold short, with this list also changing over time. For example,
in March 31st 2010, only 90 stocks were allowed for margin-trading and short-selling,
while the remaining 2000 stocks were still ineligible stocks. After several years, in
September 22nd 2014, 900 stocks were included in the list that allowed for
margin-trading and short-selling. However, in most developed stock markets like U.S.
and U.K. stock markets, there is no such designated list and almost all stocks can be
margined or shorted freely. Take advantage of this unique market setting in China,
this thesis can better examine the effect of lifting bans on margin-trading and
short-selling. Another advantage of this thesis using the sample from the Chinese
CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION
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stock market is the timing. In the U.S., many studies utilise data after or around the
financial crisis to test the impact of short-selling ban on liquidity. For example, Beber
and Pagano (2013) cover 30 countries around the world, but focus only on the
2007–09 financial crisis period; they find that short-sale bans actually have a
negative impact on liquidity and price efficiency. However, the financial crisis itself
may influence liquidity either directly or indirectly. Liquidity changes may partly
come from financial crisis incidences rather than constraints on short selling. In the
bear market, short-selling trading tends to increase and liquidity typically declines,
which enable people to be more prone to establish causal relationships between them.
In contrast, there was no financial crisis or substantial market crash that had ever
took place in China during the said period when margin-trading and short-selling
were first allowed – although in 2015, a market crash happened that consisted a
relatively small proportion of the sample period. Therefore, this study tends to suffer
a less endogeneity problem. Owing to a longer sample period and a unique market
structure, panel regressions have few confounding impacts from other events or
factors. In addition, China has a more transparent data disclosure system – at least for
margin-trading and short-selling – than the U.S., as all of its data on margin-trading
and short-selling are required to be published on a daily basis. Consequently, my
sample from the Chinese stock market contains more accurate information on
margin-trading and short-selling; thus, the effects of these activities can be better
investigated.
In addition, majority of previous studies from developed markets focus on the
effect of short-selling bans on liquidity. However, in the Chinese stock market,
margin trading dominates; hence, whether it contributes more to liquidity should also
CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION
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be investigated. Furthermore, the impact of margin-trading and short-selling on
liquidity under the market crisis period will also be investigated.
In this thesis, in addition to the impacts on liquidity, I also examine the impacts
of margin trading and short selling on the liquidity comovements between stocks
with leveraged trading and other stocks. Recently, Hu, Liu, and Zhu (2019) utilise
high-frequency data focusing on the market crash period in the Chinese stock market
from June to September 2015 and find that under market crash period, a drop in
prices of leverage-traded stocks, due to the increased the need of deleverage to meet
margin requirements, lead to selling of other stocks in the intraday level. This study
motivates me to investigate intra-day liquidities dynamics and lead-lag relations in
liquidity between eligible and ineligible stocks. In this thesis, I examine lead-lag
effect in intraday liquidities and returns between stocks that allowed for
margin-trading and short-selling and stocks that are not allowed under extremely
good and poor market conditions, using VAR estimation. Likewise, I investigate the
reasons why the margin trading and short selling can contribute to lead-lag effects in
liquidity and return. One reason that I propose could help explain the relation
between leveraged trading and lead-lag effect is called “deleverage”. According to a
theoretical model from Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2009), an investor’s funding
liquidity and stock’s market liquidity relates and reinforces each other. When the
price of a leverage-traded stock drops, an investor has to raise more capital in order
to meet margin requirements. Under poor funding liquidity, he has to sell other
unleveraged stocks in order to raise more capital. This may help explain the lead-lag
effect in intraday liquidity and return between eligible and ineligible stocks. Apart
from this reason, I also propose two more. One is “Information Diffusion Speed”, in
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which market- or industry-wide information are diffused at different speeds; some
stocks like eligible ones have higher speeds, hence their prices react to new
information faster than other stocks, which may cause lead-lag in liquidity and return
(Hou and Moskowitz, 2005; Hou, 2007). The other reason is based on the “cross
asset learning” theory from Cespa and Foucault (2014). Investors may use
leverage-traded stocks as reference stocks whilst learning information about prices
from leverage-traded stocks’ liquidities and volatilities in order to make trading
decisions on other stocks. In this thesis, I employ mediation analysis based on
Preacher and Hayes (2004, 2008) to calculate how much each of the possible reasons
mentioned above has contribute to the lead-lag effects in liquidity and return.
1.3 Main Findings and Contributions
My first empirical chapter of this thesis (i.e. Chapter 5) examines the
determinants of liquidity in the Chinese stock market. I first test several determinants
upon which impact on liquidity have been already proven in various literature (e.g.
Stoll, 2000; Chordia, Roll, and Subrahmanyam, 2001; Chai, Faff, and Gharghori,
2010). The results from panel regression suggest that trading activities like price,
volume, and volatility are still determinants of liquidity in the Chinese stock market.
More importantly, I also consider some unique trading characteristics and regulations
in my analysis. By including the status of option index listing, price limit hitting, and
status of special treated in panel regressions, I confirm that these variables that
represent the unique trading regulations in the Chinese stock market are likewise
determinants of liquidity. The purpose of this chapter is two folds: firstly, I test the
determinants of liquidity found in existing literature and to add in the unique
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determinants from the Chinese markets; secondly, to understand the determinants of
liquidity in China in order to establish the basis regression specifications of liquidity
for empirical analysis in future chapters.
My second empirical chapter (i.e. Chapter 6) investigates the impact of
margin-trading and short-selling on stocks’ liquidity. Taking advantage of unique
market setting in the Chinese stock market that provides an ideal natural expriement
for investigating the impact of leverage trading on stock’s liquidity, I first show that
stocks eligible for those activities tend to have lower effective spread and price
impact, as measured by Amihud’s Illiquid Ratio. The event study further establishes
that after lifting bans on margin-trading and short-selling, liquidity of eligible stocks
has improved. Results from both panel regression and event study are consistent with
findings from previous studies in which lifting bans on margin-trading and
short-selling can improve market quality (e.g. Beber and Pagano, 2013; Chang et al.,
2014; Chen et al., 2016; Li et al., 2018). When focusing only on eligible stocks, I
find that both position and turnover of margin-trading can improve stocks’ liquidity.
On the contrary, both position and turnover of short-selling can hamper liquidity. To
explain the reason for short-selling’s negative impact on liquidity, I assume the
primary cause to be adverse selection. Therefore, I first prove that short-sellers are
informed traders with short-sale position having a predictive power in return, whilst
margin-trading has no such predictive power. Moreover, it is justified that for stocks
with highest information asymmetry levels, their short-selling activities tend to have
the strongest negative impact on liquidity. At last, I focus on the crisis period and
find that stocks eligible for margin-trading and short-selling tend to have lower
liquidity under a market crash period compared to a normal period. In addition, both
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activities’ impact on liquidity also become very different during market crashes.
Different from a normal period in which short-selling hinders liquidity, the said
situation actually improves liquidity when market is under a poor condition whilst
margin-trading decreases liquidity. This finding about the impact of short-selling is
consistent with several theoretical and empirical findings from various literature, in
which short-sale bans during a financial crisis impair market liquidity (e.g. Battalio
and Schultz, 2011; Marsh and Payne, 2012; Beber and Pagano, 2013; Alves, Mendes,
and da Silva, 2016).
Amongst all studies that investigate the impact of margin-trading and
short-selling in the Chinese stock market, Chapter 6’s analysis encompasses the
largest sample size and the longest time span. This does not only focus on the impact
of a stock’s eligibility, but also on both the impact of margin-trading and short-selling.
This also explains the reasons for the impact of short-selling on liquidity. Most
importantly, this study reconciles discrepancies between literature findings and
regulators’ actions under a market crash period. According to literature, short-sale
bans hamper information incorporation into prices, thus hindering price efficiency
and liquidity. As for regulators, short-sale does have negative impact on liquidity. I
prove both standpoints and find that the impacts of short-selling change with market
conditions. For example, the results from panel regressions using a whole sample
period suggest that short-selling has a detrimental impact on liquidity, which is
consistent with regulators’ viewpoints. Meanwhile, short-selling actually improves
the liquidity of eligible stocks under a market crash period, which is consistent with
literature findings. Therefore, I argue that imposing bans on short-sale during a
market crisis cannot contribute to market liquidity improvement; rather, the impact of
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short-sale is not always positive. During a normal period, short-selling hampers
stocks’ liquidity.
My third empirical chapter (i.e. Chapter 7) focuses on the intra-day lead-lag
relationship in liquidity and return between eligible and ineligible stocks. Using a
VAR approach, I find a strong lead-lag in liquidities and in returns between eligible
stocks and ineligible stocks. More specifically, stocks that are eligible for
margin-trading and short-selling lead stocks that are ineligible for margin-trading or
short-selling in both liquidity and return on an intraday level. These lead-lag
relationships in liquidity and return also exist under different market conditions. To
explain lead-lag effects in liquidity and return between eligible and ineligible stocks,
I propose several channels and utilise mediation analysis to analyse said channels
and study the mechanism behind the impacts of leveraged trading on lead-lag effect.
Though I find that leverage trading can impact lead-lag effects directly and indirectly,
only margin-trading contributes to the lead-lag effects in liquidity and return while
short-selling has no significant explanation power. The first channel is a direct effect
on leverage trading, so-called a “deleverage” effect, that accounts for 58.24%
(70.73%) of the total impact of leverage trading on the lead-lag effect in liquidity
(return). When investors are facing stricter funding liquidity (i.e. more difficult to
raise capital), I find the lead-lag effect in liquidity becoming stronger. This result
supports the theoretical model of Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2009) and is
consistent with the findings of Hu, Liu, and Zhu (2019). The second is through
“information diffusion speed” channel, only accounts for a small portion of the total
impact (i.e. 2.28% (0.86%) of total impact of leverage trading on lead-lag in liquidity
(return)), suggesting that lead-lag effect in liquidity and return is not mainly caused
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by speed of information diffusion. The third is through “cross asset learning”
accounts for 39.58% (28.41%) of the total impact of leverage trading on lead-lag in
liquidity (return).
Per my existing knowledge, this study is the first one that has used
high-frequency data to investigate lead-lag effects in liquidity and return over a
relatively long period. Moreover, it is the first to use mediation models to analyse
how different channels helps explain the leverage trading’s impact on lead-lag effects.
This study also shed light on the dynamics of liquidity comovement from an intraday
aspect, thus complementing the existing literature by exploring the reasons behind
lead-lag effects in liquidity and return.
1.4 Thesis Structure
This thesis is organised as follows:
In Chapter 2, literature related to liquidity measurements and determinants, and
impact of margin-trading and short-selling are reviewed. Chapter 3 introduces the
background information of margin-trading and short-selling activities in the Chinese
stock market and their development processes. Chapter 4 describes data and
variables employed in this thesis. Chapter 5 investigates the determinants of liquidity
in the Chinese stock market, including those commonly used in various literature and
those specific in the Chinese stock market. Chapter 6 empirically examines the
impact of margin-trading and short-selling activities on stocks’ liquidity. Using
high-frequency data, Chapter 7 focuses on the lead-lag relations in liquidity and in
returns from an intraday aspect, as well as reasons leading to those lead-lag effects.
Finally, Section 8 provides a summary of the main findings, including some
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limitations and proposed potential directions for future research.
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CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW
2.1 Measurements of Liquidity
There is no simple or unequivocal universal definition of liquidity, however,
researchers agree that liquidity has different dimensions (Bernstein, 1987). For
example, Garbade (1982), Kyle (1985), Holden (1990), and O’Hara (1997), propose
that liquidity has three main dimensions: tightness, resiliency, and depth. Some other
literature presents four different dimensions namely tightness, resilience, depth, and
immediacy (Grossman and Miller, 1988; Harris, 1990). Later, Sarr and Lybek (2002)
summarize that a liquid market has five dimensions: tightness, immediacy, depth,
breadth, and resiliency. The tightness of the market is always measured by the cost
that investors would accept for immediate trading. Resiliency measures the speed to
correct any price stocks or order imbalance. Immediacy is highly related to resiliency
while it is the speed of order execution and it measures the efficiency of transaction.
Market depth is gauged by the volume being traded without a large deviation from
bid price and ask price and is also related to demand pressure (Díaz and Escribano,
2020). Breadth refers to both the numbers of orders are numerous and trading
volumes are large with minimal impact on trading prices. Among these dimensions,
though each of them is different in nature, some of them are interrelated. For
example, resiliency and immediacy are correlated in the way that a more resilient
market can adjust the price to the normal level after a shock at a faster speed.
Moreover, breadth and depth are interrelated as both dimensions depend on the
number of orders traded at equilibrium prices. Therefore, researchers have to propose
different liquidity measures to capture these different dimensions while some
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liquidity measures can be related to one another (e.g. Goyenko et al., 2009).
In most studies, the trading cost would be the most widely used measurement of
liquidity which measures the tightness. The higher trading cost can reduce the return
of investors. Trading cost can be split into two parts: the explicit and implicit. The
former trading costs include broker commissions, transaction taxes, and settlement
fees from the trading places and though these costs sometimes cannot be neglect,
especially in the day-to-day trading, most researchers just focus on the implicit
trading cost, which comes from the illiquidity of the market and measured using bid,
ask and executive prices. In the early time research, spreads were proposed as the
representative for the trading cost (Demsetz, 1968; Tinic, 1972; Benson and
Hagerman, 1974; Stoll, 1978). Based on Demsetz’s (1968) theory of transaction cost,
the stock’s liquidity is obtained from the liquidity demand’s theory and it is the
difference between the immediate bid and ask prices provided from the security
dealer. Stoll (1978) proposed quoted spread and effective spread to measure the
liquidity of a hypothetical transaction and the impact of a transaction on the price in
the stock market. Spreads are one kind of transaction cost-based measurement for
liquidity and have been used by various researchers in future studies. For example, in
the studies of Christie and Schultz (1994), Huang and Stoll (1996), they both used
several spreads calculated from the bid, ask, and trading prices as the liquidity
measure. Among them, one of the most widely used spread measures is quoted
spread.
Quoted Spread is defined as the difference between bid price b and ask price a.
Quoted Spread    ᝝  
In order to compare quoted spreads in a same basis, researchers calculate the relative
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quoted spread by normalized quoted spread with the mid-quote price m, the average
of bid and ask price.






The quoted spread measurement is proved as a good measure of trading cost,
especially for small orders. Fong, Holden, and Trzcinka (2017) proved that the
relative quoted spread at closing is the best monthly and daily percent-cost proxy for
liquidity if it is available. However, when the orders tend to be large orders, the
weighted-average bid-ask spread is believed to be a better measurement by using the
average bid and ask prices.
Another widely used transaction cost that measures the tightness is the effective
spread. It has very similar definition as quoted spread. In a simple way, it is twice the
difference between trading price and mid-quote price. However, the trading direction
also matter when calculating the effective spread as the effective spread for kth trade
is defined mathematically as
Effective Spread   
     ᝝     if kthtrade is a buy
     ᝝      if kthtrade is a sell
where Pk is the trading price for kth trade and Mk is the midpoint price at the time of
the kth trade. Then to make the effective spreads comparable, researchers sometimes
calculate the relative effective spread by taking the logarithm of the prices (e.g. Chai,
Faff and Gharghori, 2010). Researchers also simplify the definition as
Relative Effective Spread        ln      ᝝ ln     
The effective spread is always used as the benchmark of liquidities, especially in
the high-frequency data scenario. In the study of Fong, Holden and Trzcinka (2017),
they use both relative quoted spread and relative effective spread as the liquidity
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benchmark. The volume-weighted average of effect spread is a good way to capture
market liquidity. However, the calculation process would be very complicated and
cost large amount of time.
Another measurement of spread is realized spread and it is calculated from
liquidity supplier’s side. The realized half-spread is defined as the difference between
the transaction price and the mid-price at some time after the transaction. The time
interval should be long enough to ensure that the market price can be adjusted to
reflect the price impact (Huang and Stoll, 1996; Goyenko et al., 2009).
Realized Spread   
     ᝝   ᤼   if kthtrade is a buy
     ᝝    ᤼   if kthtrade is a sell
The spreads measures mentioned above can be calculated at both intraday level
and daily or monthly, even annually level. Early literatures tend to use daily or
monthly quoted spread based on end-of-day or end-of-month bid and ask prices.
Recently, more researchers prefer using high-frequency data and obtain the spreads
at intraday level. Goyenko et al., (2009) compared the monthly and annually spreads
with the intraday high frequency spreads and suggested low frequency liquidity
measures and high frequency measures are correlated. However, regardless the
high-frequency or low-frequency data a researcher is used, the calculation of spreads
requires both bid and ask prices. Sometimes, they are difficult to obtain, especially
the bid and ask price at close are easy to be absent. To address this problem, Roll
(1984) first propose an estimation for transaction cost that based on daily price
changes instead of bid or ask prices. The estimation equals to twice the square root of
covariance between price changes in day t and t-1, which has following specification:
Roll      ᝝          ᝝᤼݋ ܿ
Roll (1984) argues that this measure could be a good estimation of effective spread.
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Based on Roll’s (1984) measure, Lesmond, Ogden and Trzcinka (1999) proposed a
measurement using the maximum likelihood estimator for transaction cost for no
trading price interval and they argue that this new measurement would perform as
good as, or even better than the average effective spread. In their model, Lesmond,
Ogden and Trzcinka (1999) estimate the “true return”    
  based on measured
returns    using the following equation:
   
               
where
         
  ᝝  ᤼  if    
     ᤼ 
        if  ᤼       
       
         
  ᝝     if    
       
and     is the market return while  ᤼  and     are thresholds for trades on
negative and positive information. The difference between the true return and
measured return is the proportional transaction cost.
For larger orders, traders can move up or mover down the price and the price
changes are related to the order sizes and the changes in the price are correlated to
the average execution price, i.e. the weighted average bid-ask spread. A market in
which investors can trade large size of orders without significantly moving the price
is said to be “deep.” Therefore, market depth is inversely related to the weighted
average spread for large trade size.
Apart from the tightness, some researchers focused on the resiliency of liquidity,
or price impact, which measures to what extent the price will change after a certain
transaction. Amihud’s (2002) Illiquidity ratio is a popular measurement of price
impact, which followed the concept of liquidity by Kyle (1985). So for any stock on
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where Rt is the return for the stock on day t and Volt is the volume (in value) on that
day. It was proved to be a good measurement of liquidity by several researchers. For
example, Goyenko et al. (2009) and Hasbrouck (2009) found this illiquidity ratio
perform well in measuring price impact. Marshall et al. (2011) also found it was
highly related to liquidity benchmark. Moreover, in the emerging markets, it was one
proxy that measures liquidity within individual country (Lesmond, 2005). Fong et. Al
(2017) also argue that this is the best daily proxy for liquidity.
However, it is argued that the Illiquidity Ratio may have bias when dealing with
cross-sectional data and be affected by the size of firms. It is natural that the trading
volume tends to increase with the firm size so the Illiquidity Ratio would be affected
if the sample contains firms with different sizes. Moreover, it fails to capture the
trading frequency, which is an important aspect of liquidity. To address these
problems, we use another measure for price impact, referred to price impact ratio,
which is proposed by Florackis, Gregoriou, and Kostakis (2011). It is defined as the




Sometimes, when the quote data are not available, researchers would use trading
activity related data to measure the liquidity. For example, turnover is often used to
measure the average holding period of stocks (Atkins and Dyl, 1997). Amihud and
Mendelson (1986) also suggested that turnover is negatively related to spreads and
positively related to liquidity, implying turnover could be used as measurement of
CHAPTER 2 LITERATURE REVIEW
21
liquidity. Another widely used measurement is trading volume; follow the intuition,
the higher the trading volume, the more liquid the stock would be. However, both
turnover and trading volume would be influenced by outside shocks like new
information. Lesmond et, al. (1999) and Bekaert et, al. (2007) suggested that the
frequency with no trading can be a proxy for illiquidity. For example, Lesmond,
Ogden and Trzcinka (1999) propose two zero return measures, which captures both
the tightness and depth of the liquidity. One measure uses the number of days with
zero return over the total observations and the other is the ratio of the number of days
with positive trading volume and zero return to the total observations. Similarly, Liu
(2006) used turnover-adjusted number of zero daily trading volumes as a measure of
illiquidity and focused on the trading speed. However, these zero-trading proxies are
not good measurement of illiquidity in the Chinese stock market as daily trading
volumes of every stock can never be zero3.
2.2 Determinants of Liquidity
Many researchers using empirical evidences to propose that firm’s trading
characteristics can affect a stocks’ liquidities (e.g. Demsetz, 1968; Tinic, 1972;
Benston and Hagerman, 1974; Branch and Freed, 1977; Stoll, 1978; Stoll, 2000;
Chordia et al., 2000). In the study of Demsetz (1968), he develops a theory of
transaction cost and also first used economic analysis to prove that stock price is a
determinant of bid-ask spread. Later, based on similar approach, Tinic and West
(1972) further show that risk is also a determinant of spread. However, their study
fails to include enough stocks in their sample while their measure for risk using high
3 It seems surprising that the daily trading volume of every stock is always positive (also see Table 9 in Section
5). This phenomenon may be caused by the special investor segment in the Chinese stock market as the Chinese
stock market is dominated by retail investors (explained in Section 3.5).
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minus low over the average price is not a standard measure of risk. Benston and
Hagerman (1974) then expand the sample size and improve the measure of risk and,
they find that stock’s unsystematic risk could affect the spread. In addition, using
number of shareholders as a proxy for the trading scale, they also find it negatively
affect the spread. Amihud, Mendelson and Uno (1999) utilize the special trading
regulations in Japan and find that decrease in minimum trading unit could increase
the number of shareholders, which is a proxy for trading scale, and finally lead to
improvement in liquidity. Branch and Freed (1977) use data from American Stock
Exchange (AMEX), a market that had not been investigated in literature yet and
argue that trading activity like price, volume and volatility are determinants of
spreads. Stoll (1978) then use data from NASDAQ and proves empirically that
bid-ask spread is negative related to price while positively related to stock’s risk,
measured by volatility. Later, studies of Stoll (2000) and Chordia et al. (2000)
extended the early studies by including other liquidity measures, larger sample size,
and longer sample span and both studies find some consistent evidence that trading
activity variables such as stock prices, volatility and trading volume, are correlated to
liquidity. More specifically, Stoll (2000) find that a stock’s relative quoted spread is
negatively related to its volume and price while positively related to the stock's
volatility. On the other hand, the number of trades affected spreads positively in
NYSE/AMSE while it had negative impact on spreads in NASDAQ. Chai, Faff and
Gharghori (2010) use six different monthly low-frequency liquidity measures
including spreads, turnover, Amihud’s Illiquidity ratio and zero return and zero
trading measures in Australia stock market and suggested that trading activity
characteristics are determinants of liquidities. When investigating the driven cause of
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movements in liquidities, Karolyi et, al. (2012) used cross-sectional test and
time-series test and found that consistent with literature, market volatility and trading
activities do impact the liquidities in different countries through 15 years periods.
Apart from trading activity variables, some researchers argued that firm’s
characteristics like market value and ownership structure will affect stock liquidity.
In order to explain the small firm effect, Stoll and Whaley (1983) found that
transaction cost could partly explain why small firms had abnormally high
risk-adjusted returns. It is found that the proportional bid-ask spread for small-sized
firms were larger than that for large-sized firms. Stoll (2000) compares the
NYSE/AMSE to Nasdaq and found that firm size was positively related to the
spreads in NYSE/AMSE while negatively associated to spreads in Nasdaq. Moreover,
the ownership structure is also considered as a determinant of liquidity (Bolton and
Von Thadden, 1998; Kamara et, al., 2008; Koch, et, al., 2009). When the ownership
is concentrated, the shares that available for trading is constrained, thus leaving less
trading activities and decrease in stock’s liquidities. Moreover, higher concentration
in ownership implies greater possibility of informed trading, which lead to decrease
in liquidity. In the work of Heflin and Shaw (2000), by investigating the influence of
block ownership on stock’s market liquidity, they find higher block ownership (both
managers’ and other investors’) would cause lower liquidity. Similarly, other
researchers also find evidences support that higher block ownership would hinder
firm’s stock liquidity (Brockman et al., 2009). Jacoby and Zheng (2010) extend the
work of Heflin and Shaw (2000) by including larger sample from Nasdaq and
introducing new proxy for ownership dispersion. They also find that firm size played
a significant role in the relationship between market quoted depth and changes in
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block shareholding of Nasdaq stocks. Lee and Chung (2018) analyse data from 20
emerging markets and find spreads decrease with foreign ownership. As the
ownership disperses, the stock’s liquidity improves. In contrast, Chu, Liu and Tian
(2015) argue that divergence in ownership has detrimental effect on liquidity when
investigate the Chinese market. Rubin (2007) finds a mixed impact that the level of
institutional investors would improve the liquidity while the concentration of
institutional investors would negatively influence the liquidity. Jiang, Kim and Zhou
(2011) find that higher institutional ownership leads to lower spreads and price
impacts, implying a higher liquidity.
Besides, the firm’s corporate governance is proved to influence the stock’s
liquidity. Chung, Elder and Kim (2010) suggest that better corporate governance
contributes to lower transaction cost and smaller price impacts, thus leading to
improved market liquidity. Ali, Liu and Su (2017) find consistent evidence that firms
with better corporate governance, which is measured using corporate governance
quality, have lower trading cost and price impacts. When a firm has better corporate
governance, the possibility of informed trading and effect of adverse selection are
likely to be lower, thus lead to a higher liquidity.
From the market aspect, the trading venues and different trading mechanism are
proved to affect liquidities. In early studies, researcher Benston and Hagerman
(1974), Branch and Freed (1977), and Grossman and Miller (1988) propose an
equilibrium model and argue that number of market makers and their immediacy to
adjust to equate the supply and demand would directly influent the market liquidity.
Atkin and Dyl (1997) even compare the trading volume between NASDAQ and
NYSE, the former on is a dealer market and the latter is an auction market. They find
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a decrease in trading volume when stocks switch the trading venue from NASDAQ
to NYSE. The studies mentioned all focus on the U.S. market (NYSE, AMEX and
Nasdaq), which are quoted-driven market. Different from the U.S. market, stock
markets in China and Australia are order-driven markets with no market markers. As
Chai, Faff and Gharghori (2010) suggested, since there is no market maker and it is
in fact public limit orders provide liquidity and establish the bid and ask prices, the
market characteristics provide more transparent trading environment to market
participants. Brown and Zhang (1997) compare a dealer market with a limit-order
market and argue that information efficiency will be improved in order market.
Malinova and Park (2013) compared order-driven market and quote-driven market
and suggest that order-driven market has higher trading volume, which attracts more
investors. Trading status like trading halts could have impact on liquidity.
2.3 Impacts of Margin-trading
Margin-trading is one type of leverage trading that investors borrow money from
security companies to buy stocks. The margin rate, or sometimes called margin level,
will definitely influence stock’s price, liquidity, and volatility. If a stock’s margin
level sets at m%, an investor can borrow up to (100 – m) % from security companies
when purchasing stock, with the purchased stock serving as collateral for the loan
(Alexander et al., 2004). Most earlier literature just focuses on the impact of margin
level. Largay III (1973) focuses on the special 100% margin requirement in U.S.
during 1968-69 and investigates the impact of high margin restrictions on stocks’
prices and trading volumes. He finds the prices and trading volumes of stocks under
high margin restrictions decrease after the restrictions were posed. Hardouvelis (1990)
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examines the effect of raising margin requirements in the U.S. market from 1934 to
1987 and find that raising margin requirements can contribute to lower volatility in
prices and smaller deviations from fundamental values. He argues that margin
requirements can be regarded as effective policy tools to help stabilize the market
and depress speculations. Hardouvelis and Peristiani (1992) investigate the effect of
margin requirements in Japan and find that an increase in margin requirement can
lead to a decrease in trading volume and a drop in trading activities from
margin-buyers. Consistent with Hardouvelis (1990), they also believe that margin
requirement can be an effective way to stabilize the market. Hardouvelis and
Theodossious (2002) find asymmetry effects of margin requirement under different
market condition. An increase in margin requirement is associated with lower
volatility during bull and normal markets, but no such relation is found in bear
market. In contrast, Seguin (1990) find that margin-trading does not harm the market
as some regulators assumed, instead, introduction of margin-trading improves the
market depth and lowers the volatility but increase the trading volume. Using data
from 1993 to 1998 in the U.S. market and control market-wide factors that are not
included in the study of Hardouvelis and Theodossious (2002), Alexander et al.
(2004) also find an increase in trading volume after stocks were eligible for
margin-trading. However, they fail to find any improvements in spreads or market
depth when stocks become eligible for margin-trading. Using data from the Chinese
stock market, researchers find improvements in price efficiency and decrease in
volatility after lifting bans on margin-trading (Chang et al., 2014; Chen et al., 2016).
More recently, Kahraman and Tookes (2017) find that an improvement liquidity after
a stock becomes eligible for margin-trading in the Indian stock market. They also
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prove that the positive effect of margin-trading on liquidity is caused by margin
traders’ contrarian strategies.
Apart from the impact of margin requirement and eligibility, margin-trading will
impact the stock’s liquidity through deleveraging. According to the model of
Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2009), it predicts that margin-trading can be
destabilizing as it can increase the illiquidity of stocks after a drop in stocks’ prices.
The stock’s market liquidity and investor’s funding liquidity are mutually reinforcing,
leading to “liquidity spirals” in a market crash period. More specifically, when an
investor margin purchases a stock, a decrease in the stock’s price will cause a
decrease in collateral’s value, and lead to a margin call, which decreases the
investor’s funding liquidity. If the investor is facing a funding constrain and fails to
meet the margin requirement, then he has to force liquidate the margin purchased
stock, which will decrease the price and liquidity of the stock. Therefore,
margin-trading activity can impact the stock’s liquidity and investors’ funding
liquidity. Kahraman and Tookes (2017) prove this theory as they find
margin-trading’s impact on liquidity become negative during the market crash
period.
In addition, some researchers argue that margin-traders are informed traders
while others hold the opposite opinion. For example, Alexander et al. (2004) find
margin level is positively related to adverse selection components of the spread,
which suggests that margin-traders are more likely to be informed traders. Hirose,
Kato and Bremer (2009) find similar results using weekly margin-trading data in
Japan. Their findings suggest that margin-traders have herding behaviors while
margin-trading could predict future returns in the Japanese stock market. In contrast,
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Chang et al. (2014) fail to find any return predictive power in margin-trading,
implying that margin-traders are probably not informed traders.
2.4 Impacts of Short-selling
2.4.1 Impact on Price and Return
Short-sales have different purposes. In the common view, investors, especially
the speculators, use short-sales to make profit by shorting stocks at higher prices then
return them at lower prices. Therefore, public believe that short-sellers may
deliberately drag down stock prices by selling at aggressively low prices or even
spreading rumors about the firm or the whole market to decrease share values.
Goldstein and Guembel (2008) even prove that in theory, short-sellers can
manipulate price using “bear raid” strategy. It is these trading that attract public’s
attention to blame market crash on short-sellers. However, short-sales can serve for
other functions. For example, for brokers and dealers, short-selling is an approach to
fulfill the market-making function while for institutional investors, it is an essential
hedging strategy. Short-sellers can enhance the market’s integration by disclosing
information about over-valued stocks and correct the stock prices to the fundamental
value (Akabas et al., 2008; Boehme et al., 2006; Boehmer et al., 2008).
As a trading mechanism to fulfill the integration of market, short-sale is argued
to have influence on stock prices. Lintner (1971) argues that according to CAPM
with homogenous invertors beliefs, short-selling should only have hedging purpose,
so short sale constraints would have no impact on price. Diamond and Verrecchia
(1987) argue that if investors have rational expectation, then short-sale constraints
will not influence the stock price to deviate from its fundamental. However, if
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investors are less than fully rational and are heterogeneity, short-sale constraint does
affect the price (Harrison and Kreps, 1978; Duffie, 1996; Duffie et al., 2002). In
contrast to the opinion that short-sale constraints will not influence the stock’s price,
according to Miller’s (1977) seminal model, short-sale constraints would lead to
stock overpricing, since the pessimistic investors who do not originally own the stock
are sidelined from trading. Jarrow (1980) compares two identical markets that the
only difference is short sale constraints. Using the single period mean-variance
model, he predicts that under heterogeneous expectations, price can be either upward
or downward, depend on parameter of economy. However, if investors have
homogenous expectations of the covariance matrix of future prices, short sale
constraints will increase risky asset’s prices, which is consistent with Miller’s (1977)
prediction. Shleifer and Vishny’s (1997) model predicts that stocks will become
overpriced caused by market imperfections and limits to arbitrage if short-sale is
restricted. Also, Chen et al. (2002) suggest that short-sale constraints tend to inflate
prices. Liu and Wang (2013) find that bid price with short-sale constraints is lower
and ask price is higher than that without short-sale constraints using an equilibrium
model.
Though theoretical models have divergences in the impact of short-sale bans on
the stock’s prices, the empirical evidence prone to support that short-sellers are more
well-informed and trade to prevent prices from being overvalued so bans on
short-selling will inflate the stocks’ prices (Chen et al., 2002; Chang et al., 2007;
Lamont, 2012). For example, Chang et al. (2007) take advantage of short-selling
pilot trail in Hong Kong where only specific stocks are designated to lift the bans on
short-selling to investigate the price change after lifting bans. They find both price
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effects and negative event returns on stocks eligible for short-selling after bans were
lifted. The overvaluation in the eligible stocks’ prices is caused by short-sale
constraints, which is consistent with Miller’s (1977) overpricing prediction. Sharif,
Anderson and Marshall (2014) also find similar result which support Miller’s (1977)
model as they find that differences between prices of stocks that eligible and
ineligible for short-selling become smaller after bans on short-selling were removed.
Short-sales can influence the prices when it is costly to short, in that case, stocks
can also get overvalued. By reviewing short-selling bans during the 1930s crisis,
Jones (2012) finds that policies from regulators made shorting to be more difficult.
During 1920s and 1930s, stocks that were expensive to short had higher prices and
abnormally low returns in the future (Jones and Lamont, 2002). Duffie, Galeanu and
Pedersen (2002) construct a model and consider the impact of lending fees as high
lending fee will bid up stock prices. Lamont and Thaler (2003) find that even though
bubbles in the technology sector exist and stocks related are so overpriced that
arbitrage should have been possible, the high cost on shot-sales made short positions
difficult to establish. Therefore, the stocks’ prices remain at overpriced level and
cannot be adjusted to fundamental values. However, Diether et al. (2009) fail to find
supporting evidence that bans on short-sales influence stock prices. There is no
change in share prices when Regulation SHO’s pilot program restricted short-selling.
According to Miller’s (1977) model, short sale constraints prevent opinion of
pessimists, which cause the overvaluation of stock prices and will lead to low future
returns. To test Miller (1977), researchers focus on relationship between difference of
investors options and stock return. Consistent with Miller (1977), Diether, Malloy
and Scherbina (2002) use dispersion of analyst’s earnings forecasts to measure
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degree of divergence in opinions. They find that higher the divergence, lower future
return. Similarly, Boehme, Danielsen and Sorescu (2006) find that high dispersion
and short-sale constraints are both required to induce overvaluation. Furthermore,
Boehmer et al. (2008) find that short sellers can gain higher excess returns. Diether et
al. (2009) discover that short-selling trading volume increase more following price
increases and positive returns. They find out that short sellers can positively predict
future returns over a five-day horizon, suggesting short sellers may have access to
some insider information, especially negative one. Supporting this explanation,
Karpoff and Lou (2010) find that short-selling activity increased before a financial
misconduct while Desai et al. (2002) and Asquith et al. (2005) find that short interest
and future returns are negatively correlated. Short sales have predictive power on
future returns, implying short sellers are informed traders. Finding from Desai et al.
(2006) that short sellers can anticipate earnings restatements before they are
announced publicly further support the hypothesis that short-sellers are likely to be
informed traders. Christophe et al. (2004) also find abnormal higher short selling
before negative earnings surprises and Boehmer et al. (2015) find similar heavy
increase in shorting during the week before analyst downgrade recommendation or
negative forecast revisions. Chang et al. (2014) investigate the pilot scheme in
Chinese stock market that certain stocks on a list are eligible for short-selling. They
find consistent evidence that short-selling activity can predict future returns.
Another explanation for the prediction power in future returns by short-sellers is
that short-sellers tend to be sophisticated investors so they can identify overpriced
stocks better than other investors (Diether et al., 2009). For example, Boehmer et al.
(2008) conclude that 74% of short-selling orders are executed by institutional
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investors and very few are executed by individual investors. Short-sellers sometimes
use certain indicators to capture overvalued stocks that they target firms with high
P/E ratio and M/B ratio (Dechow et al., 2001).
2.4.2 Impact on Price Adjustment and Price Efficiency
Diamond and Verrecchia (1987) predict that with short-sale constraints, price
will adjust more slowly to negative information because short-sale constraints
prevent informed investors to trade on negative news. Emprically, Bris et al. (2007)
find supporting evidence from an international comparison using different market
efficiency measures. They conclude that downward price moves are slower in
markets where shorting is prohibited while in countries where short sellings are
allowed, price incorporate with negative information more efficiently. Using data
from 26 countries, Saffi and Sigurdsson (2011) find lower efficiency for stocks in
countries with more stringent short-sale constraints. Beber and Pagano (2013) use
data on different short-sale bans from international stock market during the 2007-09
financial crisis and also find short-sale bans hampered price discovery.
Researchers also argued about the impact of short-sale constraints on the
stability of the market. For regulators, they believe that bans on shorting can stabilize
the market in the financial crisis time (Jones, 2012). Xu (2007) develops an investors’
perspective model and also predicts increasing skewness under short-sale constraint,
supporting the idea that short-sale constraints lead to more stable market. Empirically,
Bris et al (2007) find in countries where short-selling is not allowed, stock returns are
less negatively skewed. When short-sale bans are lifted in Hong Kong, volatility
increases and the possibility that extremely negative returns occur also increases
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(Chang et al., 2007).
However, other researchers have opposite views toward the impact of short-sale
bans. Diamond and Verrecchia’s (1987) model predicts more negatively skewed
returns under short-sale constraint since prices are adjusted slower to negative
information. Hong and Stein (2003) construct a model, suggesting that investors with
negative information are prevented from trading until the market drops when
accumulated negative information comes out, which destabilized the market and
exacerbate the crash. Boehmer et al. (2013) find that the short-sale ban in US, which
was intended to stabilize the turbulent stock market, fails to increase the prices and
the ban has other side-effects of reducing liquidity, slowing down price discovery
and impending market-making for options. When constraints are removed or relaxed,
there are no increases in volatility and occurrences of negative returns (Saffi and
Sigurdsson, 2011).
2.4.3 Impact on Liquidity
The impacts of short-selling constrains on liquidity are mixed. Based on
Glosten-Milgrom (1985) model, Diamond and Verrecchia (1987) conclude that short
sell constrains can reduce the price discovery speed because of preventing informed
investors to trade on negative news. This would further increase the bid-ask spread.
However, this model is based on a homogeneous assumption that the constraints
influence investors equally, whether informed or not (the market makers are risk
neutral and make zero expected profit for each trade). If investors are not influenced
at the same level, the impact of short-sale constraints on liquidity would be unclear.
Liu and Wang (2013) develop an equilibrium model and propose that short-sale
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constraints will increase the spread and decrease market depth, thus hinder the
liquidity. Empirical studies tend to support Liu and Wang’s (2013) prediction.
Boehmer et al. (2013) find that bans on short-sale in US reduce liquidity and Beber
and Pagano (2013) also find short-sale constraints imposed during 2007-09 financial
crisis around the world increase the bid-ask spread thus lower the liquidity.
Charoenrook and Daouk (2009) compare the data from 111 countries and argue that
stocks that eligible for short-selling tend to have higher liquidity. Thus, banning
short-sale cannot contribute to stabilize the market. Alves, Mendes and da Silva
(2016) find consistent evidence in European markets that short-sale bans have
detrimental impact on liquidity. The similar result stands in Australian market as
Helmes et al. (2017) find that short-sale constraints will increase the bid-ask spread
when examining the impact of short-sale bans in Australian stock market during the
financial crisis period. Li et al. (2018) contend that short-selling activities could
contribute to improvements in liquidity in the Chinese stock market, as they provide
additional liquidity to the market. On the contrary, Sharif et al. (2014) also focus on
the Chinese market and argue that short-selling decrease the liquidity as stocks that
eligible for short-selling tend to have higher spreads. Their finding is consistent with
Ausubel’s (1990) theory that uninformed traders just avoid the short-selling eligible
stocks to avoid trading with informed investors. In addition, study of Cai et al. (2013)
also support Ausubel’s (1990) theory as the empirical results suggest that stocks that
are eligible for short-selling have lower liquidities. They argue that this detrimental
effect of short-selling is caused by adverse selection. Short-sellers, as informed
traders, just deter uninformed traders from trading the short-eligible stocks. Instead,
uninformed traders switch their trading to other short-ineligible stocks, thus lead to
CHAPTER 2 LITERATURE REVIEW
35
the decrease in liquidities of eligible stocks.
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CHAPTER 3: INSTITUTIONAL SETTING
3.1 Margin-trading and short-selling development in China
At the end of June 2006, the China Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC)
released "Measures for the Administration of Margin Financing and Securities
Lending Services of Securities Firms on Trial Basis" which began the process of
preparing the relevant parties (e.g., securities firms, stock exchanges, and investors)
in the Chinese stock market for margin-trading and short-selling. The chairman of
the CSRC Fulin Shang believed that the introduction of margin-trading and
short-selling could encourage the innovation of the stock market while stimulate the
trading activities.4 During the period between June 2006 and March 2010, when
margining trading restrictions were lifted on a trial basis, the CSRC and stock
exchanges released several relevant legislation and detailed rules (see Table 1).
According to a CSRC officer, the trial program would not begin until the CSRC
believes that China's legislative framework has been refined for margin trading
activities and when the global capital markets have recovered from the 2008
financial crisis. After 21 months from December 2011, the CSRC announced the trial
program's successful completion and officially lifted the margin-trading restrictions.
3.2 Qualification of Stocks and Investors for Leveraged Trading
The dates of lifting bans on margin-trading and short-selling are collected
manually on the websites of CSRE, SSE, and SZSE (see Table 2). The first date that
bans were lifted is 31st March, 90 stocks with large market capitalization and high
4 http://www.csrc.gov.cn/pub/newsite/hdjl/zxft/lsonlyft/200710/t20071021_95204.html
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Table 1. Policy History of Margin-trading and Short-selling Trial
liquidity from Shanghai Stock Exchange (SSE) and ShenZhen Stock Exchange
(SZSE) were selected as the pilot stocks for margin trading activities. In December
2011, when the margin trading constraints were officially lifted, the number of stocks
eligible for
margin trading increased to 278. Since then, the list was expanded several times.
With the development of margin-trading and short-selling, more stocks are included
in the list that allowed for margin-trading and short-selling. The last inception date is
21st October, 2019 and 43.6% (1600/3671) of stocks are eligible for margin-trading
5 http://www.csrc.gov.cn/pub/newsite/zjhxwfb/xwdd/200810/t20081005_68632.html
Date Legislations, rules, and events Releasing bodies
30th June
2006
Measures for the Administration of Margin Financing





Detailed Rules for the Implementation of Margin
Financing and Securities Lending Transactions SZSE and SSE
29th August
2006
Rules for the Implementation of Registration and
Clearing Services for Pilot Margin Financing and
Securities Lending Services for China Securities







The essential clauses of the contract for margin financing
and securities lending & The essential clauses of the risk





Measures for the Risk Control Indexes of Securities
Companies
Notice of problems emerged from further regulating
security companies' divisions (Draft)
Provisions on the Regulation of Branches of Securities




Regulation on the Supervision and Administration of
Securities Companies
Regulation on risk management of security companies
State Council
5th October




Announcement No. 42 [2008] of China Securities
Regulatory Commission: Interim Provisions on the









Announced pilot project of margin trading and short
selling officially started SZSE and SSE
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1st 2010.3.31 90 - 90
2nd 2011.12.5 191 3 278
3rd 2013.1.31 276 54 500
4th 2013.9.16 206 6 700
5th 2014.9.22 218 18 900
6th 2016.12.12 77 27 950
7th 2019.10.21 711 61 1600
This table shows the major changes in the list of stocks that are eligible for margin-trading and short-selling. Only
90 stocks were eligible for margin-trading and short-selling at first.
and short-selling at that time.
Table 2 displays the number of that are eligible for margin trading since March
2010. In fact, eligible stocks that listed in SSE are component stocks for Shanghai
Stock Exchange Index (SSE Index). For example, the first 50 stocks that allowed for
margin-trading and short-selling are the components of SSE Index 50, while in 2011,
all the eligible stocks come from SSE Index 180. From 2013, the CSRC specifically
announced the requirements for the stocks that are eligible for margin-trading and
short-selling should be those that qualified the following criteria:
1. Stocks have to be listed and traded in the Stock Exchange for at least three
months;
2. Stocks that eligible for margin-trading should have at least 1,000 million
number of shares outstanding or with the least market capitalization of 5,000 million;
3. Stocks that allowed for short-selling should meet the minimum requirement
6 Notice:
(1) Stocks are eligible for both margin trading and short selling simultaneously;
(2) Some stocks became disqualified during time (e.g. market value lower than the requirement), then the stock
exchange would remove the stock from the eligible list and publish announcement of removal on the stock
exchange website;
(3) This thesis only focus on the first six events, the last ban-lifting event occurred in 2019 is not included in the
sample period.
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for 2,000 million number of shares or 8,000 million RMB of market value;
4. Number of shareholders should over 4,000;
5. The following situations did not happen over the past three months: i) the
stock's daily turnover is less than 15% of the index benchmark turnover with a
trading volume of less than 50 million RMB; ii) the stock's daily return deviates from
the index benchmark return for more than 4%; iii) the stock's volatility is five more
times than the index benchmark volatility;
6. Firms that issue the stocks should have finished the Full Circulation Reform
for Listed Companies;
7. Stocks are not among the special treated (ST) group.
Following these requirements, only stocks that are relatively large and involatile
can be included as those eligible for margin-trading and short-selling, implying the
government's attempt to avoid any potential sharp volatility or manipulation of prices
on smaller and unstable stocks. In March 2015, the CSRC announced that to boost
the short-selling trading activity in the Chinese stock market, more stocks, estimated
at least 500, will be included in the list that allowed for short-selling. However, only
a few months later, this plan for boosting short-selling aborted when the Chinese
stock market faced the most massive market crash in July 2015. Both the regulators
and investors believe that short-selling could aggravate the market crash.
Based on the principle of prudence, the CSRC had required that only investors
with sufficient experience in security investment and risk-bearing capability could
invest in stocks with margins. The securities firms (i.e., brokers) will have to select
their margin trading clients based on this principle. The more explicit criteria for the
qualified investors are not specified in the released file but through moral suasion.
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The guidance opinion is that to open the margin trading account with a broker, an
individual investor has to have financial assets worthy of at least 500,000 RMB and
had opened his/her regular trading account with the broker for at least 18
months.7This guidance opinion put a high threshold where only experienced
investors with sufficient financial assets can be involved in margin-trading and
short-selling activities.
In its revised version of the document8, the CSRC specifies that margin trading
should not be made available to the investors who lack the risk-bearing capability,
who have material fraud records, or who have opened the regular trading accounts
with their brokers for less than six months. In April 2013, the CSRC announced that
the brokering firms could decide the thresholds for new margin trading accounts
based on the suitability doctrine.9 In order to compete for the margin trading
business, soon after this announcement, many security companies lowered the
financial threshold for eligible investors significantly. For example, GuoTaiJunAn
(GTJA), a reputed broker in China, only required its customers to have more than
100,000RMB of financial assets to qualify for the margin trading account. The
loosened criteria for margin trading accounts have caused the number of margin
trading accounts opened in various brokers to increase exponentially since then.
Accordingly, standards of eligible investors continued to decline. By the end of
2014, all of the brokers have only required investors with six months of account
activity to open the margin trading account, and the financial threshold was
becoming lower. One extreme case was HuaTai Security Company even reduced the
7 http://stock.hexun.com/2010-01-23/122462185.html
8 i.e.,Measures for the Administration of Margin Financing and Securities Lending Services of Securities Firms
on Trial Basis
9 http://finance.sina.com.cn/stock/quanshang/qsyj/20130426/162715294894.shtml
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capital requirement to zero. These inappropriate behaviors of some of the brokers
have finally alerted the CSRC. At the beginning of 2015, the CSRC rectified this
situation by stressing the congruence in both time and capital requirements for
investor eligibility. Consequently, the proposed guidance opinion has pulled the
financial threshold for the margin-trading account back to 500,000RMB.10
3.3 Margin Requirements and Collateral Discounts
Although individual security companies have autonomously imposed
heterogeneous margin requirements on various stocks, they need to comply with
requirements settled by Stock Exchanges11. According to such regulations, the
margin rate, defined as the proportion of margin value to the total value of margin
financing/short selling, should be at least 50%. Both cash and securities can be used
as collaterals, and there was no compulsory requirement on the proportion of cash as
margin. However, as securities' values fluctuate over time under diverse risk levels of
securities, the discount rates for these securities also varied (illustrated in the
following section). The requirements also settled the least margin maintenance ratio
at 130%. Unlike the margin ratio, this margin maintenance ratio is the ratio of asset
(both self-owned and borrowed from the broker) value in the account to the
borrowed asset's value. Mathematically, it is
margin maintenance ratio
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10 http://stock.hexun.com/2015-01-20/172567513.html
11 According to Shanghai/Shenzhen Stock Exchange on Issuing Detailed Rules for the Implementation of Margin
Trading and short selling
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If the account's margin maintenance ratio is below this lowest requirement 130%,
investors will receive a margin call, a request for additional margin. The margin
balance will be re-calculated on a daily basis; if one investor fails to fulfill the
required margin (i.e., keep margin maintenance ratio higher than 150%) within two
days after the margin call, the broker can force close the positions. However, this
margin maintenance requirement is canceled in July 2015, right after the market
crash to relieve investors' severe potential loss if positions are forced closed. Brokers
could set the margin maintenance ratio by themselves instead of strictly following
the 130% requirement. As a result, they tend to lower the ratio and prone to not force
close the positions of investors.12
Margin can either be cash or securities. However, if securities are used as
collaterals, their values should be discounted since their market values could
fluctuate. Therefore, the discount rates are related to the risk levels of securities. As
clearly stated by ShangHai Stock Exchange (SSE) and ShenZhen Stock Exchange
(SZSE), different types of securities have their highest discount rates, and the
guideline discount rates are showed in Table 3.
Different security companies sometimes claimed independent discount rates for
the same security, and the discount rate also varied with time according to the risk of
securities. Later in 2016, the CSRC modified the discount rates requirements.
According to the updated requirement, the discount rate should be zero for stocks
with static Price/Earnings (PE) Ratios higher than 300 or negative since these stocks
are considered as high risk level stocks.
12 http://www.csrc.gov.cn/pub/newsite/zjhxwfb/xwdd/201507/t20150701_280174.html
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Table 3. Discount Rates Requirements from SSE and SZSE
Security Type SSE SZSE
Warrant 0 0
Corporate Bond 0.8 0.8
Government Bond 0.95 0.95
Listed Funds 0.8 0.8
ETF 0.9 0.9
Special Treated A Shares 0 0
Shares not included in SH Index180/SZ Index100 0.65 0.65
Component shares in SH Index180/SZ Index100 0.7 0.7
3.4 Margin Interest Fee
Both margin-trading and short-selling have their loan interest rates, determined
by individual security companies. In 2010 when the given practice started in China,
six security companies, the first bunch of authorized service suppliers, regulated their
loan interest fees. They based interest rates on the benchmark interest rate for
half-year loan published by the People's Bank of China (PBoC) and rose by 3 percent,
for both margin-trading and short-selling. For example, the half-year loan on 31st
April 2010 was 4.86%, the interest rate for margin financing and securities lending
was 7.86%. Later in November, these security companies increased interest rates to
8.10% as the PBoC rose the benchmark interest rate. As more security companies
participated in the market, the offered interest rates became diversified yet still
closely related to the benchmark interest rate. Some security companies just had the
same rate for both margin financing and securities lending. For example, the loan
fees for margin trading and short selling were both 8.35% in April 2015 for
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GuoTaiJunAn, ZhongXin, HaiTong; However, for BoHai, it was 8.35% for margin
trading and 10.35% for short selling13.
Both margin-trading and short-selling behaviour are not complete and mature in
China. According to Measures for the Administration of Pilot Securities Lending and
Borrowing Business of Securities Companies, security companies can only loan their
own capital and stocks to investors. Despite reduced risks, such a regulation
generated some drawbacks. First, limiting the resources to what security companies
have may refrain the development of margin-trading and short-selling since
sometimes investors cannot borrow enough capital or stocks as they expected. In
addition, security companies may prefer to maximize profit through their existing
resources rather than lend them to customers for interest since the profit may
probably overweight interest when investment opportunities emerge.
In April 2008, in Regulation on the Supervision and Administration of Securities
Companies approved by the State Council, refinancing was first proposed to solve
these problems. Later in October 2011, CSRC published Pilot Measures for
Supervision and Administration of Refinancing Business in which refinancing
business was officially allowed. According to these regulations, refinancing is a
mechanism where security companies that are short of capital or stocks are allowed
to acquire resources from professional financial institutions such as bank, fund,
insurance company or special security finance companies. In many foreign markets
like U.S., refinancing is commonly used and is open to the market. Security
companies can freely choose banks or funds to raise capital and stocks. However, in
China, security companies can only refinance via one channel: the special security
finance company founded by the government. China Security Finance (CSF)
13 GuoTaiJunAn, ZhongXin, HaiTong and BoHai are main security companies in China.
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Corporation is the only institution that provides margin financing loan services to
qualified security companies in China.
In August 2012, refinancing for margin trading was officially approved and later
in February 2012, refinancing for short selling was allowed. The introduction of
refinancing improved China's stock transactions system and enhances the
completeness the market's functions.
3.5 Investors Segments and Specific Trading Rules
The investors that dominate the stock markets in China are mainly the
individual investors while institutional investors dominate the stock markets in many
developed countries like U.S. and UK (Lee et al., 2010). According to the 2018
Annual Statistics from the Shanghai Stock Exchange (SSE), over 99% of investors in
the market are retail investors (or called individual investors) and their trading
activities account for 82.01% of the total market trading activities. In contrast, the
institutional investors only accounts for less than 20% of the total market trading
activities, which seems to be abnormal in the U.S. or U.K. stock markets. Because of
the high participation of retail investors, trading in the Chinese stock market are
highly active that the trading volume for every stock could never be zero unless the
case of trading halt. More interestingly, though the individual investors dominate the
stock market, their profit abilities are relatively low comparing to institutional
investors. This investors segmentation could partly explain the reason why
margin-trading dominates the market. Individual investors are not as sophisticated as
the institutional investors; thus they are not familiar with short-selling as institutional
investors. They could rather follow the traditional trading pattern which buys at a
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lower price and sells at a higher price to obtain profit.
As a relatively new stock market which established three decades ago, the
Chinese stock market has several specific trading rules that designed to protect
investors. One special trading regulation is called “T+1”. According to this rule,
investors in the stock market cannot trade the stocks on the same day of transaction.
However, investors could trade immediately in the option markets since there is no
such regulation in financial derivative markets in China. Moreover, when investors
use leverage trading, they could also margin buy or short sell on the same day of
transaction.14Another special trading regulation is "Price Limit". According to the
trading regulation of the Chinese stock market, a stock's price can only move by 10%,
either up or down, compared to its closing price from last trading day. The regulator
believes that this limit in price movement could partly protect investors and stabilize
the market from volatile price movements. The third special feature is the trading
status. The stock exchange would determine whether a stock is subject to "Special
Treatment" according to the underlying firm's accounting performance. Sometimes,
when a company faces some problems (e.g. high probability of bankrupt, high
leverage, continuous deficits) that would lead the stock exchanges to believe there is
high probability of bankruptcy, its stock would have a trading status as special
trading (ST) status. These special trading (ST) stocks would have many restrictions
in trading like only 5% price limits. Therefore, ST stocks are believed to be of highly
risk. This trading status is actually a warning sign given to the investors. Any ST
stocks are not eligible for margin-trading nor short-selling.
14 During the market crash period (July 2015), margin-trading and short-selling still need to follow this “T+1”
trading rule.
CHAPTER 3 INSTITUTIONAL SETTING IN CHINA
47
3.6 Policy Changes after the Market Crash
Since both margin-trading and short-selling businesses are relatively new in the
Chinese stock market, the regulators impose several specific restrictions on these
activities. First, naked short-sale is prohibited in China that investors cannot short
stocks unless they do borrow shares from the brokers. In addition, both
margin-borrowing and short-selling have a duration of 180 days (or 6 months).
According to the Measures for the Administration of the Margin Trading and Short
Selling Business of Securities Companies, investors need to finish the position before
the period of 180 days and any trading that exceed the time limit would be penalized
or even forced the position. For stocks that eligible for margin-trading and
short-selling, the stock exchanges can suspend the trading behavior when the amount
of shares that be margin-financed or short-sold is larger than 25% of its total market
capitalization until that drops to 20%.
The market crash happened during the middle of June 2015. On June 15th, the
Shanghai Composite Index dropped by 2% and the next day the market index
continued decreasing by 3.47%. The most severe crash took place on date June 19th
and June 26th, as the market index dropped by 6.42% and 7.4% respectively. On June
26th, more than two thousand stocks prices decreased by 10% and reached the price
limits. To stabilize the market and encourage the investors' confidence, regulators
imposed several policies while some are related to the margin-trading and
short-selling activities.
On June 29th, the first trading day after the major market crash, the CSRC
announced that there still be enough developing potential for margin-trading and also
encourage brokers to expand the margin-trading activities. On the same day, the CSF
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corporation also responded to the public that very few forced liquidations took place
in the market and investors should not be panic about either margin-trading or
short-selling activities. On July 1st, the CSRC announced that channels for
margin-financing would be broadened in the future as all security companies could
use trading systems between security exchange and institutions to gain the capital for
margin-trading. The CSRC also modified the Measures for the Administration of the
Margin Trading and Short Selling Business of Securities Companies to allow
extending the duration of margin-borrowing and short-selling from 180 days
(half-year) to more days. Moreover, the margin-maintenance-ratio can be lower than
130% while security companies can determine the collateral and the relevant
discount rates. In summary, these changes in policies aim to relax the regulation on
margin-trading and short-selling activities and finally, reduce the possibility of forced
liquidation. Later in the middle of July, SSE and SZSE advised security companies to
cease the short-selling activity in order to stabilize the market. On August 3rd, the
CSRC modified the Measure for Margin Trading and Short Selling again and
prohibited the intra-day trading (generally written as T+0). Instead, investors for
margin-trading and short-selling should wait one trading day to exercise the stocks
borrowed/margined (usually called T+1). Right after this constraint on intra-day
trading, the volume for short-selling dropped significantly.
3.6 Margin-trading and Short-selling Statistics
Shown in Table 4 and Table 5, the number of investors engaged in
margin-trading and short-selling surged after 2010, together with the increase in the
trading volume. It seems that margin-trading and short-selling have been popular in
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China and they have developed rapidly. However, compared with the whole market,
margin-trading and short-selling only accounted for a part of trading. First, the stocks
that allowed for margin-trading and short-selling account only part of the stocks in
the whole market. At the end of 2016, totally 2831 stocks listed in the A-share market,
only 33.56% (950/2831) of them are allowed for margin-trading and short-selling.
This percentage is still lower compared to the U.S. market or European markets.
Similarly, on the same day, margin-trading and short-selling only share less than 20%
of the total trading volume. Such data may indicate that the market was not as mature
and complete as that in developed countries like U.S. and it still has a large
developing space for margin-trading and short-selling.
In Table 6, the summary statistics for margin-trading and short-selling activities
are showed. The first panel shows the statistics for margin-trading purchase,
recovering and related balance while the second reveals the statistics related to
short-selling activities. These two panels imply that both activities developed rapidly
over these years. However, margin trading is more than short selling as the volume,
turnover and the balance for margin-trading activity are much higher than that for
short-selling activity. Especially in 2015, the margin-trading activities reached a peak
while short-selling activities decreased compared with previous years before the
market crash.
Investors' preference for margin trading can be explained for several reasons.
First, the time that short-selling is allowed is very short and investors are not familiar
with this new trading mechanism. As a result, when they are introduced to
margin-trading and short-selling, they tend to choose the activity with familiar
trading mechanism, buy at a lower price and sell at a higher price. Moreover,
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Table 4. Number of Margin-trading and Short-selling Accounts at the End of
Each Year (2010 – 2016)








Table 5. Total Value of Margin-trading and Short-selling for Each Year (2010 -
2016)
Time
Value of shares margin
purchased (billion RMB)




2010 70.09 1.28 71.37
2011 297.56 27.39 324.95
2012 725.58 177.89 903.47
2013 3293.56 579.49 3873.04
2014 9579.22 1126.78 10705.99
2015 32472.94 2923.33 35396.26
2016 11481.18 83.62 11564.80
short-selling is much riskier than margin-trading as it may cause unlimited losses
theoretically (stock price could only drop to zero but increase to an unlimited level).
More importantly, the supply of security that could be used for short-selling is
limited than the supply of capital than could be used for margin-trading. Even though
investors are willing to short sell stocks, the resources that they can access is very
scarce. In an extreme case, the balance of short-selling is zero, implies a short-sell
constraint. This could partly count for disproportional little increase in short-selling
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after the market crash even no bans imposed on short-selling behaviour.
In Figure 1, the trends of margin-trading and short-selling with the Shanghai
(Securities) Composite Index (SCI) price from 2010 to 2016 are plotted. From
Figure 1 Panel A, it is evident that the margin-trading activity was developing at
relatively low speed from 2010 to 2014 as the number of stocks that eligible for
margin trading only account for a small proportion of the total stocks. Until mid of
2014, the margin-trading began to boost as more stocks were allowed for
margin-trading. The margin-trading activity then moves together with the index price.
When the market is under good condition, margin purchases from investors also
increase; while the market crashes, the margin-trading activity plummet with the
market. In Panel B, the short-selling activity also began at a relatively low level as
investors were not used to short-selling right after bans were lifted. When the market
was under good condition, the short-selling activities also increased. However, when
the market has an upward trend, the short-selling tend to have a downward trend,
which is consistent with the intuition that short-sellers are less likely to gain profit in
an upward trend market. However, after the market crashes in mid-2015, the value of
shares being shorted plummeted to a low level. Though the regulators did not pose
bans on short-selling, security companies were reluctant to lend stocks to investors,
which made short-selling became difficult hereafter.
Table 6. Summary Statistics for Margin-Trading, Short-Selling and Related Balance
Average daily finance purchase/ short sell volume is the cross-sectional average of the daily numbers of shares margin purchased/ sold short. Average daily finance repaying/ short
repurchase volume is the cross-sectional average of the daily number of shares covering finance position/ short position. Average daily finance purchase/ repaying turnover is the
proportion of finance purchase volume/ finance repaying volume to daily trading volume. Average daily short sell/ repurchase turnover is the proportion of short sell volume/ short
repurchase volume to daily trading volume.
2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016
Average daily finance purchase volume 311,299 1,086,705 1,100,602 2,647,077 5,021,657 11,090,662 55,867,467
Average daily finance purchase turnover 0.7723% 4.5691% 7.5891% 13.5056% 20.0486% 20.5230% 19.5637%
Average daily finance repaying volume 250,532 986,006 1,027,800 2,434,593 4,674,015 11,142,807 56,626,849
Average daily finance repaying turnover 0.6116% 4.2149% 7.1815% 12.8286% 19.8099% 21.7023% 20.6914%
Average daily finance balance volume 3,898,253 25,629,098 23,917,284 42,677,311 65,264,898 109,975,000 965,312,960
Average daily short sell volume 4,531 86,574 194,137 373,895 474,555 852,983 301,654
Average daily short sell turnover 0.0136% 0.4287% 1.2698% 1.3718% 1.2220% 0.7306% 0.0837%
Average daily short repurchase volume 4,495 84,475 190,567 373,923 473,660 854,187 295,467
Average daily short repurchase turnover 0.0138% 0.4283% 1.2656% 1.3748% 1.2238% 0.7308% 0.0920%
Average daily short balance volume 10,577 184,296 415,511 556,036 371,021 221,839 171,177
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Figure 1. Margin-trading and Short-selling Compared to the Market Trend
Panel A: Daily average value of shares margin purchased and Daily Index Price
Panel B: Daily average value of shares short sold and Daily Index Price
The blue lines in Panel A and Panel B represent the daily average value of shares purchased on margin and the
daily average value of shares being shorted. The red lines in panels A and B show the price of Shanghai Security
Composite Index (SCI). The period is from March 31, 2010 to the end of 2016. The left vertical axes in Panel A
and Panel B are the value of shares being margin purchased and short sold, in million RMB. The right vertical
axes in Panel A and Panel B are the prices of SCI.




My sample includes all A-share stocks listed on different boards15 of Shanghai
Stock Exchange (SSE) and ShenZhen Stock Exchange (SZSE). We collect all the
available trading data over the period from March 31st, 2010, to December 31st, 2016.
Our data consist of daily trading activities, margin-trading and short-selling ban
characteristics, margin finance and short sell balances, ban-lifting dates and bid and
ask prices for every trading minute. Data for daily prices, returns, volumes, number
of shares outstanding, ownership concentration and data related to margin-trading
and short-selling are obtained from China Stock Market& Accounting Research
(CSMAR) and WIND database. Bid and ask prices are drawn from RESSET
high-frequency database. All databases provide comprehensive and professional data,
including data on the stock market and corporate governance of listed firms in China.
In Chapter 5 and 6, all data are on the daily based (as spreads are calculated
using high-frequency data but still on the daily bases). In Chapter 7, I use the
intraday data, including the 1-minute bid price, ask price, trading price, return, and
trading volume to estimate the changes of liquidities and returns during the day. The
sample period in Section 7 is from September 22nd, 2014 to December 11th, 2016(the
beginning of the 5th lifting bans on margin-trading and short-selling to the beginning
to the 6th lifting bans event; see Table 2). Different from the daily data, this intraday,
1-minute frequency data could provide more detail and accurate information about
15 Many Chinese studies in which researchers exclude stocks from Growth Enterprise Market (GEM)board and
Small and Middle-sized Enterprise (SME) board. Stocks from these two boards are considered immature and
highly volatile. There are totally 2780 stocks listed in the market and nearly 1000 stocks are listed on the GEM
and SME boards.
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the price discovery process and the lead-lag relationship in liquidities between
margin and non-margin stocks in the specific market situations. The Chinese stock
market begins at 9:15, and during the first 15 minutes, there is no actual trading
being executed, but only call auction. Then from 9:30 to 11:30 and from 13:00 to
15:00, there are totally four hours (i.e. 240 minutes) trading time. For each stock, the
trading price, bid price and ask price are obtained at the end of each minute while
1-minute trading volume is the total value being traded during the one minute. All
the high-frequency data are collected from RESSET high-frequency database, a
professional financial database in China. The other daily data and firm-specific
information like firm size are collected from CSMAR and WIND.
4.2 Liquidity Measure
In this thesis, to measure the liquidity from diverse aspects, spreads and price
impact ratios are used as liquidity measures. First, to measure the transaction cost of
trading stocks, spreads including relatively quoted spread and relative effective
spread are calculated. In most studies (e.g. Benston and Hagerman, 1974; Branch and
Stoll, 1978; Stoll, 2000), spreads are used to measure the liquidity since spreads
measure the cost of transaction in straightforward way. Fong et al. (2017) compare
several liquidity measures and find that the daily closing relative quoted spread is the
best percentage-cost proxy for liquidity. Therefore, to obtain the daily relative quoted
spreads, daily quoted spreads are first calculated at the market close as we obtain
both the bid and ask prices at the market close from 2010 to the end of 2016.16 Then
the relative quoted spread is calculated using the equation below.
16 Because SSE and SZSE have different closing time, the closing bid and ask prices for stocks listed in SSE are
drawn at the time of 15:01 while for stocks listed in SZSE, the closing time is 14:57.
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The other transaction-based liquidity measurement is the relative effective
spread. According to Stoll (2000) and Fong et al. (2017), the effective spread is used
as the benchmark for transaction-based liquidity measures. The relative effective
spread at kth minute is defined as
Relative Effective Spread        ln      ᝝ ln     
To obtain the relative effective spread on the daily basis, I first calculate the intraday
minute-based relative effective spreads, then calculate the value-weighted average
using the trading volume for each minute.
Relative Effective Spread
 
Trading volume  in RMB value  
Total trading volume  in RMB value 
      ln      ᝝ ln     
For each stock, the daily relative effective spread is the RMB-volume-weighted
average of relative effective spread over one day period. More specifically, I first
calculate the relative effective spread for every stock every minute, then use the
trading volume (in RMB) of every minute as the weights to compute the weighted
average relative effective spread for every trading day. All spreads are winsorized by
replacing the observations of the upper and lower 0.5% while all non-positive
spreads are also eliminated.
According to Fong et al. (2017), the daily relative quoted spread is the
measurement that has the highest correlation with the daily relative spread, so the
relative spread can be viewed as the best daily percentage-cost proxy for liquidity. In
this thesis, I also find that these two transaction-based liquidity measures are highly
correlated (see Table 7). As a result, in Chapter 5, I will use both spreads
measurements as the transaction cost liquidity measures. In Chapter 6 and 7, I only
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use the benchmark measurement, the relative effective spread, as the transaction cost
liquidity proxy.
Apart from the transaction cost, the price impact measurements are also widely
used in literature, which captures the resiliency of liquidity. One of the most widely
used measure is Amihud’s (2002) Illiquidity ratio (e.g. Pastor and Stambaugh, 2003;
Goyenko et al., 2009; Hasbrouck, 2009; Adrian et al., 2017). The daily Amihud’s




where Rt is the return for the stock on day t and Volt is the volume (in RMB value) on
that day. As Fong et al. (2017) argued, the daily Amihud’s Illiquid ratio is “the best
daily cost-per-dollar-volume proxy”. Moreover, I also use Florackis, Gregoriou and




where Turnovert is the turnover (equals to trading volume over total market
capitalization) on that day.
Though the Price Impact Ratio of Florackis, Gregoriou and Kostakis’s (2011)
extends the Illiquid Ratio of Amihud (2002) by eliminating the possible influence of
firm size, which is directly related to the trading volume that used in the Amihud’s
Illiquidity Ratio, the Amihud’s Illiquid ratio is still the most widely used liquidity
measurement that captures the resiliency aspect of liquidity. In Table 7, it is found
that these two price impact ratios are high correlated (correlation coefficient is over
0.6). Therefore, only the Amihud’s Illiquid Ratio is used as the price impact measure
in Chapter 6 and 7.
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Therefore, in this thesis, four measurements of liquidity—Relative Quoted
Spread, Relative Effective Spread, Amihud’s Illiquidity Ratio and Price Impact
Ratio, are used in order to grasp different aspects of liquidity in Chapter 5. Then in
Chapter 6 and 7, I only use the Relative Effective Spread and Amihud’s Illiquidity
Ratio as liquidity measures. Though these measurements are called liquidity
measures, they all measure the illiquidity of the market. For example, higher
spreads indicate higher trading costs and less market tightness.
In Table 7, I present the summary statistics and correlation coefficients of these
liquidity measures. The relative quoted spread is calculated at the market close for
every stock at a daily basis. The relative effective spread is the volume-weighted
average of minute relative effective spread on a daily basis. Amihud’s Illiquid Ratio
is defined as the daily absolute return to the trading volume (in RMB value) while
the Price Impact Ratio is calculated using daily absolute return to the turnover. It is
found that all four liquidity measures used in this study are negatively correlated
with turnover and volume. As all liquidity measurements in this study actually
measures illiquidity (the higher the measurement value, the lower the liquidity)
while turnover and volume are used to measure liquidity in most literature, this
result implies that our liquidity measurements are, at least, consistent with each
other and with the traditional measurements. In addition, relative quoted spread and
relative effective spread have a correlation coefficient of approximately 0.5, which
infer that they are partly related to each other also make sense since both measures
are spreads and aimed to measure the tightness of liquidity. Similarly, the relatively
higher relationship between Amihud’s Illiquid Ratio and Price Impact Ratio also
verifies that
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Table 7. Summary Statistics and Correlation Coefficients of Liquidity
(Illiquidity) Measures
Panel A. Summary Statistics of Liquidity Measures
Variables Mean Minimum Median Maximum StandardDeviation Observations
Relative Quoted
Spread 0.1469% 0.0162% 0.112% 0.9429% 0.1277% 3,430,172
Relative Effective








Price Impact Ratio 1.58272 0 0.845474 21.39539 2.453813 3,755,876
Panel B. Correlation Coefficients of Liquidity Measures














Ratio (4) 0.173 0.190 0.606 1
Turnover (5) -0.166 -0.100 -0.173 -0.274 1
Volume (6) -0.166 -0.171 -0.228 -0.0996 0.373 1
Panel A shows the summary statistics of four illiquidity measures that will be used in this thesis. Relative Quoted
Spread is daily quoted spread calculated at market close; Relative Effective Spread is daily volume-weighted
average of one-minute relative effective spread; Amihud’s Illiquid Ratio is calculated as the ratio of absolute daily
return to the trading volume (in RMB); Price Impact Ratio is the ratio of absolute daily return to the turnover.
Panel B shows the correlation coefficients between the four illiquidity measures and two traditional liquidity
measures: turnover and volume. All these (il)liquidity measures are calculated on a daily basis.
they have some inner correlation as they both measure the price impact aspect of
liquidity. However, spreads and price impact measures are not highly correlated
with each other, implying that they can capture different dimensions of liquidity.
To illustrate the overall trends of liquidity, I calculate equally-weighted average
of liquidity of all stocks that listed in both Shanghai and ShenZhen Stock Exchange
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as the market average liquidity from March 2009 to the end of 2016 and plot in
Figure 2. From the Panel A and B in Figure 2, we find a co-movement with relative
quoted spread and relative effective spread. Moreover, the two measurements of
price impact also move in a similar pattern over time. However, we fail to find out
any evident change in the trends of liquidity measures over time. At the first event,
only 90 stocks were allowed for margin-trading and short-selling while there were
around 2000 stocks in the market. Until the end of 2016, less than half of the stocks
in the market were eligible for margin-trading and short-selling. Therefore, it is
natural that we failed to find out any trends in the market average liquidities as the
impact from eligible stocks may be overwhelmed by the rest stocks in the market.
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4.3 Margin Trading and Short Selling Variables
In order to examine the impact of lifting bans on stocks’ liquidities, bans on
margin-trading and short-selling were measured using one dummy variable17, which
represents the status of these two activities: eligible (MS = 1) or prohibited (MS =
0).
To further investigate the impact of margin-trading and short-selling on liquidity,
two variables are applied. For short selling, one variable used as measurement of the
level of short selling trading was short interest ratio. It is defined as the proportion of
short interest to the total number of shares outstanding where short interest is the
difference between the number of shares shorted and shares already repurchased. As
used in many studies, researchers believed that short interest could disseminate
information about the market situation to investors (Diamond and Verrecchia, 1987;
Senchack and Starks, 1993; Desai et al., 2002; Lamont and Stein, 2004; Asquith,
Pathak, and Ritter, 2005; Akbas, Boehmer, and Sorescu, 2017). For example,
Diamond and Verrecchia (1987) suggested that an unexpected raise inferred negative
news to investors. Senchack and Starks (1993) further proved that stocks with an
unexpected increase in short interest generated negative abnormal returns.
absoult short interest on day  
  short interst on day   ᝝ ᤼   share shorted on day  
᝝ share repurchased on day  
17 Here I use only one dummy variable, instead of two, to show the permit/ban on these two activities because
the ban or permit on margin-trading and short-selling became effective simultaneously.
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relative short interest  
total share shorted ᝝ toatal share repurchased
number of shares outstanding
For margin trading, we use finance interest ratio as measurement of margin
trading activity. Similar to short interest ratio, it is defined as the finance interest (in
number of shares) to the number of shares outstanding and the finance interest are
the number of shares that borrowed yet not repaid.
absoult finance interest on day  
  finance interest on day   ᝝ ᤼   margin financed on day  
᝝margin repaid on day  
relative finance interest  
total margin financed ᝝ total margin repaid
number of shares outstanding
Instead of using short interest or finance interest, I calculate the ratio in order to
adjust difference in the number of shares.
Some researchers use short turnover and finance turnover to measure the
margin-trading and short-selling activities (e.g. Boehmer and Wu, 2013; Li et al.,
2018). Different from relative short interest and relative finance interest, which
measures the position of margin-traders and short-sellers, short turnover and finance
turnover focus more on the trading activities. Similar to the definition as trading
turnover, the short and finance turnover is defined as the ratio of
short turnover  
Volume of shares be shorted
Total trading volume
finance turnover  
Volume of shares be margin borrowed
Total trading volume
In Table 8, the summary statistics and correlations of finance interest (also
known as finance balance), short interest, finance turnover, and short turnover is
presented. Mean of relative short interest and short turnover is only 0.0119% and
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0.7939%, indicating that short-selling activities only account for tiny portion in the
Chinese
Table 8. Summary Statistics and Correlation Coefficients of Margin-trading
and Short-selling Variables
Panel A. Summary Statistics of Margin-trading and Short-selling Variables






0.0119% 0 0.00534% 0.1022% 0.017% 805,427
Relative Finance
Interest
5.1356% 0.0233% 4.2578% 19.0166% 4.0584% 805,427
Short Turnover 0.7939% 0 0.1225% 9.1329% 1.4697% 805,427
Finance Turnover 17.3924% 0.0686% 17.5658% 41.0175% 8.5293% 805,427
Panel B. Correlation Coefficients of Margin-trading and Short-selling Variables












-0.0394 0.542 -0.0484 1
Panel A shows the summary statistics of four variables that measure the positions and trading activities of
margin-trading and short-selling. Panel B shows the correlation coefficients between the four measures.
market. In contrast, though relative finance interest has mean of 5.14%, the mean of
finance turnover is 17.39%, suggesting that near to one fifth of the daily stock
transaction is through margin-trading. In panel B of Table 9, it is found that
margin-trading measures are negatively related to short-selling activities. The
correlation between relative short interest and short turnover is 0.48 while the
correlation between relative finance interest and finance turnover is 0.54, inferring
that margin-trading and short-selling measures are somehow inter-related.
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CHAPTER 5: DETERMINANTS OF LIQUIDITY
5.1 Introduction
Liquidity is vital to participants in the stock market. For investors, it would
affect stock’s return, and in turn, investor’s profit (Amihud and Mendelson, 1988).
For firms, it could impact capital structure and investment opportunities (Frieder and
Martell, 2006; Becker-Blease and Paul, 2006; Banerjee, Gatchev, and Spindt, 2007;
Lipson and Mortal, 2009). Its significance thus accounts for a well-established
investigation for determinants of liquidity in developed market (e.g. Demsetz, 1968;
Benston and Hagerman, 1974; Branch and Freed, 1977; Stoll, 1978; Stoll and
Whaley, 1983; Chordia et al., 2000; Stoll, 2000; Chordia et al. 2002). Through both
theoretical model and empirical analysis, they find that firm’s trading activities (e.g.
price, volume, volatility, trading scales), size, ownership structure and its corporate
governance are determinants of liquidity. In addition, researchers proposed that
trading mechanism and trading venues would also affect liquidity (Branch and
Freed ,1977; Hasbrouck and Schwartz, 1986; Brown and Zhang, 1997). With the
development of emerging market, more researchers start to focus on investigating
these markets and draw comparisons with developed markets. For example, Fong,
Holden, & Trzcinka (2017) found that emerging markets tend to have lower market
liquidity than stock markets in the developed countries. As the largest emerging
market, the Chinese stock market is different from many other markets. The Chinese
stock market is a pure order driven market with no market markers to provide
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liquidity as in the U.S. market. Moreover, individual investors dominate the market
rather than institutional investors (Yao, Ma, & He, 2014). Most importantly, there are
many trading rules that are unique in the Chinese stock market like the price limit
rule. Therefore, in this section, I will examine the determinants of liquidity in the
Chinese stock market and whether they will be different from those in developed
markets.
Many empirical evidences suggest that firm’s trading characteristics like price,
volume, volatility and trading scale can influence stocks’ liquidities. In early studies,
price, volume and trading scale are already found to be negatively related to the
bid-ask spread while volatility is positively related (Demsetz, 1968; Tinic, 1972;
Benston and Hagerman, 1974; Branch and Freed, 1977; Stoll, 1978). Moreover, the
number of shareholders is proposed to influence the spread (Benston and Hagerman,
1974; Branch and Freed ,1977; Stoll, 1978). Studies of Stoll (2000) and Chordia et al.
(2000) extend the early studies by including other liquidity measures, larger sample
size and longer time period and both find some consistent evidence that trading
activity variables such as stock prices, volatility and trading volume, are correlated
to liquidity. For example, Stoll (2000) argues that relative quoted spreads were
negatively related to volume and price and positively related to the stock's volatility.
However, the number of trades affects spreads in NYSE/AMSE while it negatively
impact on spreads in NASDAQ. Karolyi et, al. (2012), using cross-sectional test and
time-series test, conclude that market volatility and trading activities do impact the
liquidities in different countries.
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In addition, some researchers argue that firm size will positively affect stock
liquidity and firms with larger size would have lower transaction cost. Stoll and
Whaley (1983) found that the proportional bid-ask spread for small-sized firms were
larger than that for large-sized firms. According to Amihud and Mendelson (1988),
investors who hold stocks with higher transaction cost would require higher return
for compensation. Stoll (2000) compares the NYSE/AMSE to Nasdaq and found that
firm size was positively related to the spreads in NYSE/AMSE while negatively
associated to spreads in Nasdaq.
Moreover, the ownership structure is also considered as a determinant of
liquidity (e.g. Kamara et, al., 2008). Heflin and Shaw (2000) contend that higher
block ownership would cause lower liquidity. Similarly, other researchers also find
evidences to support that higher block ownership would hinder firm’s stock liquidity
(Brockman et al., 2009). Jacoby and Zheng (2010) extend the work of Heflin and
Shaw (2000) and argue that firm size played a significant role in the relationship
between market quoted depth and changes in block shareholding of Nasdaq stocks.
In contrast, Rubin (2007) find a mixed impact that the level of institutional investors
would improve the liquidity while the concentration of institutional investors would
negatively influence the liquidity.
As the largest emerging market over last two decades, Chinese stock market has
gained growing attention. However, the Chinese stock market is different from many
other stock markets in several aspects. First, different from the U.S. market and
many European markets which are quote driven, the Chinese stock market is a pure
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order driven market with no market markers. In the literature, the number of market
makers is positively associated to transaction cost (Branch and Freed ,1977; Stoll,
1978; Grossman and Miller, 1988; Stoll, 2000). Chai, Faff and Gharghori (2010)
suggest that in a pure order driven market, since public limit orders provide liquidity
and establish the bid and ask prices in the absence of market makers, the market
characteristics provide more transparent trading environment to market participants.
This difference in the trading mechanism would affect the impact of liquidity
determinant’s explanation power. Brockman and Chung (2002) use data from Hong
Kong stock market, which is also an order-driven market and proposed that firm size
lost its explanatory power in market bid-ask spread changes. However, Chai et, al.
(2010) suggest that trading activity characteristics like price, volume and volatility
are still determinants of liquidities using six different monthly low-frequency
liquidity measures including spreads, turnover, Amihud’s Illiquidity ratio and zero
return and zero trading measures in Australia stock market to test whether trading
activities were still determinants of liquidities in order-driven market. Malinova and
Park (2013) compare the impact of trading mechanism on liquidity and price
discovery in order-driven market and quote-driven market and they find that small
orders had lower price impacts in the order-driven market than in the quote driven
market. In their studies, prices are more efficient and trading volume is higher in a
limit order market. Therefore, the difference in trading mechanism does affect the
market’s liquidity.
The second difference is the investor segmentation. Individual investors are the
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dominating investors in the Chinese stock market, rather than institutional investors
compared to the developed stock markets (Yao, Ma, & He, 2014). In the Chinese
stock market, over 99% investors are retail investors, which seems to be abnormal in
most developed security markets.
Last, Chinese stock market has its special trading regulations, which is
explained in Section 3.5. For example, stock prices can only move by 10% from
closing price of previous trading day. This special regulation is called price limit and
is designed to protect investors from unlimited losses and stabilize the market.
Another distinctive feature in the Chinese stock market is the T+1 rule. Investors
cannot sell the stock on the day they buy the stock, they have to wait till tomorrow to
execute the transaction. There are also trading restrictions on stocks if they have
special treatments (ST). Stocks in the Chinese stock market have their trading status
according to the firm’s performance. Generally, stocks with special trading status
would have more trading restrictions like lower price limit.
In this Chapter, the relevance of determinants of liquidity in longstanding
literature in the Chinese stock market is firstly examined. Will those variables
perform differently because of the specific nature of the Chinese stock market? In
addition, I also investigate the impact of some special trading regulations that are
unique in the Chinese stock market. All the determinants tested and proved in this
chapter would be used as the control variables in the following two chapters so as to
eliminate unobserved heterogeneity.
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5.2 Data Description and Methodology
The sample period for this chapter is from 31st March 2010, the first date when
margin-trading and short-selling were allowed in the Chinese stock market, to the
end of 2016. All stocks listed on Shanghai Stock Exchange (SSE) and ShenZhen
Stock Exchange (SZSE) are included in the sample set. The liquidity measures used
in this chapter are relative quoted spread, relative effective spread, Amihud’s Illiquid
Ratio and Price Impact ratio that mentioned in Section 4.2. All liquidity measures are
calculated on a daily basis. Bid price, ask prices and stock price used to calculate
quoted spread are collected at the market close. Effective spread is the volume
weighted average calculated using minute effective spread and cumulated trading
volume. Return and trading volume used to calculate the Amihud’s Illiquid Ratio are
stock’s daily return and trading volume in RMB value and turnover in the Price
Impact ratio is calculated using daily trading volume over stock’s firm size.
In order to examine determinants of liquidity in the Chinese market, several
liquidity-determinant variables are extracted from previous literature, including
share price, volatility, trade number, volume, firm size, ownership concentration,
return etc. The summary statistics of these variables are showed in Table 9. Return is
calculated as the percentage change in the price on a daily basis. According to the
trading rules in the Chinese stock market, the minimum/maximum of daily return is
-/+10% while the average of daily return is 0.097%. Volatility is the moving standard
deviation of returns based on the previous 20 days’ observations. Trade Number is
the number of trades executed successfully on that day, which used to represent the
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trade scale. Firm size is calculated as the total market value of all shares (including
shares not available for trading in RMB value) while Market Value is the market
value of tradable shares (in RMB). The Ownership Concentration is measured by the
percentage of shares
Table 9. Summary Statistics for Possible Liquidity Determinant Variables




Return 0.040% -10% 0.097% 10% 2.735% 3424857
Price 15.95 2.44 11.95 96.50 13.48 3424857
Volatility 2.808% 0.785% 2.507% 9.084% 1.310% 3424857
Trading Volume 1.45×1008 2268024 6.08×1007 2.24×1009 2.61×1008 3424857
Turnover 2.820% 0.066% 1.676% 25.484% 3.445% 3424857
Trade Number 6823.30 210 3567 82343 10088.52 3424857
Firm Size 1.11×1010 9.24×108 4.96×1009 2.14×1011 2.28×1010 3424857
Market Value of
tradable shares
8.45×1009 3.10×1008 3.44×1009 1.93×1011 1.97×1010 3424857
No. of Shares
Outstanding
8.32×1008 1.37×1007 3.10×1008 2.08×1010 2.19×1009 3424857
Ownership
Concentration
34.31% 0.907% 32.54% 91.00% 22.58% 3424857
(in RMB). The Ownership Concentration is measured by the percentage of shares
owned by 10 largest outstanding shareholders to the total number of shares
outstanding. The Institutional Shareholdings are the percentage of shares hold by
institutional investors (exclude financial institutions) to the total shares. Turnover
refers to the proportion of number of shares traded to the total number of shares
outstanding. Volume is the daily value of shares (in RMB) traded while the Price is
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obtained at the market close.
In Table 10, the correlation coefficient matrix for these variables that will be
used in the regressions in the next section is first presented. Both used as liquidity
measures in early research, turnover and volume are positively correlated. Volatility
and trade number are also correlated to these two variables. The trade number are
highly correlated to trading volume as the correlation coefficient is 0.928. Another
pair that has unusual high correlation is firm size and market value of tradeable
shares (correlation=0.945). Both variables can be used as measures of stock’s firm
size and therefore, firm size is included in the following regressions.
Model used for regression is a linear regression model absorbing two levels of
fixed effects: firm level and day level. First, a univariate regression is performed for
each liquidity determinant to examine their impact on liquidity. Once these
determinants are examined one by one, all of them are put together in the panel
regression to investigate their overall impact on liquidity.
Liquidity measures used in the following regressions are relative quoted spread,
relative effective spread, Amihud’s Illiquid ratio and Price Impact ratio, all of which
measure the illiquidity. Their summary statistics and correlation coefficients matrix
are showed in Table 7 (Section 4.2). Determinants used in the regression include
price, firm size, volume, turnover, volatility, trade number, ownership concentration
ratio and institutional shareholding ratio. Both firm-level fixed effect and time-level
fixed effect are included. Standard errors are clustered by both firms and dates.
Table 10.Correlation Coefficient Matrix for Some Liquidity Determinant Variables
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Turnover (1) 1
Volume (2) 0.355*** 1
Return (3) 0.0886*** 0.0742*** 1
Price (4) 0.289*** 0.190*** 0.0273*** 1
Volatility (5) 0.491*** 0.315*** 0.00577*** 0.254*** 1
Trade Number (6) 0.387*** 0.928*** 0.0586*** 0.0623*** 0.338*** 1
Firm Size (7) -0.0915*** 0.495*** 0.00607*** 0.102*** -0.0473*** 0.435*** 1
Market Value of
tradable shares (8) -0.130*** 0.485*** 0.00641*** 0.0479*** -0.0614*** 0.423*** 0.945*** 1
Ownership
Concentration (9) -0.372*** 0.0769*** 0.00761*** -0.198*** -0.102*** 0.0782*** 0.220*** 0.330*** 1
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5.3 Overall Regressions
In this section, whether the determinants of liquidity in the literature (mentioned in
Section 5.1) are also determinants in the Chinese stock market is examined first. In
addition, I also tested some variables that are unique in the Chinese stock market. In
Table 11, I present results from univariate panel regression using some widely used
determinants of liquidity including price, firm size and other trading activities as the
independent variable. All independent variables used in regressions are in logarithm,
except institutional shareholding ratio and return. Consistent with previous studies
(e.g. Demsetz, 1968; Tinic, 1972; Benston and Hagerman, 1974; Branch and Freed,
1977; Stoll, 1978; Chordia, Roll and Subrahmanyam, 2000; Roll, 2000), price is
negatively associated with spreads and two price impact measures. Firm size is also
negatively correlated to stocks’ spreads and price impacts, consistent with Stoll and
Whaley (1983). Volume and turnover, as two simple measures of liquidity in early
research, are also negatively related to these illiquidity measures. Different from
literature, volatility is negatively correlated to my illiquidity measures. This could just
be caused by only including volatility alone as independent variable as volatility is
included along with other variables in the regression in previous studies. Trade
number is negatively related to stock’s spreads and price impact measures, indicating
that more trades lead to higher liquidity. Ownership concentration ratio is positively
associated with illiquidity measures, suggesting that block-holders may be investors
that not actively trade over time so they hinder the market liquidity. This impact of
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ownership concentration is consistent with the finding of Rubin (2007). In addition,
higher returns seem to improve the liquidity, except for the Price Impact ratio, which
is statistically insignificant.
Some of determinants can interfere with one another when including them in one
regression. For example, from Table 10, it is found that trade number and trading
volume are highly correlated. Though trade number is a determinant of liquidity, it is
inappropriate to include it in the regressions along with trading volume. Similarly,
trading volume and turnover are both used as simple liquidity measures and they are
also interrelated so there is no need to include them both in the same regression.
Therefore, in the regression containing several determinants at once, determinants
used are price, firm size, trading volume, volatility, ownership concentration and
return. Apart from this, I also include one lagged term of each illiquidity
measurements (i.e. AR(1) term) in each regression since liquidity is auto-correlated.
The results of regressions are presented in Table 12.
Consistent with literature, stock’s trading characteristic like price and volume are
negatively related to spreads and price impacts. The coefficients of volatility in this
regression are positive and statistically significant, which is also consistent with
literature. Compared to the results from last regression, this suggests that the impact
of volatility on liquidity would be opposite when controlled for other trading
characteristics. Firm size seems to decrease spreads and Amihud’s Illiquid Ratio,
which is also consistent with previous empirical findings while its impact on Price
Impact ratio is opposite. Ownership concentration would decrease the stock’s liquidity.
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Table 11. Coefficients on Liquidity Determinants from Univariate Panel Regression Models
There are four illiquidity measures used as dependent variables: Relative Quoted Spread, Relative Effective Spread, Amihud’s Illiquid Ratio and Price Impact Ratio. These variables are taken
logarithm form so that their distributions are more likely to be normal. Price, Firm size, Volume, Turnover, Voaltility, trade number, and Ownership Concentration are also in logarithm. All
regressions are controlled for the time effect as for every day, one daily dummy variable is included in the regression and for each firm, the fixed effect is used. The numbers reported in
parentheses are standard errors. The estimates with three (***), two(**), one (*) asterisks are statistically significant at 1%, 5%, 10% level.






-0.569*** -0.452*** -0.175*** -0.131*** -0.257*** -0.174*** 0.0527*** -0.841***
(0.00834) (0.00889) (0.00231) (0.00235) (0.00476) (0.00270) (0.00368) (0.0447)
Relative
Effective Spread
-0.292*** -0.288*** -0.121*** -0.0945*** -0.129*** -0.142*** 0.0485*** -0.511***
(0.00785) (0.00693) (0.00188) (0.00193) (0.00411) (0.00216) (0.00273) (0.0452)
Amihud's Illiquid
Ratio
-0.646*** -0.920*** -0.679*** -0.577*** -0.832*** -0.707*** 0.0399*** -0.932**
(0.0170) (0.0181) (0.00374) (0.00526) (0.0122) (0.00431) (0.00634) (0.454)
Price Impact
Ratio
-0.303*** -0.144*** -0.472*** -0.666*** -0.625*** -0.508*** 0.382*** -0.527
(0.0150) (0.0151) (0.00487) (0.00391) (0.0115) (0.00521) (0.00550) (0.454)
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Table 12. Determinants of Liquidity from Panel Regressions
There are four illiquidity measures used as dependent variables: Relative Quoted Spread, Relative Effective
Spread, Amihud’s Illiquid Ratio and Price Impact Ratio. These variables are taken logarithm form so that their
distributions are more likely to be normal. Price, Firm size, Volume, Turnover, Voaltility, and Ownership
Concentration are also in logarithm. Because the liquidity is considered to correlated with itself, the AR(1) is the
one lag of the dependent variable with a lag time of one day. More specifically, AR(1) represents the lagged
relative quoted spread, lagged relative effective spread, lagged Amihud’s Illiquid Ratio and lagged Price Impact
Ratio. All regressions are controlled for the time effect as for every day, one daily dummy variable is included in
the regression and for each firm, the fixed effect is used. The numbers reported in parentheses are standard errors.
The estimates with three (***), two(**), one (*) asterisks are statistically significant at 1%, 5%, 10% level
The impacts of return are different for spreads and price impact measures.
Stocks with high return seems to have higher transaction cost but lower price impact.
It is also found that the lagged liquidity term is positively correlated to the liquidity
measure, also supporting that liquidity is auto-correlated.
To further investigate the determinant of liquidity in the Chinese stock market, I
add three more variable that represent the special trading regulations in China into
the panel regression. First, according to the “T+1” rule, investors in the stock market
cannot trade the stocks on the same day of transaction. However, investors could










-0.382*** -0.108*** -0.0160** -0.107***
(0.00891) (0.00567) (0.00635) (0.00813)
Firm Size
-0.0931*** -0.0600*** -0.218*** 0.557***
(0.00629) (0.00445) (0.00772) (0.0107)
Volume
-0.0890*** -0.0700*** -0.634*** -0.543***
(0.00204) (0.00142) (0.00401) (0.00411)
Volatility
0.0103*** 0.0502*** 0.115*** 0.0627***
(0.00304) (0.00234) (0.00607) (0.00647)
Ownership
Concentration
0.0150*** 0.0200*** 0.00476** 0.355***
(0.00180) (0.00136) (0.00206) (0.00363)
Return
0.506*** 0.903*** -0.569*** -0.896***
(0.0290) (0.0270) (0.118) (0.117)
AR(1)
0.104*** 0.344*** 0.0331*** 0.0585***
(0.00184) (0.00330) (0.00190) (0.00214)
Constant
-2.093*** -1.644*** -6.311*** 0.248*
(0.0920) (0.0648) (0.116) (0.149)
Observations 3,035,864 3,035,864 3,035,864 3,035,864
R-squared 0.448 0.585 0.656 0.496
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derivative markets in China. Therefore, if a stock is the component of the index
option, it would be more liquid than other stocks that are not included in the list of
index option. Moreover, the index options seem to influence the stock prices in
several cases. For example, the prices of three main stock index options18 drop
significantly before the market crash in June 2015. It is natural to speculate whether
stocks listed in the index options would influence their trading activities and
liquidities. Therefore, to examine whether the list of index option would influence
the liquidity, I include one dummy variables to identify the status whether stocks are
listed in most commonly traded index option. The index option is HuShen300
(HS300). According to SSE and SZSE, stocks included in HS300 should be large in
firm size and high in liquidity. All stocks are ranked by the weighted average of daily
market capitalization, market values outstanding, number of shares outstanding and
trading volume (both in number of shares and in RMB), then the first 300 stocks are
included into HS300 index. The dummy variable is called HS300 and equals to one if
the stock is included in the HS300 index.
Another special trading regulation is “Price Limit”. According to the trading
regulation of the Chinese stock market, a stock’s price can only move by 10%, either
up or down, compared to its closing price from last trading day. The regulator
believes that this limit in price movement could partly protect investors and stabilize
the market from volatile price movements. However, this regulation would probably
decrease the liquidity as investors are reluctant to trade when a stock hits the price
limit. For example, when a listed company discloses negative information and most
investors are willing to sell its stock. If there is no price limit, the stock price would
decrease until it reaches to the expected value of the market. However, when there is
18 They are: HuShen300 (HS300), ZhongZheng500(ZZ500) and ShangZheng50(SZ50).
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a price limit, the stock price can only decrease by 10% and is still higher than its
expected value, then very few or even no investors would like to trade this stock,
thus the liquidity would be hindered. In fact, once a stock hits the price limit, its
liquidity would dry up and trading volume would plummet to a very low level in
most cases. To capture this specific trading regulation, I create one dummy variable
“Price Limit”, which equals to one if the stock hit the price limit on that trading day.
The third special feature is the trading status. The stock exchange would
determine whether a stock is subject to “Special Treatment” according to the
underlying firm’s accounting performance. Sometimes, when a company faces some
problems (e.g. high probability of bankrupt, high leverage, continuous deficits) that
would lead the stock exchanges to believe there is high probability of bankruptcy, its
stock would have a trading status as special trading (ST) status. These special trading
(ST) stocks would have many restrictions in trading like only 5% price limits.
Therefore, ST stocks are believed to be of highly risk. This trading status is actually a
warning sign given to the investors. I use another dummy variable “trading status” to
measure whether the stock is under special treatment. The dummy variable equals to
one is the stock is an ST stock and equals to 0 if the stock is normally traded.
The results after adding three dummy variables that represent the unique trading
regulations in the Chinese stock market are showed in Table 13. First, the impact of
each determinant remains largely the same after considering trading rules in China.
Second, dummy variable HS300 is negatively associated to two spreads measures
and Amihud’s Illiquid Ratio, which suggests that stocks being components of stock
index seems to improve the stock’s liquidity. In addition, price limit is positively
related to our liquidity measures, which supports the hypothesis that price limit
actually hinders the stock’s liquidity. Finally, it is found that the spreads for ST
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-0.382*** -0.108*** -0.0162** -0.104***
(0.00887) (0.00565) (0.00629) (0.00803)
Firm Size
-0.0848*** -0.0553*** -0.215*** 0.554***
(0.00621) (0.00436) (0.00756) (0.0105)
Volume
-0.0887*** -0.0702*** -0.635*** -0.544***
(0.00203) (0.00142) (0.00402) (0.00412)
Volatility
0.00991*** 0.0505*** 0.114*** 0.0651***
(0.00300) (0.00231) (0.00607) (0.00645)
Ownership
Concentration
0.0153*** 0.0199*** 0.00477** 0.354***
(0.00178) (0.00135) (0.00204) (0.00363)
Return
0.503*** 0.903*** -0.562*** -0.889***
(0.0288) (0.0266) (0.117) (0.116)
HS300
-0.0389*** -0.0162*** -0.0177* 0.0518***
(0.00684) (0.00583) (0.0101) (0.0123)
Price Limit
0.263*** 0.412*** 0.720*** 0.729***
(0.0725) (0.0545) (0.0267) (0.0268)
Trading Status
0.0756*** 0.0618*** -0.0119 0.0829***
(0.00769) (0.00614) (0.00998) (0.0132)
AR(1)
0.104*** 0.341*** 0.0331*** 0.0582***
(0.00183) (0.00333) (0.00190) (0.00214)
Constant
-2.236*** -1.730*** -6.339*** 0.307**
(0.0905) (0.0634) (0.116) (0.147)
Observations 3,035,570 3,035,570 3,035,570 3,035,570
R-squared 0.449 0.587 0.657 0.497
There are four illiquidity measures used as dependent variables: Relative Quoted Spread, Relative Effective Spread,
Amihud’s Illiquid Ratio and Price Impact Ratio. These variables are taken logarithm form so that their distributions
are more likely to be normal. Price, Firm size, Volume, Turnover, Voaltility, and Ownership Concentration are also in
logarithm. HS300 is a dummy variable which equals to one if a stock is listed in the HS300 index. Price Limit is a
dummy variable which equals to one if a stock’s closing price increases/decreases by +10%/-10% compared to the
closing price from previous trading day. Trading Status is a dummy variable that is equal to one if a stock is special
treated. Because the liquidity is considered to correlated with itself, the AR(1) is the one lag of the dependent variable
with a lag time of one day. More specifically, AR(1) represents the lagged relative quoted spread, lagged relative
effective spread, lagged Amihud’s Illiquid Ratio and lagged Price Impact Ratio. All regressions are controlled for the
time effect as for every day, one daily dummy variable is included in the regression and for each firm, the fixed effect
is used. The numbers reported in parentheses are standard errors. The estimates with three (***), two(**), one (*)
asterisks are statistically significant at 1%, 5%, 10% level
stocks are higher. According to the risk-return model, ST stocks are stocks with
higher risk so a higher return is expected for compensation. Higher stock return is
associated with higher transaction cost (Amihud and Mendelson; 1988). Trading
status’s impact on Amihud’s Illiquid ratio is negative but insignificant. In contrast,
trading status is positively related to Price Impact Ratio, also suggesting that stocks
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be special treated would hinder the liquidity.
5.4 Conclusion
In conclusion, as consistent with literature, trading activities like price, volume
and volatility, are proved also to be determinants in the Chinese stock market.
Moreover, price and volume will reduce both spreads measures and price impact
measures, thus improve liquidity while volatility is negatively correlated to liquidity.
I also find that larger firm size contributes to higher liquidity using both spread
measures and Amihud’s Illiquid measures. In contrast, higher concentration of
ownership will lead to higher spreads and price impact. The impact of return on
different illiquidity measure is quite the opposite. For relative quoted spread and
relative effective spread, higher return is associated with higher spreads. However, in
terms of price impact measures, return will reduce the price impact, implying higher
liquidity. The impact of these determinants remain the same even after I include three
variables that are unique in the Chinese stock market. I find that if stocks are listed in
the index HS300, their liquidities tend to increase. In addition, when a stock hits the
price limit or is specially treated, the spread will increase and price impact tend to be
higher, therefore suggesting a lower liquidity.
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CHAPTER 6: THE IMPACTS OF MARGIN-TRADING
AND SHORT-SELLING ON LIQUIDITY
6.1 Introduction
As margin-trading and short-selling emerged, several research studies delved
into the impact of these activities on the stock market (e.g. Bris, Goetzmann and Zhu,
2007; Hirose, Kato and Bremercan, 2009; Beber and Pagano, 2013; Boehmer et al.,
2013; Boehmer and Wu, 2013; Alves, Mendes and da Silva, 2016; Chen et al., 2016;
Kahraman and Tookes, 2017). However, most of these studies focus on the U.S.
market and only a few investigate the Chinese stock market. For example, after
lifting the bans on margin trading and short selling, Chang, Luo, and Ren (2014) find
that price efficiency improved and volatility decreased. When comparing
margin-trading and short-selling, they argue that the effects of short-selling were
more remarkable than that of margin-trading. Sharif, Anderson, and Marshall (2014)
also focused on the first introduction of margin-trading and short-selling in March
2010 in the Chinese stock market. They suggest that stocks eligible for
margin-trading and short-selling to have lower levels of liquidity than their
cross-listed and matched pairs. Chen et al. (2016) expand the existing sample by
including more stocks and increasing the time frame. They argue that margin-trading
and short-selling could help incorporate existing information into the stock pricing,
which would improve price efficiency. Furthermore, Ma et al. (2018) focus on the
Chinese stock market and propose that aggregated margin-trading on a market level
improves trading activity and liquidity, while short-selling decreases liquidity.
Consistent with Chang et al. (2014), Li et al. (2018) find that short-selling improves
price efficiency and liquidity while reducing stock volatility.
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After the financial crisis during 2008-09, investigations extensively focused on
the impacts of short-sellers on stock market return, liquidity, and price discovery. The
regulators argue that short-sellers could harm the market. Consequently, they
imposed bans on short-sale during this period of the financial crisis.19 On the other
hand, many researchers suggest that bans on short-sale negatively impact market
liquidity. For example, the study of Diamond and Verrecchia (1987) includes a
theoretical model, which predicts that with constraints on short-sale, the price will
adjust more slowly to negative information. As a result, this will impair the stock’s
liquidity. Boehmer et al. (2012) empirically examine the effect of short-sale bans on
the U.S. stock market during the 2008 financial crisis. Short-sale constraints hindered
the liquidity of most large-cap stocks and worsened market performance. Beber and
Pagano (2013) utilize international data from the 2007 to 2009 financial crisis. While
their results suggest that short-sale bans hindered both liquidity and price discovery,
some of these suffer from endogeneity given that many of them focus on the crisis
period. Instead of the bans on short-selling causing a decrease in liquidity, the
financial crisis may have already dried up the market liquidity beforehand.
Furthermore, the Chinese stock market is a perfect example to investigate the impact
of margin-trading and short-selling. By taking advantage of China’s gradual
legislation of margin-trading and short-selling where only a few stocks could be
eligible, I could avoid this endogeneity problem.
In this chapter, I match the stocks eligible for margin-trading and short-selling to
the corresponding non-eligible stocks. Initially, I prove that stocks eligible for
margin-trading and short-selling would have higher liquidity. An event study that
compares the liquidities of eligible and ineligible stocks before and after the
19 For example, see Berber and Pagano (2013). They summarized the impact of short-sale bans during the
2007-09 financial crisis period all around the world.
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inception dates further proves that lifting bans on margin-trading and short-selling
would improve the eligible stocks’ liquidities. As I focused on margin-trading and
short-selling, I find that margin-trading would increase the stock’s liquidity while
short-selling hinders liquidity. Moreover, I reason that an increase in adverse
selection causes the negative impact of short-selling on liquidity. To support this
conjecture, I further prove that short-sellers are informed traders, where an increase
in a short-sale position could predict future returns. Moreover, I demonstrate that
firms with a high level of information asymmetry mainly cause the negative impact
of short-selling on liquidity. However, when focusing on a market crisis period, I find
that eligible stocks tend to have lower liquidity. In contrast to a normal market period,
the impact of margin-trading and short-selling on liquidity become the opposite.
Moreover, short-selling seems to improve liquidity during a crisis.
6.2 Data Description and Methodology
The sample period for this chapter occurs from March 31, 2010, which is the
first day after lifting the bans on margin-trading and short-selling to December 11,
2016, which is a day before the 6th inception date (See Table 2 from Section 3.2).
The sample includes all the stocks eligible for margin-trading and short-selling. More
specifically, the sample ranges from March 31, 2010 to December 5, 2011, which
includes 90 stocks eligible for margin and short selling. Then, from September 22,
2014, the sample contains 900 stocks eligible for both activities.
I also include stocks ineligible for margin-trading and short-selling in the sample.
As mentioned in the introduction, I use the matching approach to select stocks that
are ineligible for margin trading and short selling to match the eligible stocks. Since
the primary purpose of the thesis is to investigate the impact of margin-trading and
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short-selling on liquidity, I match each margin stock to one non-margin stock
according to the industry, as well as the daily closing price, market capitalization,
and trading volumes. The selection of matching pairs is executed to reflect the
characteristics of the margin stocks as close as possible.
Similar to the matching method used by Huang and Stoll (1996), Bacidore and
Sofianos (2002) and Sharif, Anderson, and Marshall (2014), I calculate the sum of
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For a margin stock, I first calculate the sum of relative price difference square,
relative market value difference square, and relative volume difference square
between this stock and each non-margin stock within the same industry. Then, I
select the stock that has the minimum sum of relative difference squares as the
matched non-margin stock given that the ultimate goal for matching is to choose the
corresponding non-margin stock that has the price, firm size, and trading volume
closest to the margin stock. To minimize the difference in the matching pairs, I
exclude matching pairs with the highest one percent of relative differences in price,
market value, and trading volume. Table 14 shows all summary statistics for
matching. Panel A shows the characteristics of eligible stocks. Panel B shows the
characteristics of matched ineligible stocks. In Panel C, I compare these criteria and
calculate the differences in mean and median. Panels A and B highlight that market
capitalization and trading volume of eligible stocks are higher than matched
ineligible stocks. In Panel C, I execute the t-test to compare the mean values of three
matching criteria for eligible and ineligible stocks. It turns out that price, market
value, and trading volume of eligible stocks are all higher than matched ineligible
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stocks. Additionally, I utilize the Wilcoxon matched-pairs test to compare the median
of two groups of stocks. The results suggest that eligible stocks have higher median
values in both market value and trading volume.
Even after choosing matched pairs with minimum differences in price, market
capitalization, and volume, the nature of eligible stocks led to this result. According
to the CSRC requirement, the stocks that are on the list allow margin-trading and
short-selling are required to be large in firm size and high in trading volume (see
Section 3.2). Therefore, to eliminate this effect in future regressions, I include control
variables like price, firm size, and trading volume.
After selecting the matching pairs that contain both eligible and ineligible stocks
for the sample, I run panel regressions to examine whether the eligibility for
margin-trading and short-selling will influence the stocks’ liquidities with and
without control variables that could also affect liquidity. Thus, the regression
equation is:
 ᤼᤼ݑ                                            
where Illiquidityit is the illiquidity measure for stock i on day t; α is the constant of
the regression; MSit is a dummy variable that represents whether stock i is eligible
for margin-trading and short-selling or not and it is equal to one if stock i is eligible
on day t; β is the coefficient on the dummy variable; γ is a constant vector; Xjt is a
vector containing the control variables that include price, volatility, firm size, and
other variables that I proved to be determinants of liquidity in the previous chapter;
and      is the error term. In this panel regression, I also control for both day fixed
effect and firm fixed effect.
Table 14. Summary Statistics for Matched Pairs
In panel A and B, the summary statistics for three matching criteria for eligible stocks and corresponding matched ineligible stocks is showed. Price is the closing price in RMB; Market Cap is the stock’s market
capitalization (in RMB value), which equals to the total value of shares outstanding; Volume is the stock’s trading volume, also in RMB value. All these characteristics are on daily basis. In panel C, the difference in
mean and difference in median of three characteristics between eligible and matched ineligible are showed. T-statistic is for the null hypothesis that the difference in means equals to zero. Z-score is from a
non-parametric Wilcoxon matched-pairs test of the null hypothesis that the difference in medians equals zero. Three (***) asterisks represent statistically significant at 1% level.
Mean Median Standarddeviation Minimum Lower quantile Upper quantile Maximum
Panel A. Eligible stocks characteristic
Price 15.93 12.09 13.44 1.51 7.50 19.83 275.86
Market Cap 2.63×1010 1.23×1010 6.72×1010 6.59×108 7.04×109 2.39×1010 2.21×1012
Volume 3.71×108 1.79×108 6.97×108 2.46×105 8.35×107 3.96×108 3.91×1010
Panel B. Matched ineligible stocks characteristic
Price 15.89 12.07 13.31 1.53 7.51 19.80 273.46
Market Cap 8.85×109 6.93×109 7.92×109 2.94×108 4.58×109 1.05×1010 3.45×1011
Volume 2.52×108 1.43×108 4.01×108 2.09×105 6.93×107 2.95×108 2.41×1010
Panel C. Difference between eligible and ineligible stocks
Difference in Mean T-statistic Difference in Median Z-score
Price 0.039*** 26.42 0.02 1.17
Market Cap 1.74×1010*** 235.21 5.36×109*** 631.92
Volume 1.20×108*** 186.48 3.60×107*** 315.41
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Table 15. Summary Statistics for Illiquidity Measures and Some Control
Variables
Variables Mean Minimum Median Maximum StandardDeviation Observations
Relative Effective
Spread 0.166% 0.0502% 0.144% 1.08% 0.0961% 1598066
Amihud’s Illiquid
Ratio 1.84×10
-10 0 9.67×10-11 8.33×10-09 2.81×10-10 1598066
Price 15.91 2.44 12 96.50 13.17 1598066
Firm Size 2.16×1010 9.24×108 1.09×1010 2.14×1011 3.34×1010 1598066
Volume 2.95×1008 2.27×106 1.58×1008 2.24×1009 3.87×1008 1598066
Volatility 3.03% 0.785% 2.66% 9.08% 1.54% 1598066
Ownership
Concentration 43.52% 0.91% 43.63% 91.00% 21.19% 1598066
Return 0.197% -10% 0.144% 10.02% 3.42% 1598066
Table 16. Correlation Coefficients Matrix for some Control Variables
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Price (1) 1
Firm Size (2) 0.214*** 1
Volume (3) 0.377*** 0.506*** 1
Volatility (4) 0.282*** -0.103*** 0.440*** 1
Ownership
Concentration (5) -0.0867*** 0.0017* -0.117*** -0.0864*** 1
Return (6) 0.0420*** -0.0063*** 0.0979*** 0.0098*** 0.0028*** 1
The summary statistics of most variables used in the regression are listed in
Table 15. The correlation coefficient matrix for the control variables is shown in
Table 16. It is demonstrated that firm size and trading volume have higher
inter-correlation than other variables on an acceptable level.
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6.3 Panel Regressions: Overall Impact on Liquidity
Table 17 presents estimates of regressions using equation (1) where the
dependent variable is the relative effective spread and Amihud’s Illiquid Ratio. All
regressions presented in Table 17 control for the time fixed effect and firm fixed
effect. The independent variable is MS, which is a dummy variable described in
Table 17. Panel Regression: Relative Effective Spread, Amihud’s Illiquid Ratio,
and Status of Eligibility
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0.549*** 0.476*** 0.364*** 0.250***
(0.00621) (0.00606) (0.00582) (0.00671)
Constant
-2.937*** -1.314*** -14.69*** -5.771***
(0.0404) (0.0829) (0.134) (0.196)
Observations 1,389,672 1,385,095 1,389,672 1,385,095
R-squared 0.702 0.718 0.542 0.587
There are two dependent variables: the Relative Effective Spread is the volume-weighted average of minute relative
effective spread, Amihud’s Illiquid Ratio is on daily basis. These variables are taken logarithm form so that their
distributions are more likely to be normally distributed. MS is a dummy variable that equals to one if
margin-trading and short-selling are allowed for one stock at any date and zero otherwise. Price, Firm size, Volume,
Turnover, Volatility and Ownership Concentration are also in logarithm. Because the liquidity is considered to
correlate with itself, the AR(1) is the one lag of the dependent variable with a lag time of one day. More specifically,
AR(1) represents the lagged relative effective spread, lagged Amihud’s Illiquid Ratio. All regressions are controlled
for the time fixed effect as for every day, one daily dummy variable is included in the regression and for each firm,
the fixed effect is also used. The numbers reported in parentheses are standard errors. The estimates with three
(***), two(**), one (*) asterisks are statistically significant at 1%, 5%, 10% level.
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Section 4 and indicates the stock’s eligibility for margin-trading and short-selling.
Columns (1) and (3) do not have any control variables while columns (2) and (4)
include control variables. All the control variables included are determinants from
Chapter 5.
The estimates of the MS variable indicate that the eligibility for margin trading
and short selling is negatively correlated with both the effective spread and Amihud’s
Illiquid Ratio regardless of the inclusion of control variables. Columns (2) and (4)
demonstrate that trading activity liquidity-determinants like price and volume remain
negatively associated with illiquid measures while volatility is positively correlated.
Firm size is also negatively correlated to the spreads and Illiquid ratio, just like the
results from the literature and Chapter 5 of this thesis.
6.4 Event StudyAnalysis
According to the last panel regression results, stocks eligible for margin-trading
and short-selling seem to have higher liquidity than other ineligible stocks. However,
this could result from the nature of eligible stocks that tend to have a large firm size
and higher price. Though I controlled for firm size, price, volume, and other
variables that may contribute to liquidity, this endogeneity problem may still exist.
To address this, I apply the event study approach with a 180-day window before and
after the inception of lifting the ban. Timing is set as follows: time t = 0 is the date in
which the ban was lifted (i.e. inception date), time t = 1 is the first day after the ban
was lifted, time t = −1 is one day that precedes the event and so forth. So, time t
ranges from -180 to 180. As listed in Table 2 in Section 3.2, I choose the first five
events and compare the liquidities of the newly added stocks 180 days before and
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Figure 3. Average Effective Spread and Average Amihud’s Illiquid Ratio before
and after Inception Date
Panel A: Difference in Average Effective Spread between Eligible and Ineligible Stocks
(Difference = Ineligible stocks – Eligible stocks)
Panel B: Difference in Average Amihud’s Illiquid Ratio between Eligible and Ineligible Stocks
(Difference = Ineligible stocks – Eligible stocks)
Panel A plots the difference in average relative effective spread between ineligible and eligible stocks 180 days
before and after each inception date in blue dots, and the fitted line for the scatterplot. Panel B plots the difference
in average Amihud’s Illiquid ratio between ineligible and eligible stocks 180 days before and after each inception
date in blue dots, and the fitted line for the scatterplot.
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after the inception date.
In the first step, I compare the difference in liquidities between stocks eligible
for margin-trading and short-selling and ineligible stocks before and after each event.
I first compute the effective spread and Amihud’s Illiquid ratio for both eligible and
ineligible stocks before and after each event. Then, I calculate the average liquidity
for five events. The results highlight that eligible stocks have lower effective spread
and price impact compared to ineligible stocks even before bans were lifted. This
partially supports the assumption that eligible stocks have features that tend to have
higher liquidity than ineligible stocks. The next step is to calculate the liquidity
difference
between ineligible and eligible stocks and compare the difference before and after the
inception date. In Figure 1, I demonstrate the differences in the effective spread and
Amihud’s Illiquid ratio using a scatterplot. I also draw fitted lines to highlight the
trends of these differences. In both panels, the direction of the fitted lines is upward
with a slope of 1.45×10-7 in panel A and a slope of 1.84×10-3 in panel B. This
indicates that the difference between the liquidities of eligible and non-eligible stocks
became more extensive after the bans on margin-trading and short-selling were
lifted.
After presenting the descriptive evidence, I also pursue another approach to
compare the effect of lifting bans on liquidity before and after each event. I run the
regression following the same regression specifications (Equation 2) from the
previous panel regression analysis for days around each event. The event date is
chosen as the inception date when particular stocks were allowed for margin-trading
and short-selling. For example, 31st March 2010 is the first event date where 90
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stocks that were allowed for margin-trading and short-selling have a dummy variable
MSit that is equal to 1 throughout the sample period (180 days before and after the
event). Therefore, this study contains five events where each event has its sample
period20. This approach, which is different from previous panel regression, involves a
cross-sectional regression that is repeated daily. For each event, the sample contains
the newly added stocks in the eligible list and their matched non-eligible stocks. The
matching method is the same in the previous section but on a semiannual basis.
Instead of using daily price, trading volume, and market value to match a stock in the
same industry for each day, I use the average price, trading volume, and market value
of stocks pre-event for 180 days as matching criteria to select the ineligible stocks.
Once selected, we use them as the matching sample for days both before and
post-event dates. The purpose is to ensure that we are using the same ineligible
stocks as the comparison group for days both before and after the event dates. The
coefficient βit on the dummy variable is recorded for each event occurring on each
day (showed in Table 18 columns (1) to (5)). Also, I calculate the arithmetic mean
that is defined as (β1+ β2+ β3+ β4+ β5)/5 for each day t (see column (6)). To compare
the estimates before and after the event, I apply the t-test. The results are shown in
Table 18.
In Panel A, the illiquidity measure is the relative effective spread and in Panel B,
the illiquidity measure is Amihud’s Illiquid Ratio. In column (1), I present the
coefficients on dummy variable MSit 180 days before and after the first event. For
both liquidity measures, the effects of allowing for margin-trading and short-selling
20 For the first event, the sample span is from 2009/07/06 to 2010/12/27; for the second event, the sample span is
from 2011/03/14 to 2012/08/30; for the third event, the sample span is from 2012/05/11 to 2013/11/07; for the
fourth event, the sample span is from 2012/12/14 to 2014/06/18; and for the fifth event, the sample span is from
2013/12/27 to 2015/06/19.
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Table 18. Event Study: Coefficients on Eligibility (MS) Before and After Each
Event

























90 191 276 206 218 981
Panel A. Relative Effective Spread
Days
(-180,-1)
-0.0372*** -0.0201*** 0.0141*** 0.0170*** 0.00730*** -0.00396***
(0.00520) (0.00195) (0.00170) (0.00205) (0.00243) (0.00131)
Days
(+1, +180)
-0.0361*** -0.00397* -0.00243* -0.00787*** -0.00511** -0.0111***
(0.00430) (0.00208) (0.00146) (0.00176) (0.00210) (0.00114)
Difference
(Before-After)
-0.00108 -0.0161*** 0.01652*** 0.02490*** 0.01241*** 0.00719***
(0.00675) (0.00285) (0.00224) (0.002703) (0.00321) (0.00174)
Panel B. Amihud’s Illiquid Ratio
Days
(-180,-1)
-0.0617*** -0.0192*** -0.0385*** 0.00440 0.0530*** -0.0124***
(0.0124) (0.00636) (0.00503) (0.00684) (0.00683) (0.00359)
Days
(+1, +180)
-0.0608*** -0.00823 -0.0470*** -0.0406*** 0.00706 -0.0298***
(0.0115) (0.00642) (0.00541) (0.00591) (0.00650) (0.00343)
Difference
(Before-After)
-0.00091 -0.01096 0.00852 0.04498*** 0.04591*** 0.01742***
(0.01689) (0.00904) (0.00739) (0.00904) (0.00942) (0.00497)
In columns (1) to (5) record the corresponding estimations of coefficients β on MS from the regression
 ᤼᤼ݑ                                         180 days before and after the first to fifth event according to Table
2. The regression is cross-sectional that include all eligible stocks and matched ineligible stocks while controlled
for firm level fixed effect and is repeated on a daily basis. Columns (6) lists the estimation of average of
coefficients β from all five events. Results in Panel A are the estimations using relative effect spread as illiquidity
and results in Panel B use Amihud’s Illiquid Ratio as illiquidity measure.
occur in the same direction in both before and after the event date. However, the
coefficients increase by 1.08% and 0.09% in the effective spread and price impact
after qualifying the first 90 stocks for margin trading and short selling. This result is
consistent with the findings of Sharif, Anderson, and Marshall (2014). They also use
these 90 stocks from the Chinese stock market, matched them to cross-listed
H-shares, and find that the liquidity of eligible stocks decreased after the first event.
However, my finding is not statistically significant. In column (2), I listed results
around the second event, where stocks eligible for margin-trading and short-selling
have significantly lower spreads before and after the second event. Additionally, for
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the price impact measure, the impact is negative but insignificant after the event. The
results for the first two events underline that the liquidity of eligible stocks declined
relative to ineligible stocks after the events.
However, the third, fourth, and fifth events show different results. In Panel A,
180 days before the event date, the coefficients on MS are positive for third, fourth,
and fifth events. Then, after each event, the coefficients become negative, which
suggests that stocks eligible for margin-trading and short-selling would have higher
liquidity. The differences are all positive and statistically significant, which implies
the liquidity of eligible stocks improved after bans on margin-trading and
short-selling were lifted. In Panel B, the effects of lifting bans on price impact are not
as apparent as the one in Panel A. The difference in the third, fourth, and fifth events
are all positive and two of them are statistically significant at the 1% level,
suggesting a decrease in price impact of the eligible stock after bans were lifted.
Though the differences for the first two events are negative, column (6) shows that
the overall differences are positive and significant, suggesting that lifting bans would
improve liquidities of eligible stocks compared to corresponding matched eligible
stocks.
6.5 Impacts of Margin-trading and Short-selling
The previous sections suggest that stocks eligible for margin-trading and
short-selling are more likely to have higher liquidity. Moreover, the event study
proves the impact of lifting bans on margin-trading and short-selling improves
eligible stock’s liquidity. However, I only focus on the eligibility of margin-trading
and short-selling by solely using one dummy variable that indicates the eligibility
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status. Therefore, in this section, I focus on the trading behaviour of these two
activities by using the sample that only contains stocks eligible for margin-trading
and short-selling. The sample period is still from March 31, 2010 to December 11,
2016. To accurately capture the behaviour of margin-trading and short-selling, I use
two variables that measure their respective trading activities. The regression has the
following specifications:
 ᤼᤼ݑ                 ᤼     ᤼݋      ᤼᤼ܿ   ᤼             
    ᤼݋       ݏ   ᤼                          鈀 
where Illiquidityit is the illiquidity measure; α is the constant of the regression;
Relative Finance Interestit and Relative Short Interestit are independent variables that
measure the margin-trading and short-selling positions (definitions are indicated in
Section 4.4);  ᤼ and    are coefficients on these two variables;   is a constant
vector and Xjt is a vector containing control variables; and      is the error term. In
this panel regression, I also control for both day fixed effect and firm fixed effect.
Table 19 shows estimates of regressions with and without control variables. In
columns (1) and (3), coefficients on both independent variables are statistically
significant and negative, suggesting that both margin-trading and short-selling
activities would improve the liquidities of stocks when excluding control variables.
However, after controlling for the trading activities and firm characteristics that
would influence the stock’s liquidity, the impact of short-selling becomes the
opposite. Both of the results from columns (2) and (4) imply that a higher position in
margin-trading would lower both the effective spread and price impact while a higher
position in short-selling is associated with an increase in the spread and price impact,
which hinders liquidity. This negative impact of short-selling on liquidity is
consistent with the findings of Ma et al. (2018) but inconsistent with that of Li et al.’s
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Table 19. Panel Regressions: Relative Effective Spread, Amihud’s Illiquid Ratio
and Relative Finance Interest and Relative Short Interest
There are two dependent variables: the Relative Effective Spread and Amihud’s Illiquid Ratio, both on daily basis.
These variables are taken logarithm form so that their distributions are more likely to be normal. Relative Finance
interest is the ratio of the number of shares that borrowed yet not repaid to the total number of shares outstanding.
Relative Short interest is the ratio of the number of stocks that be shorted but not repurchased to the total number
of shares outstanding. Price, Firm size, Volume, Turnover, Voaltility and Ownership Concentration are also in
logarithm. Because the liquidity is considered to correlate with itself, the AR(1) is the one lag of the dependent
variable with a lag time of one day. More specifically, AR(1) represents the lagged relative effective spread,
lagged Amihud’s Illiquid Ratio. All regressions are controlled for the time fixed effect and firm fixed effect as for
every day and every stock, one daily dummy variable and one firm dummy variable are included in the regression.
The numbers reported in parentheses are standard errors. The estimates with three (***), two(**), one (*)
asterisks are statistically significant at 1%, 5%, 10% level.
(2018). The impacts of control variables are most consistent with the literature
mentioned in Chapter 5. Price, volume, and firm size are negatively associated with
illiquidity measures while volatility is positively associated. Moreover, the price limit
is positively correlated to both illiquidity measures. However, the impact of
ownership concentration becomes different compared to the results in Section 6.3.
This suggests that for stocks that are eligible for margin-trading and short-selling,
higher concentrated ownership seems to improve the stock’s liquidity. Additionally,
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES Relative EffectiveSpread
Relative Effective
Spread Amihud's Illiquid Amihud's Illiquid
Relative Finance
Interest
-0.659*** -0.925*** -2.235*** -1.521***
(0.0956) (0.0831) (0.314) (0.153)
Relative Short
Interest
-66.04*** 31.96*** -393.2*** 74.39***
(13.50) (11.61) (40.94) (17.96)
Price -0.224*** -0.0376**(0.0153) (0.0164)
Firm Size -0.0943*** -0.319***(0.0122) (0.0264)
Volume -0.0432*** -0.574***(0.00253) (0.00704)





Return 0.684*** -0.130(0.0324) (0.171)
HS300 0.0268*** 0.0353***(0.00677) (0.0133)
Price Limit 0.0672*** 0.767***(0.0143) (0.0340)
AR(1) 0.450*** 0.323*** 0.188*** 0.0276***(0.00903) (0.00700) (0.00517) (0.00286)
Constant -3.583*** -1.176*** -18.84*** -5.847***(0.0595) (0.179) (0.121) (0.354)
Observations 702,987 701,009 702,987 701,009
R-squared 0.691 0.719 0.516 0.594
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the coefficient’s sign in HS300 also changes compared to the previous regression
results, which could simply be caused by the sample changes.I use finance turnover
and short turnover to measure the margin-trading and short-selling activities
(definitions are itemized in Section 4.4). As mentioned in Chapter 4, these variables
are different from finance interest and short interest since they capture the daily
trading activities of margin-trading and short-selling. On the other hand, relative
values of the finance interest and short interest measure the position of
margin-trading and short-selling. To further test the impact of margin-trading and
short-selling activities on a stock’s liquidity, I run a regression with the following
specifications:
 ᤼᤼ݑ                 ᤼     ᤼᤼ܿ      ݋  ᤼ݑ            ݏ      ݋  ᤼ݑ           
       
This equation is significantly similar to equation (3). The only difference is the
changes in the independent variables. The results are shown in Table 20. When
control variables are not considered, the impacts of finance turnover on both
effective spread and price impact are not significant. While short turnover seems
only to decrease the effective spread, it does not do so towards the price impact.
However, after including control variables, the effects of margin-trading and
short-selling activities become well defined. Columns (2) and (4) illustrate that
increased trade in margin-trading activities would lower the illiquidity measures,
which then improves the liquidity. In contrast, short turnovers are positively
associated with both illiquidity measures, which infers that an increase in
short-selling trading would impair a stock’s liquidity. Consistent with literature and
previous results, trading activities like price and volume are negatively associated
with spread and price impact while volatility is positively associated. Firm size is
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Table 20. Panel Regressions: Relative Effective Spread, Amihud’s Illiquid Ratio
and Finance Turnover and Short Turnover
There are two dependent variables: the Relative Effective Spread and Amihud’s Illiquid Ratio, both on daily basis.
These variables are taken logarithm form so that their distributions are more likely to be normal. Finance
Turnover is the ratio of volume of shares being margin-borrowed to the total trading volume. Short Turnover is
the ratio of volume of stocks being shorted to the total trading volume. Price, Firm size, Volume, Turnover,
Voaltility and Ownership Concentration are also in logarithm. Because the liquidity is considered to correlate
with itself, the AR(1) is the one lag of the dependent variable with a lag time of one day. More specifically, AR(1)
represents the lagged relative effective spread, lagged Amihud’s Illiquid Ratio. All regressions are controlled for
the time fixed effect and firm fixed effect as for every day and every stock, one daily dummy variable and one
firm dummy variable are included in the regression. The numbers reported in parentheses are standard errors. The
estimates with three (***), two(**), one (*) asterisks are statistically significant at 1%, 5%, 10% level.
also negatively correlated to both illiquidity measures. Moreover, the coefficient on
price limit is positive as before. In this regression, the impacts of ownership
concentration are unclear, and the impact of listing in HS300 is similar to the last
regression.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES Relative EffectiveSpread
Relative Effective
Spread Amihud's Illiquid Amihud's Illiquid
Finance Turnover
-0.0220 -0.132*** -0.0340 -0.514***
(0.0196) (0.0169) (0.0651) (0.0412)
Short Turnover
-0.367*** 0.0563* 0.694 2.391***



























0.455*** 0.330*** 0.194*** 0.0374***
(0.00913) (0.00716) (0.00528) (0.00289)
Constant
-3.588*** -1.415*** -18.86*** -5.075***
(0.0601) (0.193) (0.123) (0.468)
Observations 702,987 701,006 702,987 701,006
R-squared 0.690 0.717 0.514 0.578




In the previous section, I find that margin-trading improves liquidity while
short-selling hampers stocks’ liquidity. As mentioned in Ma et al.’s (2018) study,
both margin-trading and short-selling activities seem to increase the trading activity.
Hence, both should lead to an improvement in liquidity. Moreover, according to
Diamond and Verrecchia’s (1987) model, short-selling could help incorporate new
information into stock prices, which in turn increases the liquidity. Although the
impact of margin trading on liquidity is comprehensible, the impact of short-selling
on reducing liquidity requires further analysis.
In this paper, I assume that short selling could reduce stock liquidity since short
sellers are informed traders and increase risks associated with adverse selection of
the uninformed traders. According to Cai et al. (2013), short-sellers are most likely to
be informed traders who would deter other non-informed traders from trading the
stock. Therefore, stocks that have more short-sellers would attract less uninformed
traders since the latter would rather trade other stocks. Consequently, this leaves
stocks with high short-selling behaviour with less liquidity. Ultimately, short-selling
activities reduce liquidity because short-sellers are primarily informed traders.
In this section, I will test the hypothesis on whether short-sellers are informed
traders. Previous empirical research (Engelberg et al., 2012; Kolasinski et al., 2013;
Chang et al., 2014; Akbas et al., 2017) suggests that short-sellers are essentially
informed traders who could predict future returns. Chang et al. (2014) suggest that
short-selling in the Chinese stock market is more likely to be an informed activity
and has predictive power on future returns. To test this hypothesis, I begin with the
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following regression that evaluates whether the changes in the margin-trading and
short-selling positions could predict future returns. I utilize the returns on future day
t+2 instead of t+1 to avoid any reversal effect.
     ᤼ݑ           ᤼      ݁ ᤼               ݏ                   (5)
where Returnit+2 is the return of stock i on day t+2; Δmarginit is the change in relative
finance interest of stock i on day t and Δshortit is change in relative short interest of
stock i on day t; Xjt is a vector of control variables that include determinants of
liquidity, past return, and turnover. This regression also controls for both firm fixed
Table 21. Can Change in Margin and Short Predict Future Return
Dependent variable is future return on day t+2.Δmargin is changes in relative finance interest (=relative finance
interestit-relative finance interestit-1) andΔshort is changes in relative short interest (=relative short
interestit-relative short interestit-1). Because the return is considered to correlated with itself, Return (1-5) is the
average return of past five days and Turnover (1-5) is the average turnover of past five days. Price, Firm size,
Volume, Voaltility and Ownership Concentration are also in logarithm. All regressions are controlled for the time
fixed effect and firm fixed effect as for every day and every stock, one daily dummy variable and one firm
dummy variable are included in the regression. The numbers reported in parentheses are standard errors. The
estimates with three (***), two(**), one (*) asterisks are statistically significant at 1%, 5%, 10% level.
Model (1) Model (2) Model (3)
Δmargin -0.0284 0.0180 0.00648(0.0528) (0.0557) (0.0567)
Δshort -2.317*** -2.709*** -2.262**(0.891) (0.909) (0.897)
Return (1-5) -0.0237 -0.0148(0.0176) (0.0178)











Constant 0.000718*** -0.000772 0.0830***(5.87×10-06) (0.000886) (0.00633)
Observations 793,512 776,156 774,394
Adjusted R2 0.476 0.480 0.481
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and day fixed effect. The results are presented in Table 21.
In column (1), I only include two independent variables, namely the changes in
the margin and changes in short. Coefficients imply that changes in the position of
margin-trading have an insignificant impact on future returns while changes in a
short-selling position could predict negative future returns. Since there is always
autocorrelation in returns that depend on past trading activities, I add two control
variables in column (2) to control for the impact of weekly return reversal and
turnover. Return(1-5)it is the average return of the past 5 days while Turnover(1-5)it
is the average turnover of the past 5 days for stock i at time t. After controlling for
past return and turnover, Δshort remains negatively associated with a future return
while Δmargin still has no predictive power. However, the average of past returns
seems to have no significant impact on future returns while an increase in past
turnover could partly predict a lower future return. In column (3), I added more
control variables that include those used in previous sections like price and firm size
where changes in short-selling position remain negatively correlated to a future
return. The outcomes suggest that an increase of 1% in relative short interest would
lead to a 2.26% decrease in the stock’s return. On the contrary, changes in
margin-trading position would not influence the stock’s future return. Results from
these 3 models are consistent with the existing literature, such as Engelberg et al.,
2012 who are arguing that short-sellers are informed traders. Moreover, the results
also support the finding of Chang et al. (2014) that margin-trading investors could
not predict future returns in the Chinese stock market.
To further test the hypothesis that short-selling reduces the stock’s liquidity
because of adverse selection, I assume that in firms with higher information
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asymmetry, short-selling would have a more substantial impact on liquidity than in
firms with less information asymmetry. At this point, I divide the sample into three
groups (Group 1, Group 2, and Group 3) and construct two dummy variables (Group
2 and Group 3). Each group contains stocks with different levels of information
asymmetry. Firm size, institutional ownership, and the number of analysts’ reports
are respectively used as proxies for levels of information asymmetry. I include stocks
with high information asymmetry in Group 1 and stocks with a low level of
information asymmetry in Group 3. The regression is shown in the following
equation:
 ᤼᤼ݑ                 ᤼     ᤼᤼ܿ      ݋  ᤼ݑ             ݑ        ᤼᤼ܿ      ݋  ᤼ݑ 
   鈀      鈀ݑ        ᤼᤼ܿ      ݋  ᤼ݑ     ᤼      ݏ      ݋  ᤼ݑ      
      ݑ         ݏ      ݋  ᤼ݑ     鈀       鈀ݑ       ݏ      ݋  ᤼ݑ     
             鈀 
Illiquidityit is the illiquidity measures that include the relative effective spread and
Amihud’s Illiquid Ratio of stock i on day t; Finance Turnover and Short Turnover are
measures of margin-trading and short-selling activities respectively;  ᤼ is the
coefficient on Finance Turnover that represents the impact of margin-trading activity
on liquidity in stocks with highest information asymmetry;    is the coefficient on
the term     ݑ        ᤼᤼ܿ      ݋  ᤼ݑ  that represents the differential impact of
margin-trading on stocks with a medium level of information asymmetry (stocks in
Group 2) relative to Group 1 stocks;  鈀 is the coefficient on the term    鈀ݑ     
  ᤼᤼ܿ      ݋  ᤼ݑ  that represents the differential impact of margin-trading on
stocks with the highest levels of information asymmetry (stocks in Group 3) relative
to Group 1 stocks. Similarly,  ᤼ shows the impact of short-selling activities on
liquidity in stocks with the highest levels of information asymmetry (stocks in Group
1) while    and  鈀 represent the differential impact of short-selling activity on
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Table 22. Information Asymmetry and Impacts of Finance Turnover and Short
Turnover
Dependent variables are relative effective spread (in Panel A) and Amihud’s Illiquid Ratio (in Panel B). In
columns (1) and (4), firm size is used as measure of information asymmetry level. In columns (2) and (5),
institutional shareholding ratio is used as measure of information asymmetry level. In columns (3) and (6),
number of analysts’ reports is used as measure of information asymmetry level. Control variables include price,
firm size, volume, volatility, ownership concentration, HS300 dummy variable and price limit dummy variable.
Estimates of control variables are not showed in this table. All regressions are controlled for the time fixed effect
and firm fixed effect as for every day and every stock, one daily dummy variable and one firm dummy variable
are included in the regression.  ᤼ and  ᤼ represent the impact of margin-trading activity and short-selling on
liquidity in stocks with highest information asymmetry (stocks in Group 1);    and  鈀 represent the differential
impact of margin-trading on stocks with median and highest information asymmetry (stocks in Group 2 and
Group 3).    and  鈀 represent the differential impact of short-selling activity on stocks median (Group 2) and
highest (Group 3) information asymmetry.  ᤼      is the marginal effect of margin-trading on liquidity of
stocks in Group 2;  ᤼    鈀 is the marginal effect of margin-trading on liquidity of stocks in Group 3;  ᤼     
is the marginal effect of short-selling on liquidity of stocks in Group 2 and  ᤼    鈀 is the marginal effect of
short-selling on liquidity of stocks in Group 3.The numbers reported in parentheses are standard errors. The
estimates with three (***), two(**), one (*) asterisks are statistically significant at 1%, 5%, 10% level.
stocks with medium (Group 2) and highest (Group 3) levels of information
asymmetry. Apart from these coefficients, I also focus on the marginal effect of
Panel A. Relative Effective Spread Panel B. Amihud’s Illiquid Ratio














-0.0323 0.0149 -0.0304* -0.374*** -0.331*** -0.390***
(0.0212) (0.0207) (0.0177) (0.0458) (0.0514) (0.0447)
 ᤼
0.662*** 0.251** 0.842*** 4.404*** 2.481*** 2.189***
(0.179) (0.122) (0.102) (0.689) (0.431) (0.382)
  
-0.156*** -0.0772*** -0.152*** -0.271*** -0.229*** -0.211***
(0.0310) (0.0299) (0.0238) (0.0631) (0.0651) (0.0573)
 鈀
-0.164*** -0.329*** -0.309*** -0.201** -0.228*** -0.269***
(0.0365) (0.0317) (0.0302) (0.0809) (0.0743) (0.0779)
  
-0.531** -0.178 -0.140 -0.900 0.195 0.378
(0.224) (0.156) (0.119) (0.674) (0.435) (0.335)
 鈀
-0.524** -0.396** 0.109 -1.823** -0.117 0.755
(0.214) (0.201) (0.154) (0.726) (0.561) (0.470)
 ᤼     
-0.189*** -0.0623** -0.182*** -0.645*** -0.560*** -0.600***
(0.0246) (0.0243) (0.0239) (0.0563) (0.0551) (0.0578)
 ᤼    鈀
-0.196*** -0.314*** -0.340*** -0.575*** -0.559*** -0.658***
(0.0301) (0.0254) (0.0283) (0.0717) (0.0622) (0.0757)
 ᤼     
0.130 0.0723 -0.0562 3.504*** 2.676*** 2.567***
(0.143) (0.113) (0.117) (0.426) (0.400) (0.365)
 ᤼    鈀
0.138 -0.146 0.193 2.581*** 2.364*** 2.945***
(0.119) (0.171) (0.146) (0.370) (0.480) (0.445)
Observations 700,879 700,879 700,879 700,879 700,879 700,879
Adjusted R2 0.727 0.731 0.723 0.587 0.585 0.584
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margin-trading and short-selling on liquidities. More specifically,  ᤼      ( ᤼  
  ) is the marginal effect of margin-trading (short-selling) on the liquidity of stocks
in Group 2 while
 ᤼    鈀 ( ᤼    鈀 ) is the marginal effect of margin-trading (short-selling) on the
liquidity of stocks in Group 3. The control variables Xit are the same ones used in
equations 1, 2, and 3. Like in the previous regressions, I also controlled for both the
firm fixed effect and day fixed effect in this regression.
In Table 22 columns (1) and (4), firm size is used to capture the level of
information asymmetry and the sample are classified into three groups with the
differential level of information asymmetry. Stocks in Group 1 are stocks with small
firm size with less than two-thirds of other stocks while stocks in Group 3 are those
that have a large firm size with higher than two-thirds of other stocks. The remaining
one-third of stocks with medium sizes are in Group 2. The coefficients  ᤼ for both
illiquidity measures are negative but insignificant for effective spread while
coefficients  ᤼ are both positive and statistically significant. This implies that
finance turnover improves liquidity while short turnover decreases the liquidity of
stocks in Group 1. It is also found that both coefficients    and  鈀 are all negative
for both illiquidity measures. Also, both coefficients    and  鈀 are negative but   
for price impact is not significant. However, to determine the marginal impact of
margin-trading and short-selling on liquidities for Groups 2 and 3, it is vital to focus
on the sum of coefficients.  ᤼      and  ᤼    鈀 show the marginal effect of
finance turnover on the stock liquidity of Groups 2 and 3. All the results are negative
and statistically significant, implying that margin-trading improves the liquidity of
stocks in Groups 2 and 3. In contrast,  ᤼      and  ᤼    鈀 are not significant for
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effective spread. This suggests that the impact of short-selling activity is not
statistically significant on the liquidity for stocks with medium and high levels of
information asymmetry. However, the results from price impact recommend that the
marginal effects of short-selling on liquidity for stocks in Groups 2 and 3 are 3.504
and 2.581, which is less than the effect in Group 1 ( ᤼ = 4.404), which suggests that
Group 1 stocks have the highest price impact, thus lowest liquidity. Overall, when
utilizing firm size as a measure of information asymmetry, the results underline that
short-selling has the most substantial negative impact on both illiquidity measures in
the group of stocks with the highest level of information asymmetry.
In columns (2) and (5), I present the coefficients using the institutional
share-holding ratio as a proxy for the level of information asymmetry. I equally
divide the stocks into three groups according to their institutional shareholding rate.
Stocks with low institutional holding ratios are in Group 1. The coefficients  ᤼ for
price impact are negative and significant. However, for effective spread, these
coefficients are not significant. The  ᤼ is both positive and statistically significant.
This denotes that finance turnover improves price impact while short turnover
decreases the liquidity of stocks with high levels of information asymmetry.
Furthermore, the outcomes highlight that both coefficients    and  鈀 are all
negative for both illiquidity measures. Coefficients    for effective spread are
negative and  鈀 in columns (2) and (5) are also negative. However, most of them
are not statistically significant. The sum of coefficients  ᤼      and  ᤼    鈀 ,
which show the marginal effect of finance turnover on the stocks’ liquidity of Groups
2 and 3 are negative. This signifies that margin-trading still improves the liquidity of
stocks in Groups 2 and 3. Both  ᤼      and  ᤼    鈀 are insignificant for effective
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spread. By using the effective spread as a measure for stocks with medium and high
levels of information asymmetry, this implies that the impact of short-selling activity
on liquidity is insignificant. However,  ᤼      in column (5) is higher than  ᤼ ,
indicating that short-selling in stocks with a medium institutional shareholding ratio
would have the strongest negative effect on price impact. Overall results suggest that
short-selling activities would have a negative impact on effective spread only in
those stocks with the lowest institutional shareholding ratio and have the highest
levels of information asymmetry.
In columns (3) and (6), when using thw number of analysts’ reports as a proxy
for the level of information asymmetry, results are notably similar to the previous
ones. Both  ᤼ and  ᤼ suggest that margin-trading improves liquidity while
short-selling does otherwise. Coefficients  ᤼      and  ᤼    鈀 are all
statistically significant and positive, which highlights that margin-trading could also
improve the liquidities of stocks with medium and low levels of information
asymmetry. The insignificant  ᤼      and  ᤼    鈀 of effective spread proves that
for stocks with medium and low levels of information asymmetry, short-selling
seems to have an insignificant effect. However, in column (6), both  ᤼      and
 ᤼    鈀 are positive and statistically significant and are larger than  ᤼ . This
indicates that short-selling would decrease liquidity the most in stocks with the
highest number of analyst reports. In summary, the marginal impact of short-selling
in Groups 2 and 3 vary across different measures of illiquidity. Short-selling in stocks
with the highest levels of information asymmetry would have the strongest and
significant negative impact on effective spread while short-selling increases price
impact the most in stocks with the highest level of information asymmetry.
CHAPTER 6 IMPACTS OF MARGIN-TRADING AND SHORT-SELLING ON LIQUIDITY
108
Despite the discrepancy in the last measure of information asymmetry, results
from Tables 21 and 22 support the hypothesis that short-sellers are informed traders.
First, their positions have a predictive power of returns that margin-traders do not
possess. The trading behavior of short sellers would deter other uninformed investors
from trading the stocks. Having said this, in stocks with the highest levels of
information asymmetry, short-selling tends to have the strongest negative impact on
liquidity, especially when using the effective spread as a measure of illiquidity.
6.6.2 Influences from Market Conditions
In this section, I further investigate the impact of margin-trading and
short-selling on liquidity under poor market conditions. Several researchers, such as
Beber and Pagano (2013) argue that a short-sale ban during the financial crisis
actually hinders the market’s liquidity. However, the regulators still believe that
short-selling would decrease a stock’s liquidity. Moreover, the impact of
margin-trading on liquidity during a crisis seems to be different compared to
operations in a normal market condition. Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2009) explain
that when stocks have large losses, the impact of funding liquidity and stocks’
liquidities would spiral to the point that both would dry up and further impair the
other. Kahraman and Tookes (2017) confirmed this empirically using data from the
Indian stock market. Margin-trading would decrease liquidity during a crisis period
rather than improve as it does during the normal period.
To investigate whether the impacts of margin-trading and short-selling on
liquidity are different during the crisis period, I separate the sample into two parts,
one with a poor market condition and the other that contains the rest. One dummy
variable called “Downturn” is used to represent the market state, such as whether it is
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in poor condition or not. My method involves two ways to define this dummy
variable: (1) Downturn is equal to one if the index return is less than 20th percentile
and (2) Downturn is equal to one if index return is less than negative five per cent.
I first examine whether market conditions would change the impact of eligibility
on liquidity. Following equation 1 and after adding the dummy variable Downturn,
the regression will have the following specifications:
 ᤼ݑ                 ᤼                       ᤼ݑ ᤼ݎ                   (7)
 ᤼ is the coefficient on eligibility MS and represents the impact of MS when
the market is in a normal condition;  ᤼      then represent the marginal effect of
MS when the market is in poor condition; and Xit is a vector that includes all control
variables used in previous regressions. The results are shown in Table 23.
In Panel A, the dummy variable is initially defined as equal to one when the
index return is less than the 20th percentile. Using both illiquid measures,  ᤼
coefficients are negative and statistically significant. This is consistent with the
results in Table 23 that stocks eligible for margin-trading and short-selling would
have lower spread and price impact, thus have higher liquidity. The same result still
holds in Panel B as Downturn is defined in a second way, which is equal to one when
the index return is less than -5%.  ᤼ in Panels A and B prove that being eligible for
margin-trading and short-selling could improve liquidity in overall sample period
and sample period when market performance is in either a normal or good state. All
coefficients of    are positive and statistically significant while the coefficients of
 ᤼      are all positive where most of them are significantly different from zero.
This result infers that when market performance is poor, especially when the index
return is extremely at low levels, the stocks eligible for margin-trading and
CHAPTER 6 IMPACTS OF MARGIN-TRADING AND SHORT-SELLING ON LIQUIDITY
110
Table 23. Poor Market Condition and Impact of Eligibility on Liquidity
Dependent variables are relative effective spread (in columns (1) and (3)) and Amihud’s Illiquid Ratio (in
columns (2) and (4)). In Panel A, downturn is defined equals to one when the index return is less than its 20th
percentile. In Panel B, downturn is defined equals to one when the market index return is less than minus five
percent. Independent variable is MS, a dummy variable equals to one if a stock is eligible for margin-trading and
short-selling on particular day. Control variables include price, firm size, volume, volatility, ownership
concentration, HS300 dummy variable and price limit dummy variable. Estimates of control variables are not
showed in this table. All regressions are controlled for the time fixed effect and firm fixed effect as for every day
and every stock, one daily dummy variable and one firm dummy variable are included in the regression.  ᤼
represent the impact of MS on liquidity when market is not under poor condition;    is the differential impact of
MS on liquidity when market is under poor condition.  ᤼      is the marginal effect of MS on liquidity when
market is under poor performance. The numbers reported in parentheses are standard errors. The estimates with
three (***), two(**), one (*) asterisks are statistically significant at 1%, 5%, 10% level.
short-selling would have lower liquidity than ineligible stocks.
Since the impact of eligibility on liquidity changes in poor market conditions, I
proceed to investigate whether the impact of margin-trading and short-selling
activities on liquidity would change under poor market conditions or not. The
regression takes place in the following form:
       ݑ           ᤼     ᤼᤼ܿ      ݋  ᤼ݑ           ᤼᤼ܿ    ݋  ᤼ݑ       ᤼ݑ ᤼ݎ  
   ᤼      ݏ      ݋  ᤼ݑ            ݏ    ݋  ᤼ݑ       ᤼ݑ ᤼ݎ      
             鈀 
Coefficients  ᤼ and  ᤼ represent the impact of margin-trading and short-selling
activities when the market is in a normal or good condition. The sum of coefficients
 ᤼      and  ᤼      then represent the marginal effect of margin-trading and
short-selling activities when the market is in poor conditions.
Panel A
Downturn=1 if index return < 20th
percentile
Panel B
Downturn=1 if index return < -5%










-0.0205*** -0.0582*** -0.0170*** -0.0305***
(0.00357) (0.00763) (0.00355) (0.00744)
  
0.0213*** 0.110*** 0.0523*** 0.157***
(0.00316) (0.0104) (0.0186) (0.0179)
 ᤼     
0.000858 0.05140*** 0.03526** 0.12655***
(0.00444) (0.01011) (0.01892) (0.01838)
Observations 1,362,391 1,362,391 1,362,391 1,362,391
R-squared 0.719 0.616 0.719 0.587
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Table 24. Poor Market Condition and Impact of Margin-trading and
Short-selling on Liquidity
Dependent variables are relative effective spread (in columns (1) and (3)) and Amihud’s Illiquid Ratio (in
columns (2) and (4)). In Panel A, downturn is defined equals to one when the index return is less than its 20th
percentile. In Panel B, downturn is defined equals to one when the market index return is less than minus five
percent. Dependent variables are finance turnover (the ratio of volume of shares being margin-borrowed to the
total trading volume) and short turnover (the ratio of volume of stocks being shorted to the total trading volume).
Control variables include price, firm size, volume, volatility, ownership concentration, HS300 dummy variable
and price limit dummy variable. Estimates of control variables are not showed in this table. All regressions are
controlled for the time fixed effect and firm fixed effect as for every day and every stock, one daily dummy
variable and one firm dummy variable are included in the regression.  ᤼ and  ᤼ represent the impact of
margin-trading activity and short-selling on liquidity in stocks under normal market conditions;  ᤼      is the
marginal effect of margin-trading on liquidity of stocks under poor market condition;  ᤼      is the marginal
effect of short-selling on liquidity of stocks in crisis period. The numbers reported in parentheses are standard
errors. The estimates with three (***), two(**), one (*) asterisks are statistically significant at 1%, 5%, 10%
level.
The related coefficients are shown in Table 24. Using both illiquid measures and
definitions of poor market performance, the  ᤼ coefficients are all negative and
statistically significant. This is consistent with the results in Table 20 that highlight
how margin-trading would improve liquidity. The  ᤼ coefficients in Panels A and B
are all positive but insignificant in column (1), which suggests that short-selling
activities would decrease the liquidity. Generally, using the overall sample periods,
the impacts of finance turnover and short turnover turn out to be the same when
Panel A
Downturn=1 if index return < 20th
percentile
Panel B
Downturn=1 if index return < -5%
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Effective Spread Amihud's Illiquid Effective Spread Amihud's Illiquid
 ᤼
-0.127*** -0.525*** -0.129*** -0.530***
(0.0171) (0.0414) (0.0170) (0.0414)
 ᤼
0.0662 2.399*** 0.2775*** 2.285***
(0.0915) (0.327) (0.0911) (0.326)
  
0.262** 1.099*** 0.433*** 1.094***
(0.102) (0.0939) (0.0915) (0.138)
  
-0.985** -7.931*** -1.053* -5.920***
(0.439) (0.655) (0.559) (1.050)
 ᤼     
0.134 0.574*** 0.304 0.564***
(0.104) (0.0848) (0.494) (0.132)
 ᤼     
-0.919** -5.532*** -0.976* -3.635**
(0.437) (1.611) (0.562) (1.018)
Observations 689,596 689,596 689,596 689,596
R-squared 0.718 0.580 0.718 0.582
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market performance is not at extremely poor levels. All coefficients of    are
positive and statistically significant while the coefficients of    are negative and
significant in both panels that use both illiquidity measures. The coefficients of  ᤼  
   are all positive but insignificant when using the effective spread as an illiquidity
measure. This result infers that when the market performance is poor, the
margin-trading activity would increase price impact. On the other hand, the
coefficients of  ᤼      are all negative and statistically different from zero in Panels
A and B. This suggests that short-selling activity actually decreases the spread and
price impact, which then improves a stock’s liquidity when the market has extremely
negative returns. This result is coherent with the prediction of Diamond and
Verrecchia (1987). In their study, they expound on how constraints in short-sale
would prevent the incorporation of negative information into the stock’s price that
hinders the price discovery process and decreases a stock’s liquidity. In my case,
when a market is in poor condition, information circulated in the market is more
likely to be negative. Therefore, stocks that have a higher prevalence of short-selling
activities integrate negative expectations into the price more rapidly, which then
improves liquidity.
6.7 Conclusions
The overall results highlight that stocks eligible for margin-trading and
short-selling could improve market liquidity. The robustness of the result becomes
evident when using an event study. Moreover, I prove that margin-trading activities
dominate the market, where its positioning and trading behavior simultaneously
improve liquidity. In contrast, short-selling has detrimental impacts on liquidity
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given that I assume is caused by adverse selection. To support this hypothesis, I
prove that changes in the short-selling position appear to predict future returns.
Additionally, short-selling activities have the greatest negative impact on liquidities
in stocks that have the highest levels of information asymmetry. In contrast, while
changes in margin position have no predictive power of the returns, margin-trading
activities have a stronger positive impact on liquidities of stocks with medium and
low levels of information asymmetry. Furthermore, the results verify that stocks
eligible for margin-trading and short-selling tend to have lower levels of liquidity
during a market crisis period. The impacts of both activities also become opposite
under poor market conditions. More specifically, increased margin-trading is
associated with a higher price impact. This result is consistent with the findings of
Kahraman and Tookes (2017) where margin-trading improves liquidity during a
normal market period and decreases liquidity when under crisis. However,
short-selling activities would improve liquidity when markets are not performing
well. The result also partially supports the prediction of Diamond and Verrecchia
(1987) that a short-sale ban would prevent the incorporation of negative information
into the stock’s price. When the market condition is poor or in crisis, stocks tend to
deliver bad news rather than good. Therefore, short-sellers help disseminate negative
information and incorporate it into the stock price. The improvement in price
efficiency would become evident in the same way as liquidity. Generally, the
findings attempt to explain the discrepancies between the governors’ regulations and
the theoretical and empirical findings from literature about the impact of short-sale
bans during a financial crisis period. The governors believe that short-selling would
be harmful to liquidity since its overall impact on liquidity is negative and
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short-sellers are more likely to be informed traders. On the other hand, the research
findings on short-sale bans are also accurate given that these bans hinder the
integration of information into the stock prices and ultimately lowers the liquidity
during a market crash period.
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CHAPTER 7: IMPACT OF MARGIN-TRADING AND
SHORT-SELLING ON LEAD-LAG EFFECTS IN
LIQUIDITYAND RETURN
7.1 Introduction
In 2015, the Chinese stock market encountered a severe market crisis from June
15 to mid-September. Before the crisis began, the stock market prices skyrocketed as
the price of the Shanghai Composite Index rose by 150% in less than a year.
Simultaneously, these events boosted leveraged trade, which includes margin-trading
and short-selling. However, on June 15, 2015, after several large stocks plummeted,
the prices of other median and small stocks also began to fall sharply. At the end of
that day, over 1,000 stocks hit the lower price limit as their prices decreased by 10%
compared to the closing prices from the previous trading day. In the following
trading days, stock prices continued to decrease. From June 15 to September 13,
2015, there were a total of 16 out of 59 trading days, where over 1,000 stocks hit the
lower price limit. Interestingly, it is observed that several large-cap stocks first hit the
lower price limit, then other stocks followed this trend and hit the price limit. On one
hand, as the regulators crackdown the most active speculators, the first round of
selling takes place. Consequently, this leads to the financial loss of numerous
speculators. Furthermore, this worsens the liquidity’s state and the dropping of prices.
Investors with high leverage need to address problems brought upon by huge margin
calls that force them to liquidate their positions. As a result, prices drop even further
and liquidity continues to decrease. On the other hand, markets in poor conditions
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make it tougher for leveraged-trading investors to raise the necessary capital to meet
the margin requirement. In doing so, these investors will be forced to sell their other
stocks that were not traded on leverage. The media believed that margin-trading
caused these events to occur. As Richardson et al. (2017) argue, an aggregate
negative shock in the ease of access to funding capital will cause highly invested and
leveraged stocks to experience greater movements in returns. The media blamed high
levels of leverage trading that led to stock return comovement, which ultimately
caused the market to crash and the stock liquidity to dry up.
Many empirical studies already showed that leverage trading, including
margin-trading and short-selling, could impact stocks’ liquidities and price
discoveries (e.g., Chang et al., 2007; Chang et al., 2014; Chen et al., 2016; Kahraman
and Tookes, 2017). Results from Chapter 6 are also consistent with these literature,
suggesting that margin-trading and short-selling would have impact on stock’s
liquidity. Moreover, many studies suggest that leverage trading could increase the
comovements among stocks. Schinasi and Smith (2000) show that investors’
leverage could help explaining the spread of shocks from one asset to the other.
Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2009) further predict that losses on existing positions
would pose constrains on funding liquidity, which further lead to the deleverage of
other stocks, thus increases the liquidity commonality among various securities.
Caccioli et al. (2014) demonstrate that the overlapping portfolios and leveraged
investments could amplify contagions during the financial crisis period. These
theoretical studies indicate that leverage trading have an impact on all stocks, not
only those stocks that allowed for margin-trading and short-selling, also those
ineligible stocks. However, very few empirical studies focus on investigating the
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lead-lag effect between leveraged stocks and un-leveraged stocks. In most equity
markets (e.g. the U.S. market and the European markets), almost all stocks can be
leverage traded during recent decades. Therefore, it is difficult to investigate the
spillover effect of leveraged stocks. In contrast, only part of stocks in the Chinese
stock markets are eligible for leverage trading (i.e. margin-trading and short-selling),
while these eligible stocks change over time. This setting provides a perfect natural
experiment that allows immediate investigation on the impact of investor leverage on
liquidity and return spillover to other stocks. Taking advantage of unique market
setting in the Chinese stock market, I will investigate the extent of how
margin-trading and short-selling impact comovements in liquidity. In this chapter, I
will focus on the comovements between stocks that are eligible and ineligible for
leverage trading. More specifically, I will investigate how leverage trading
contributes to the lead-lag in liquidity and lead-lag in return at the intraday level. As
the literature documents these comovements on both daily and monthly bases, I will
attempt to prove that those are formed at the intraday level, where eligible stocks
would lead ineligible stocks in liquidity and return. Ultimately, my hypothesis states
that stocks eligible for margin trading and short selling influence the liquidity and
returns of ineligible stocks while the level of leveraged trading impacts the overall
intraday lead-lag effect.
Actual market observations, along with the literature, help explain the formation
of comovement in liquidity and returns. First, according to Brunnermeier and
Pedersen’s (2009) theoretical analysis, leverage traders would face heavier funding
constraints when the market drops. More specifically, they assume that investors hold
two stocks, where one is an eligible stock where a trader uses leverage and the other
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is an ineligible stock without any leverage. When investors experience a price drop
in the eligible stock, they have to either reduce the eligible stock’s position or add
capital to meet the margin requirements. If the investors choose the first option, they
lose more money since they trade on leverage. Therefore, investors prefer the second
choice that maintains their capital by selling ineligible stock. When the market
crashes, it would be more difficult for margin-traders to raise capital and meet
margin-call requirements. In turn, they will have to sell the other stocks that are not
used for leverage trading. This would decrease the price of non-leveraged stocks,
which leads to a decrease in liquidity of ineligible stocks. Even when investors lose
money on both eligible and ineligible stocks, they would be more prone to trade
ineligible stocks to satisfy the margin requirements. Moreover, according to Gromb
and Vayanos’s (2002) model, investors use leverage traded stock A as collateral to
leverage the purchase of stock B. Then, a shock in stock A’s price could lead to the
forced deleveraging of stock A. Eventually, this causes the forced liquidation of stock
B as the collateral’s value decreases and fails to meet the margin requirement,
especially when investors face constraints in funding liquidities. Therefore, stock
trading with leverage on a given level will influence the lead-lag in liquidity and
return. This is also known as the deleveraging channel that causes liquidity and
returns lead-lag between eligible and ineligible stocks.
Apart from leverage trading, I also find other reasons that could help explain the
lead-lag between eligible and ineligible stocks in liquidity and return. The second
channel, the speed of information diffusion, is where stocks eligible for
margin-trading and short-selling could influence the comovement in liquidity. Early
studies like Lo and MacKinlay (1990) and many other studies (Hou and Moskowitz,
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2005; Hou, 2007) find a lead-lag relationship between weekly returns of large-sized
and small-sized stocks. They argue that the diffusion speed of market or
industry-wide information on every stock causes this lead-lag relation. Stocks with
larger firm sizes convey information at faster speeds, causing their prices to
correspondingly react at a faster speed. In contrast, small-sized stocks incorporate
information into the prices at a slower speed. As a result, researchers observe a
lead-lag in returns between stocks with large and small firm sizes. Apart from the
firm’s size, institutional ownership also affects the lead-lag effect in returns, which is
caused by the differences in speeds of information diffusion (Chan and Hameed,
2006). In the Chinese stock market, Chang et al. (2014) find that lifting bans on
margin-trading and short-selling helps improve price efficiency and enable prices to
incorporate more information. Additionally, Chen et al. (2016) find that prices of
stocks allowed for margin-trading and short-selling become more efficient. Then, the
intensity of margin-trading and short-selling are also positively associated with price
efficiency, which suggests that margin-trading and short-selling assist the efficient
incorporation of information into the stock prices. Recent research shows that the
speed of information diffusion influences stock prices, leading to the lead-lag effect
in stock returns. Therefore, I would argue that stocks eligible for margin-trading and
short-selling could lead returns and possibly, the liquidity, of ineligible stocks. In
summary, this “information diffusion speed” channel helps explain the lead-lag
effect.
The third reason why eligible stocks could cause liquidity lead-lag in ineligible
stocks is known as the “cross asset learning”. According to Cespa and Foucault
(2014), liquidity providers like institutional investors or fund managers are often
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informed about a certain stock from the prices of other stocks. Moreover, they argue
that this cross asset learning process associates price informativeness and liquidity in
self-reinforcing and positive ways, which causes a liquidity spillover. For example, if
an investor holds stock A and learns information from stock B, a decrease in the
liquidity of stock B will cause its price to become less informative. Consequently, the
uncertainty of investors holding stock A increases, which further leads to the
decrease in liquidity of stock A. Therefore, a small drop in the liquidity of one stock
could result in a decrease of another and cause a lead-lag effect in liquidity. Chen et
al. (2018) confirm this theory by highlighting the lead-lag effect in the liquidity
between SPYs and E-minis during the financial crisis period. The decrease of
liquidity in SPY leads to both liquidity drops in E-minis and an illiquidity contagion.
In the Chinese stock market, stocks eligible for margin-trading and short-selling
always have a large firm size, trading volume, and institutional shareholding, which
are usually regarded as reference stocks like stock B in the previous example. Hence,
liquidity changes in eligible stocks will affect ineligible stocks if the investors who
hold ineligible stocks use eligible stocks as reference stocks. This reason is known as
the “cross asset learning” channel.
Apart from liquidity, I argue that volatility, as a cardinal determinant of liquidity,
could also influence the informativeness of the reference stocks. An increase in stock
volatility implies that investors have more uncertainties about the price. As a measure
of risk, volatility could reflect the price uncertainty from the investors’ point of view.
For example, investors who hold one stock X could use the volatility in stock Y as a
source of information related to the price changes in Y. An increase in stock Y’s
volatility could be viewed as a decrease in the certainty of stock Y’s price. The drop
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in the price informativeness of stock Y leads to the uncertainty of holding stock X,
which further leads to less trading of stock X. Consider investors like fund managers
and institutional investors that hold several stocks, including eligible and ineligible
stocks. If the volatility of eligible stocks increases, the informativeness about the
stocks’ prices decreases. Then, investors using eligible stocks as reference stocks
would become reluctant to trade both eligible and ineligible stocks. Therefore,
increases in the volatility of one stock could impact the price and liquidity of another.
Following the “cross asset learning” theory, changes in volatility could be viewed as
changes in the price informativeness.
Recent literature uses weekly or daily data to investigate the comovements in
liquidities and returns (e.g. Lo and MacKinlay, 1990; Conrad, Gultekin, and Kaul,
1991; Fargher and Weigand, 1998; Hou and Moskowitz, 2005; Hou, 2007; Li et al.,
2018). If comovements could be observed at the daily or weekly level, we should
observe the lead-lag relation at the intraday level. In this chapter, I will utilise the
intraday data to investigate the lead-lag effects in liquidities and returns from a micro
perspective. This study seeks to contribute to the literature by expanding the
understanding of how comovements in liquidity and return are formed through the
intraday data. If there were comovements on a daily or weekly basis, using
high-frequency minute data would be better to understand the evolution and
formation of comovements. In this chapter, I find a strong lead-lag relation in
liquidities and returns between stocks eligible and ineligible for leverage trading.
More specifically, stocks eligible for margin-trading lead the liquidity and return of
ineligible stocks. These lead-lag effects exist for individual stock analysis and under
different market conditions. When using all eligible stocks as the portfolio and
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ineligible stocks as the other, there are also strong lead-lag relations in liquidity and
returns between the eligible and ineligible portfolios of stocks. Further robustness
test also proves that the lead-lag effects are not solely caused by the firm
characteristic of eligible stocks. Using mediation analysis, I study the impact of
leverage trading on lead-lag in liquidities and returns through different mediation
channels. Over half of the impact is caused by the deleverage channel and one-third
could be explained through cross asset learning. The speed of information diffusion
is also a channel that helps explain the impact of leverage trading on lead-lag in
liquidity and return.
7.2 Data Description and Methodology
In this section, I use the intraday data, including the 1-minute bid price, ask price,
trading price, and the return and trading volumes to estimate the changes in
liquidities and price discovery process during the day. In contrast with the daily data,
this intraday, 1-minute frequency data could provide more details and accurate
information about the dynamic in liquidities and the price discovery process between
eligible and ineligible stocks, especially during specific market conditions. The
sample period begins from September 22, 2014, when a total of 900 stocks were
allowed for margin-trading and short-selling until a day before December 12, 2016,
when the number of eligible stocks increased to 950. The sample period generally
covers market conditions that are in steady, boosting, and crisis states. This section
includes 900 sample stocks eligible for margin-trading and short-selling, along with
the corresponding matched ineligible stocks.
The matching approach and criteria are the same ones from Section 6.2. I use
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industry, closing price, market capitalization, and daily trading volume as matching
criteria. The prices, market capitalization, and trading volume of matched ineligible
stocks have values that are closest to eligible stocks in the same industry. The
summary statistics for matching pairs are listed in Table 25. In Panels A and B, I
listed the summary statistics of three matching criteria for eligible and ineligible
stocks. Eligible stocks have greater firm sizes and higher trading volumes.
Additionally, the t-test results from Panel C show that eligible stocks tend to have
higher prices, market capitalizations, and trading volumes than ineligible stocks. To
control for this difference in matching results, in Section 7.5, I execute the robustness
check. Then, for the regressions in Section 7.6, I include all three matching criteria as
the control variables.
To investigate the lead-lag relation in liquidities between margin and non-margin
stocks, I use the vector autoregression (VAR) method, which follows the
methodology of Hou (2007). The VAR equations are as follows.
                  
  ᤼
 
       ᝝           
  ᤼
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       ᝝               
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 
       ᝝           
  ᤼
 
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In Equation (9), the LHS is the liquidity of stocks eligible for margin-trading and
short-selling (eligible stocks hereafter)21. While in Equation (10), the variable on the
left is the liquidity of stocks ineligible for margin-trading or short-selling (ineligible
stocks
21Eligible stocks refer to stocks eligible for margin-trading and short-selling while ineligible stocks are those
stocks that are not eligible for margin-trading nor short-selling.
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Table 25. Summary Statistics for Matched Pairs
In panel A and B, the summary statistics for three matching criteria for eligible stocks and corresponding matched ineligible stocks is showed. Price is the closing price in RMB; Market Cap is the stock’s
market capitalization (in RMB value), which equals to the total value of shares outstanding; Volume is the stock’s trading volume, also in RMB value. All these characteristics are on daily basis. In panel C, the
difference in mean and difference in median of three characteristic between eligible and matched ineligible are showed. T-statistic is for the null hypothesis that the difference in means equals to zero. Z-score is
from a non-parametric Wilcoxon matched-pairs test of the null hypothesis that the difference in medians equals zero. Three (***) asterisks represent statistically significant at 1% level.
Mean Median Standarddeviation Minimum Lower quantile Upper quantile Maximum
Panel A. Eligible stocks characteristic
Price 17.57 13.88 13.58 1.92 8.82 21.95 261.21
Market Cap 2.48×1010 1.32×1010 5.17×1010 1.17×109 7.95×109 2.43×1010 2.21×1012
Volume 5.05×108 2.62×108 8.41×108 2.46×105 1.30×108 5.55×108 3.79×1010
Panel B. Matched ineligible stocks characteristic
Price 17.55 13.89 13.52 2.15 8.83 21.93 273.46
Market Cap 9.71×109 8.02×109 7.47×109 4.07×108 5.65×109 1.14×1010 3.45×1011
Volume 3.47×108 2.17×108 4.92×108 2.09×105 1.15×108 4.14×108 2.41×1010
Panel C. Difference between eligible and ineligible stocks
Difference in Mean T-statistic Difference in Median Z-score
Price 0.014*** 10.32 -0.01 -1.207
Market Cap 1.51×1010*** 201.14 5.18×109*** 468.37
Volume 1.58×108*** 151.41 4.50×107*** 226.58
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hereafter). Given the multiple stocks on different days, I assign an ID i to each pair
on sample days22 for the different pairs of stocks on different days.        is the
margin stock’s liquidity from the ith pair at the tth minute and        is the tth
minute’s liquidity of non-margin stock from the ith pair.The coefficient ai,k in equation
9 indicates the autocorrelation of eligible stock i's liquidities. Coefficient bi,k
represents the extent of how an ineligible stock’s liquidity would influence the
liquidity of an eligible stock. In contrast, the coefficient ci,k measures how an eligible
stock’s liquidity would affect an ineligible stock’s liquidity. The coefficient di,k in
equation 10 shows the autocorrelation in the ineligible stock’s liquidities. To
determine the lead-lag effect, I compare coefficient bi,k to ci,k and calculate the
difference between ci,k and bi,k (i.e. c – b). If coefficient ci,k is larger than bi,k , it
suggests that the eligible stock leads the ineligible stock in liquidity.
In this chapter, we utilize the same liquidity measures (actually, they should be
illiquidity measures)from the previous chapter, which are the relative effective spread
and Amihud’s Illiquid Ratio. In contrast to the last two chapters, both spread and
price impact are calculated using high-frequency data. Therefore, I use following
specifications to calculate the relative effective spread price impact on one-minute
time interval.




where Pt is the trading price at the tth minute; Mt is the mid-point price at the tth
minute, which is equal to half of the bid price and ask price at minute t; Rt is the tth
minute’s return; and Volt is the total trading volume (in RMB value) during the tth
22 So for each pair of stocks on different days, it would have one specific ID number. For example, there are 850
pairs of stocks on day 1 that have the ID numbers from 1 to 850. Then, the 10th pair of stock on day 2 will have
an ID number of 860.
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minute.
To determine the number of lags used in the regression, I first calculate the daily
Akaike information criterion (AIC) and Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC) for
each pair of stocks. Both criteria suggest that using one lag would be the most
appropriate. More specifically, since for nearly all pairs of stocks, the lowest AIC and
BIC appear at one lag while both criteria increase with the number of lags. Then, I
also run the augmented Dickey-Fuller test (ADF) to each pair of matched stocks to
test for the unit roots. Since the result is significantly larger than the critical value,
this suggests that there is no unit root and there is no need for the use of the
difference in liquidity; instead, using liquidity will suffice. The results imply that
there are no unit roots with one, five, or even ten lags. Therefore, as the AIC and BIC
imply, it is natural to use only one lag in the regressions. Also, I include all five lags
in the regressions to ensure that the information shock does not fully cause the
lead-lag effects. An interval of five minutes is also widely used in technical analysis.
I estimate both Equations (9) and (10) for each pair of stocks each day with one (K=1)
and five (K=5) lags respectively.
The Chinese stock market has specific trading rules that impact price changes
and trading activities. As mentioned in Chapter 5, one is the price limit rule, where
the trading price on the current day can only increase or decrease by 10% of the
closing price on the previous trading day. When the stock hits the price limit, the
trading volume would suddenly drop, as the price can no longer be moved up or
down anymore. After the stock hits the price limits, this trading rule causes the
trading volume of several stocks to be maintained at very low levels or even become
zero. Concurrently, the spreads are impossible to calculate since there is no bid or ask
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prices when hitting upward or downward limits. Therefore, if the stocks hit the price
limit in a short time (e.g. less than 30 minutes), the useful observations for the
calculation of different liquidity measures would no longer suffice to run VAR. To
obtain accurate estimations, I only include stocks that have at least 30 valid daily
observations to run regressions with one lag and at least 40 valid daily observations
to run regressions that contain five lags.
7.3 Lead-Lag Effects in Liquidities
Table 26 summarizes the results of the VAR estimations. In liquidities, I find
that eligible and ineligible stocks are mutually influencing as the coefficients and
sums of coefficients b and c are significantly different from zero in both one-lag and
five-lag regressions. More importantly, all the differences between c and b or (c－b)
that utilise different illiquidity measurements are both positive and statistically
significant at the 1% level. This suggests that eligible stocks have more impact on
ineligible stocks’ liquidities. Besides, coefficients a and d suggest that liquidities of
eligible and ineligible stocks are autocorrelated and self-reinforcing. The results
support the hypothesis that eligible stocks would lead the liquidities of ineligible
stocks.
I proceed to examine whether these lead-lag effects in liquidities between
eligible and ineligible stocks still exist under different market conditions. In Table 27,
I separate the whole sample period into three cases: days with relatively good market
conditions, days with normal market conditions, and days with relatively poor market
conditions according to the index return. If the index return is higher (less) than its
80th (20th) percentile, the market condition is defined to be under good (poor)
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Table 26. Coefficients from VAR: Lead-lag in Liquidities
conditions and the remaining days are defined as normal conditions. In Panels A and
C, I initially find that under all three market conditions, eligible stocks still lead
ineligible stocks in liquidities given that the differences (c－b) are all significantly
positive. Then, I perform the difference in differences test by comparing the
differences (c－b) under different market conditions. The results from Panels B and
D suggest that the difference (c－b) under good market conditions is higher than the
difference under normal and poor market conditions. The distinctive impacts of
different channels on the lead-lag effects in liquidity under different market
conditions could cause these outcomes. Under a good market condition, the
incorporation of the information diffusion’s speed into the price is more likely to be
at a faster rate. More specifically, this could be due to the lower levels of information
Regression using One Lag







0.157*** 0.0145*** 0.0224*** 0.172*** 0.00775***
364,603




0.0905*** 0.0247*** 0.0640*** 0.0888*** 0.0392***
364,603
(0.000156) (0.000157) (0.000491) (0.000157) (0.000512)



















0.226*** 0.0270*** 0.0412*** 0.251*** 0.0139***
362,352




0.213*** 0.0725*** 0.181*** 0.213*** 0.108***
362,352
(0.000289) (0.000350) (0.00108) (0.000288) (0.00114)
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asymmetry when market performance is at optimal levels. At the same time, the
uncertainty that investor have through asset learning should be lower under good
market conditions, since reference stocks tend to have higher liquidity and lower
volatility. As a result, the investor has lower levels of uncertainty and the lead-lag
effect in liquidity would be stronger. On the other hand, the impact of deleveraging
seems to be stronger under poor market conditions, where the funding liquidity tends
to be lower than in normal or good market conditions. When the market performs
well, the investors are less likely to force liquidate their stocks or face a margin call.
In turn, the lead-lag effect will be weaker under good market conditions. It seems
that the impacts from information diffusion speed channel and cross asset learning
channel have greater explanatory power under good market conditions. Overall, the
lead-lag effect in liquidity persists under different market conditions and is stronger
when the market is performing well.
I argue that deleveraging’s impact on the lead-lag in liquidity is weaker under good
market conditions. To further confirm the impact of deleveraging, I choose days with
good and poor funding liquidities. Then, I test whether the lead-lag effects still exist
and are stronger when the funding liquidity is poor. Theoretically, according to
Brunnermeier and Pedersen’s (2009) model, investors’ funding liquidity or the ease
for them to obtain capital is positively related to stocks’ liquidities. Also, the stock’s
market liquidity also depends on the funding liquidity of traders. Furthermore, I use
one week’s interest rates from the Shanghai Interbank Offered Rate (SHIBOR) as a
measurement of funding liquidity. Then, I choose days with stronger funding
liquidity constrains where interest rates are higher than the top 20th percentile and
days with looser funding liquidity constrains where interest rates are lower than the
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Table 27. Coefficients from VAR under different market condition: Lead-lag in Liquidities
Panel A. VAR Coefficients using One-lag Regression
Good market Normal Poor







0.0191*** 0.0298*** 0.0105*** 0.0128*** 0.0202*** 0.00714*** 0.0147*** 0.0214*** 0.00669***
(0.000286) (0.000455) (0.000507) (0.000166) (0.000268) (0.000296) (0.000289) (0.000431) (0.000488)
Amihud’s Illiquid
Ratio
0.0247*** 0.0710*** 0.0462*** 0.0235*** 0.0581*** 0.0346*** 0.0284*** 0.0745*** 0.0460***
(0.000327) (0.00115) (0.00118) (0.000207) (0.000626) (0.000655) (0.000358) (0.00108) (0.00113)
Panel B. Difference in Difference Test using one-lag VAR coefficients









Panel C. VAR Coefficients using Five-lag Regression
Good market Normal Poor
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0.0380*** 0.0592*** 0.0209*** 0.0230*** 0.0359*** 0.0125*** 0.0277*** 0.0385*** 0.0109***
(0.000575) (0.000918) (0.00104) (0.000337) (0.000543) (0.000617) (0.000592) (0.000877) (0.00102)
Amihud’s Illiquid
Ratio
0.0709*** 0.199*** 0.128*** 0.0718*** 0.172*** 0.100*** 0.0764*** 0.186*** 0.110***
(0.000717) (0.00251) (0.00261) (0.000465) (0.00139) (0.00147) (0.000782) (0.00234) (0.00247)
Panel D. Difference in Difference Test using five-lag VAR coefficients
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bottom 20th percentile. Ultimately, I compare the lead-lag relations in liquidity
during these two situations. Table 28 summarizes the results. First, I find that the
differences (c － b) under both high funding liquidity or low funding liquidity
conditions are positive and statistically significant. This implies that regardless of
strict or loose funding constraints that the investors face, the lead-lag relations in
liquidity still exist. More importantly, the difference in difference test results indicate
that the lead-lag effect (measured by the difference between c and b) is weaker when
investors have higher funding liquidity. In contrast, when investors face low liquidity
in funding with higher interest rates and stricter funding constrains, the lead-lag
effect in liquidity is much stronger. This result supports Brunnermeier and Pedersen’s
(2009) model which links the funding liquidity with stocks’ market liquidity. If there
is an initial loss in investors’ leverage trading positions while the funding liquidity is
also at a low level, this could lead to the reduces in position and further result in
decrease in stock prices. As a result, in order to maintain the capital required for the
margin requirement and avoid force liquidation, investors have to either reduce the
leverage level or even sell other un-leveraged stocks. On the other hand, when
investors face high funding liquidity, it would be easier for them to gain the capital to
maintain the margin requirements without trading leveraged or un-leveraged stocks.
Thus, the results support that deleveraging could be a channel that helps explain the
lead-lag relations in liquidity.
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Table 28. Funding Liquidity and Lead-lag in Liquidity
Panel A: One-lag Regression








0.0150*** 0.0220*** 0.00696*** 0.0137*** 0.0236*** 0.00975***
(0.000283) (0.000420) (0.000477) (0.000274) (0.000485) (0.000527)
Amihud’s Illiquid
Ratio
0.0293*** 0.0673*** 0.0380*** 0.0137*** 0.0649*** 0.0511***
(0.000343) (0.000899) (0.000957) (0.000297) (0.00142) (0.00144)









Panel C: Five-lag Regression



















0.0300*** 0.0436*** 0.0134*** 0.0254*** 0.0418*** 0.0161***
(0.000576) (0.000851) (0.000989) (0.000552) (0.000978) (0.00109)
Amihud’s Illiquid
Ratio
0.0826*** 0.172*** 0.0891*** 0.0446*** 0.214*** 0.170***
(0.000738) (0.00191) (0.00205) (0.000668) (0.00320) (0.00325)









7.4 Lead-Lag Effects in Returns
In this chapter, I focus on the lead-lag effects in return. To investigate the
process of price discovery, I execute the same VAR estimation using Equations (1)
and (2) on the returns. Table 29 reports all VAR results. The lead-lag effect in returns
exists and eligible stocks lead the changes in the prices of ineligible stocks. Moreover,
by comparing the coefficients a and d from one-lag regressions and five-lag
regressions, I find that returns have mean-reverting patterns in the five-minute
interval. While in very short periods, (i.e. one minute), returns tend to be positively
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Table 29. Coefficients from VAR: Lead-lag in Returns
Regression using One Lag





-0.000162 0.0679*** 0.108*** 0.0299*** 0.0401***
364,603
(0.000321) (0.000156) (0.000218) (0.000316) (0.000254)
















-0.287*** 0.142*** 0.235*** -0.245*** 0.0927***
362,352
(0.000561) (0.000368) (0.000506) (0.000547) (0.000600)
autocorrelated.
Similar to the previous section, I separate the whole sample into three different
market conditions. Table 30 lists the corresponding results. Notably, in all three
different market conditions, eligible stocks still lead ineligible stocks in the returns
given that the differences between c and b are positive and statistically significant.
However, in contrast with the results in liquidity comovements, comovements in
returns are strongest under poor market conditions.
As mentioned in the introduction, three channels could explain the formation of
lead-lag effects in returns, where one is through deleveraging. When the market is
under poor conditions, the investors are more likely to force liquidate their leverage
trading and sell ineligible stocks to raise sufficient capital to meet the margin
requirement. As a result, the lead-lag in returns will be stronger under poor market
conditions. On the contrary, the information diffusion speed would be slower under
such market conditions, the liquidity will be lower, and the risk of eligible stocks
brought upon by volatility is probably higher. Consequently, this leads to weaker
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lead-lag relations in the returns. However, in spite of the discrepancies on the
impacts across these three channels, I use the mediation analysis to prove (Section
7.6 Figure 3) that the deleveraging channel accounts for 70.73% of the total impact
of leveraged trading on lead-lag in returns. Consequently, the deleverage channel
dominates the total effect, making lead-lag effects the strongest under poor market
conditions.
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Table 30. Coefficients from VAR under Different Market Conditions: Lead-lag in Returns
Lag 1








Return 0.0643*** 0.105*** 0.0403***
0.0582*** 0.0905*** 0.0323*** 0.101*** 0.164*** 0.0631***
(0.000347) (0.000486) (0.000573) (0.000187) (0.000261) (0.000307) (0.000390) (0.000526) (0.000650)
Difference in Difference Test




















Return 0.124*** 0.209*** 0.0853***
0.133*** 0.213*** 0.0803*** 0.189*** 0.328*** 0.138***
(0.000788) (0.00110) (0.00128) (0.000464) (0.000636) (0.000757) (0.000892) (0.00119) (0.00148)
Difference in Difference Test









The literature argues that using only three criteria in matching could miss some
firm-specific characteristics and cause the matching to be less accurate. To solve this
problem, I construct two portfolios where one contains all eligible stocks and the
other with all the ineligible stocks in the market. Then, I compute the average
liquidities and returns for each portfolio and run the VAR following equations (9)
and (10). Table 31 summarizes the results of this portfolio analysis.
Table 31. Coefficients from VAR: Portfolio Analysis
Regression using One Lag






0.517*** 0.158*** 0.249*** 0.673*** 0.0904***
540
(0.00596) (0.00334) (0.00742) (0.00436) (0.00921)
Amihud’s
Illiquid Ratio
0.289*** 0.00596*** 1.120** 0.150*** 1.114**
540
(0.00931) (0.000440) (0.493) (0.00750) (0.493)
Return
0.711*** -0.0158*** 0.792*** 0.980*** 0.808***
540
(0.00310) (0.000514) (0.00574) (0.000657) (0.00583)

















0.629*** 0.134*** 0.213*** 0.757*** 0.0785***
540
(0.00645) (0.00408) (0.00868) (0.00578) (0.0109)
Amihud’s
Illiquid Ratio
0.489*** 0.0120*** 2.972*** 0.309*** 2.960***
540
(0.0122) (0.000778) (0.699) (0.0105) (0.699)
Return
0.665*** -0.00802*** 1.911*** 0.989*** 1.919***
540
(0.00954) (0.000323) (0.0262) (0.000485) (0.0262)
The eligible stocks still lead ineligible stocks in both liquidities and returns since
differences (c – b) in both regressions and both liquidity measures are positive and
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statistically significant. Interestingly, the coefficients b for returns are negative in
both regressions. This suggests that a decrease in the past minute return of ineligible
stocks would actually improve the overall return of eligible stocks.
7.5.2 Firm Size
The previous VAR results demonstrate that stocks eligible for margin-trading
and short-selling lead the changes in liquidity and returns of stocks that are ineligible.
It is possible that firm-level characteristics like a firm’s size cause these lead-lag
relationships in liquidities and returns (Lo and MacKinlay, 1990; Hou and
Moskowitz, 2005; Hou, 2007). For example, Hou and Moskowitz (2005) use price
delay in weekly returns and propose that firm size and lead-lag effects in the weekly
returns are partially correlated. They believe that the industry information diffuses at
a slower rate in small-sized firms to the extent that their prices change at a slower
rate than large-sized firms.
Table 32. Coefficients from VAR: Firm size
One-Lag Regression Five-Lag Regression
Effective Spread Amihud’s Illiquid Effective Spread Amihud’s Illiquid
b
0.01614*** 0.03306*** 0.03099*** 0.09693***
(0.00033) (0.00043) (0.00068) (0.00096)
c
0.01907*** 0.03753*** 0.03548*** 0.1053***
(0.00041) (0.00064) (0.00082) (0.00139)
Difference
(c－b)
0.002994*** 0.004473*** 0.004431*** 0.008363***
(0.00049) (0.00076) (0.00103) (0.00169)
Observation 66,701 66,701 66,331 66,331
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To prove that the nature of eligible stocks with higher market capitalization is
not the sole cause of the lead-lag effect in this chapter, I choose the matching pairs
where ineligible stocks have larger firm sizes than eligible stocks. Then, I compare
the coefficients c and d to test for the existence of the lead-lag effects. Evidently, for
those non-margin stocks with higher firm sizes than margin stocks, the lead-lag
effects in liquidity and returns still exist.
7.5.3 Event Study Analysis
I execute the following event studies to prove that the lead-lag effects in
liquidities and return become stronger when bans on margin trading and short selling
are lifted. Additionally, this study substantiates that not only firm characteristics of
eligible stocks (large firm sizes and high trading volumes) but also their role in
leverage trading, cause the lead-lag effects in liquidities and returns between eligible
and ineligible stocks.
On September 22, 2014, the number of stocks eligible for margin-trading and
short-selling increased from 700 to 900. So, I only select the 200 newly added
eligible stocks and compare their lead-lag in liquidities and returns before and after
the inception date. In spite of those 200 stocks ineligible for margin-trading and
short-selling before the inception date, I still find them leading other ineligible stocks
in liquidity and returns given that they are large in firm size and trading volume.
Then, I compare the differences (c – b) between before and after the event date. I find
that lead-lag relations in both liquidities and returns increased after these stocks
became eligible for margin-trading and short-selling. This result suggests that
become eligible for margin-trading and short-selling contributes to the increase in
lead-lag effects.
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Table 33. Event Study: Coefficients from VAR Before andAfter 5th Inception
Date
One-lag Regression








0.0155*** 0.0218*** 0.00613*** 0.0166*** 0.0242*** 0.00755***
(0.000443) (0.000657) (0.000741) (0.000436) (0.000675) (0.000756)
Amihud’s Illiquid
Ratio
0.00779*** 0.0249*** 0.0169*** 0.0143*** 0.0360*** 0.0216***
(0.000552) (0.00151) (0.00159) (0.000484) (0.00135) (0.00141)
Return
0.0256*** 0.0321*** 0.00655*** 0.0420*** 0.0555*** 0.0135***
(0.000422) (0.000488) (0.000643) (0.000474) (0.000599) (0.000740)
































0.0304*** 0.0445*** 0.00847*** 0.0339*** 0.0536*** 0.00869***
(0.00364) (0.00663) (0.00173) (0.00188) (0.00540) (0.00166)
Amihud’s Illiquid
Ratio
0.0440*** 0.134*** 0.0613*** 0.0493*** 0.119*** 0.0665***
(0.00280) (0.00924) (0.00483) (0.00281) (0.00424) (0.00346)
Return
0.103*** 0.125*** 0.0219*** 0.0956*** 0.132*** 0.0359***
(0.00122) (0.00140) (0.00179) (0.00115) (0.00144) (0.00176)
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7.6 MechanismAnalysis
The previous sections highlight how eligible stocks lead ineligible stocks in
liquidities and returns. In this section, I will investigate the reasons which cause the
lead-lag relationship. Recently, Chen et al. (2016) discovered that margin-trading and
short-selling help the price discovery process. Several studies in the literature also
suggest that short-selling could enable price discovery while imposing bans on
short-selling would decrease liquidities. Therefore, I assume that margin-trading
and/or short-selling will influence the lead-lag effects in liquidities and returns. As
mentioned in the introduction, three channels could help explain the impact of
leverage trading on lead-lag effects in liquidity and return, namely the information
diffusion speed, cross-asset learning, and deleveraging. To understand how each
channel affects the lead-lag effect, I estimate several mediation models and compare
the magnitude and significance of these channels.
Many researchers in behavioral science apply the mediation analysis to
investigate causal effects. As illustrated in Figure 4 (A), the independent variable X
directly affects dependent variable Y with a total effect of c. X and Y are believed to
be the cause and effect. However, X may influence Y through another variable,
known as a mediator. Figure 4 (B) illustrates a simple case of the mediation effect,
which only contains one mediator M. In this case, independent variable X’s casual
effect on dependent variable Y could be classified as an indirect effect through the
mediator M (path ab) and direct effect (path c’). More specifically, path a represents
the impact of X on the proposed mediator M and path b represents the effect of M on
dependent variable Y while excluding the effect of X. Additionally, the relation of
direct effect and indirect effect is c = c’+a×b (Preacher and Hayes, 2004, 2008).
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Figure 4. Direct Effect and Mediation Effect (Adapted from Preacher and
Hayes, 2008)
To perform the mediation analysis, I first define the dependent variable,
independent variable, and possible mediators. The dependent variable is the lead-lag
effect in liquidity, measured by the difference between coefficients c and b (i.e. c－b)
from the VAR analysis. The independent variables are the relative finance interest
and relative short interest, as defined in Section 4.2, which are used to measure
leveraged trading. Then, I determine the mediators for the analysis. The example
above illustrates the simplest case that only includes one mediator. In this chapter, I
propose several mediators, which all proved to have indirect impacts on the
dependent variable.
To determine the mediators, I refer to the channels that help to explain the
impact of leverage trading on lead-lag in liquidity. One of the channels is the speed
of information diffusion. According to several research papers (e.g. Hou and
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Moskowitz, 2005; Hou, 2007), the prices of large stocks react faster to the industry
or market-wide information than small-sized stocks. Since stocks that have large firm
sizes are more likely to be eligible for margin-trading and short-selling, as well as
leverage trading, I propose to utilize information diffusion speed as a mediator in my
mediation analysis. To capture the speed of information diffusion and its
incorporation into stock prices, I use the delay in price that follows the work of Hou
and Moskowitz (2005). Using the estimates from these two regression equations, I
obtain the R2 that is necessary for calculating the price delay.
                         
               
         ᝝         
 
where ri,t is the stock return at time t and rm,t is the market return at time t. After
running these two regressions, the R2 from both regressions are recorded as
    
         ܿ    and     
    ᤼      ܿ    respectively. When market-wide information is not
immediately reflected in the individual stock’s return, the R2 from the first regression
would be less than the second regression. The price delay is then calculated as:





When the information is held in prices, which leads to a price delay, the
    
    ᤼      ܿ    will be higher than     
         ܿ   .
The second channel known as cross asset learning takes place when investors
hold one stock will use the price of another as a benchmark. As Cespa and Foucault
(2014) argue, a decrease in the liquidity of one stock leads to a decrease in another.
Therefore, I propose liquidity as one of the mediators while using the liquidity of
eligible stock as a form of measurement. The relative effective spread of eligible
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stocks is used as the mediator.
I also assume that investors will acquire price informativeness through a stock’s
volatility that measures uncertainty in the stock’s price from the investors’
perspective. Additionally, I propose volatility as another mediator in this mediation
analysis. To measure volatility, I use the intraday high-frequency data.
Intraday Volatility            
where ri,t is the stock’s return at time t. So, for each stock i, the volatility is
recalculated daily.
The mediators of my analysis are price delay that measures the information
diffusion speed, relative effective spread that measures liquidity from cross asset
learning, and intraday volatility that measures a stock’s volatility from the cross asset
learning channel. After considering the effects through these mediators, the
remaining impact is the direct effect that takes place through deleveraging.
If a mediated effect exists, the estimations from regressions that include
mediators should satisfy the following three conditions. First, the independent
variable affects the dependent variable when running a regression of the dependent
variable on the independent variable. In my case, I test how leverage trading impacts
lead-lag effects in liquidity in Model (1) using the following specification:
Lead-lag in Liquidity              relative finance interest       relative short interest     
             Model (1)
Second, the independent variable should affect the mediators when running the
regression of the mediators on the independent variable. I test them in models (2), (3),
and (4). While testing the independent variable’s impact on the mediators, I also
include other mediators in each regression since mediators could influence one
another. Model (2) tests how leverage trading influences price delay. Additionally, I
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consider the relationships between price delay, liquidity, and intra-day volatility since
both liquidity and volatility could contribute to the information diffusion speed.
Price Delay              ᤼relative finance interest       ᤼relative short interest   
   ᤼Illiquidity        Intraday Volatility                   Model (2)
Model (3) tests how leverage trading affects liquidity while considering the impact of
the other two mediators known as price delay and volatility.
Illiquidity               relative finance interest        relative short interest     
 鈀Price Delay        Intraday Volatility                   Model (3)
Model (4) tests how leverage trading influences intraday volatility.
Intraday Volatility              鈀relative finance interest       鈀relative short interest     
  Price Delay       鈀Illiquidity                   Model (4)
The final condition is the mediator and independent variable affect the dependent
variable in a regression of the dependent variable on both the independent and
mediator variables, which I test in Model (5). In addition, the estimates of
independent variables in Model (5) should be less than the estimates of the
independent variable from Model (1) to have a mediation effect. Model (5) measures
the direct effect of leverage trading on comovement in liquidity, while also
measuring the indirect effect of liquidity, price delay, and volatility on lead-lag in
liquidity.
Lead-lag in Liquidity               relative finance interest     
  relative short interest         Price Delay        Illiquidity       鈀Volatility     
             Model (5)
All panel regressions are controlled for both firm fixed effect and time fixed
effect. Estimates from Models (1) to (5) are listed in Table 34. The results suggest
that relative finance interest, as an independent variable, satisfy all three conditions
Table 34: Lead-lag in Liquidity and Mediators Regressions
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0.0602*** -0.485*** -0.0847** -0.344*** 0.0350**
(0.0170) (0.0892) (0.0406) (0.0283) (0.0177)
Relative Short
Interest
1.745 -37.68* -7.580* 22.60*** 2.504
(3.994) (19.82) (4.411) (4.387) (3.978)





Intra-day Volatility 0.309*** 0.250*** -0.0465***(0.107) (0.0843) (0.0146)
Price 0.0235*** 0.393*** -0.0178 0.0896*** 0.0296***(0.00644) (0.0320) (0.0142) (0.0107) (0.00639)
Firm Size -0.0187 -0.536* -0.405*** -0.905*** -0.0884(0.0552) (0.281) (0.130) (0.174) (0.0592)
Trading Volume -0.808 18.27** -21.62*** 54.31*** 1.555(0.815) (7.465) (4.582) (2.757) (1.154)
Volatility -0.201*** -2.110*** -0.358* 2.247*** -0.0939**(0.0339) (0.304) (0.197) (0.0650) (0.0472)
Ownership
Concentration
-0.00589 0.0706** 0.0121** -0.00913 -0.00565
(0.00492) (0.0290) (0.00575) (0.00624) (0.00489)
Return 0.0166 0.0388 -0.0712*** 0.300*** 0.0315***(0.0105) (0.0603) (0.0266) (0.0321) (0.0113)
HS300 -0.000866 -0.0208** -0.00218 0.0155*** -0.000135(0.00185) (0.00937) (0.00253) (0.00255) (0.00185)
Price Limit -0.00288* 0.0297*** 0.00863*** 0.00148 -0.00235(0.00166) (0.00723) (0.00211) (0.00404) (0.00170)
Constant 0.00932*** 0.257*** 0.117*** 0.0926*** 0.0202***
(0.00342) (0.0217) (0.0123) (0.00633) (0.00380)
Observations 362,980 362,636 362,636 362,636 362,636
R-squared 0.010 0.370 0.469 0.731 0.010
In column (1) and column (5) the dependent variable is lead-lag in liquidity. In column (2), the dependent variable
is price delay; in column (3), the dependent variable is the relative effective spread and in column (4), the
dependent variable is intraday volatility. For all regressions in this table, independent variables are relative finance
interest and relative short interest. Price, Firm size, Volume, Turnover, Volatility and Ownership Concentration are
used as control variables. All regressions are controlled for the time fixed effect as for every day, one daily dummy
variable is included in the regression and for each firm, the fixed effect is also used. The numbers reported in
parentheses are standard errors. The estimates with three (***), two(**), one (*) asterisks are statistically
significant at 1%, 5%, 10% level.
while relative short interest does not because of its insignificant impact on the
dependent variable in models (1) and (5). Moreover, the coefficient on relative
finance interest from Model (5) is less than the one derived from Model (1),
suggesting that there could be a mediation effect. Apart from this, the independent
variable affects each mediator variable that explains the dependent variable, implying
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that they could be regarded as mediators. Model (1) highlights that margin-trading
directly influences the lead-lag in liquidity. Higher positions in margin-trading will
lead to stronger lead-lag effects. Additionally, relative finance interest is negatively
associated with the price delay, suggesting that higher levels of leverage will improve
the speed of information diffusion. Results from Models (3) and (4) suggest that
margin-trading negatively affects the measure of illiquidity, which is consistent with
the previous chapter’s findings. Also, margin-trading reduces a stock’s volatility.
Estimates from Model (5) suggest that margin-trading still influences the lead-lag in
liquidity, even after including the impacts from the mediators. Moreover, these
mediators are all negatively and statistically significant related to the lead-lag effects
in liquidity, suggesting that all three channels could help explain leverage trading’s
impact on lead-lag in liquidity.
In the previous analysis, I proved that margin-trading contributes to the lead-lag
effects in liquidity. In this case, all mediators contribute to explaining the lead-lag
effects in liquidity. Then, I calculate the proportion of each channel. In line with
Preacher and Hayes (2004, 2008), I first compare the total effect β with the direct
effect β0 and calculate that the direct effect that accounts for 58.24% (=β0÷β) of the
total effect. Then, the indirect effect accounts for 42.76% (=1–58.24%) of the total
effect. As proposed, three channels could help explain the impact of leverage trading
on the lead-lag in liquidity. The remaining indirect effect will be divided into these
three channels according to the estimators from the regressions. For instance, the
corresponding impact of the information diffusion speed channel on the lead-lag
effect in liquidity is calculated as  ᤼  
 ᤼         鈀 鈀
     W鈀R      鈀R . Similarly, the
indirect effect through the liquidity channel is 4.15% (=     
 ᤼         鈀 鈀
     W鈀R) and
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volatility is equal to 37.13% (=  鈀 鈀
 ᤼         鈀 鈀
     W鈀R ). Figure 5 illustrates the
relationships between the independent variable, mediators, and dependent variables.
Certainly, margin-trading would improve the comovements in liquidity through
four channels. The first is the direct effect through deleveraging, which accounts for
58.24% of the total effect. An increase in margin-trading position would lead to a
stronger lead-lag in liquidities between stocks eligible and ineligible for
margin-trading and short-selling. When leveraged trading investors encounter some
mispricing in margin stocks, a higher margin position would lead to a higher funding
demand and an increased possibility of selling non-margin stocks. The second
channel is information diffusion. Only 2% of the impact of margin-trading on
comovements in liquidity occurs via faster diffusion in market-wide information.
This suggests that leverage trading does reduce price delays and increases the speed
at which market-wide information is transmitted from large to small-cap firms’
stocks. However, the impact is very subtle. The third channel, cross asset learning,
explains 41.28% (=4.15%+37.13%) of the total effect. Leverage trading improves the
liquidity and decrease the volatility of eligible stocks. Also, investors that use eligible
stocks as their benchmark will have increased informativeness, which decreases the
uncertainty in their stocks. Hence, the liquidity of the stocks they hold will also
increase.
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Figure 5. Direct and Mediated Effect of Leverage Trading on Lead-lag in
Liquidity
I also perform the same mediation analysis on lead-lag in returns. Table 35
highlights the estimations from regressions. Similar to the results from Table 34 that
uses lead-lag in liquidity, I find that only margin-trading position has a positive total
effect and direct effect on lead-lag in returns. The proposed mediators also influence
the lead-lag in returns. Then, I calculate the corresponding proportions of each
channel, which explains the impact of leverage trading on lead-lag in returns. Figure
6 shows the results.
In addition, Figure 6 illustrates that the information diffusion speed channel
only accounts for 0.86% of the total effect, while the cross asset learning channel is
responsible for 28.41% of the total effect. The remaining 70.73% goes to
deleveraging, which is the direct effect channel. Since the deleverage channel’s
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Table 35: Lead-lag in Return and Mediators Regressions
In column (1) and column (5) the dependent variable is lead-lag in return. In column (2), the dependent variable
is price delay; in column (3), the dependent variable is the relative effective spread and in column (4), the
dependent variable is intraday volatility. For all regressions in this table, independent variables are relative
finance interest and relative short interest. Price, Firm size, Volume, Turnover, Volatility and Ownership
Concentration are used as control variables. All regressions are controlled for the time fixed effect as for every
day, one daily dummy variable is included in the regression and for each firm, the fixed effect is also used. The
numbers reported in parentheses are standard errors. The estimates with three (***), two(**), one (*) asterisks are
statistically significant at 1%, 5%, 10% level.
impact is much stronger when the market is under poor conditions, this result helps
to explain the observations from Table 30 that confirms how the lead-lag relationship
under poor market conditions is at its strongest. When the market is under a crisis
period, even though the impacts from the information diffusion speed and cross asset
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)










0.451*** -0.485*** -0.0847** -0.344*** 0.319***
(0.0403) (0.0892) (0.0406) (0.0283) (0.0466)
Relative Short
Interest
-7.129 -37.68* -7.580* 22.60*** -2.666
(6.576) (19.82) (4.411) (4.387) (6.487)





Intra-day Volatility 0.309*** 0.250*** -0.242***(0.107) (0.0843) (0.0871)
Price -0.0259** 0.393*** -0.0178 0.0896*** 0.00618(0.0122) (0.0320) (0.0142) (0.0107) (0.0128)
Firm Size 0.731*** -0.536* -0.405*** -0.905*** 0.365***(0.129) (0.281) (0.130) (0.174) (0.123)
Trading Volume -2.543 18.27** -21.62*** 54.31*** 9.777**(2.089) (7.465) (4.582) (2.757) (4.917)
Volatility -0.696*** -2.110*** -0.358* 2.247*** -0.143(0.0706) (0.304) (0.197) (0.0650) (0.212)
Ownership
Concentration
-0.0100 0.0706** 0.0121** -0.00913 -0.00861
(0.00889) (0.0290) (0.00575) (0.00624) (0.00773)
Return -0.101*** 0.0388 -0.0712*** 0.300*** -0.0249(0.0265) (0.0603) (0.0266) (0.0321) (0.0343)
HS300 -0.00863** -0.0208** -0.00218 0.0155*** -0.00489(0.00336) (0.00937) (0.00253) (0.00255) (0.00345)
Price Limit 0.00606* 0.0297*** 0.00863*** 0.00148 0.00890***(0.00346) (0.00723) (0.00211) (0.00404) (0.00337)
Constant 0.0247*** 0.257*** 0.117*** 0.0926*** 0.0819***
(0.00717) (0.0217) (0.0123) (0.00633) (0.0106)
Observations 362,894 362,636 362,636 362,636 362,550
R-squared 0.093 0.370 0.469 0.731 0.108
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learning channels weaken, the impact from deleveraging dominates. Thus, the
lead-lag relations are stronger under poor market conditions.
Figure 6. Direct and Mediated Effect of Leverage Trading on Lead-lag in
Returns
7.7 Conclusion
Using intraday high-frequency data reveals a strong lead-lag relationship in
liquidities and returns between stocks that are eligible and ineligible for
margin-trading and short-selling. Moreover, this lead-lag relation holds under
different market conditions. When using all eligible stocks in a portfolio and all
ineligible stocks in another, the lead-lag effect still exists in both liquidities and
returns. The results from the event study further prove that this lead-lag effect exists
because of leverage trading. Then, using mediation analysis, I find that relative
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finance interest help explain the lead-lag effect in liquidities and returns. Additionally,
I proposed three mediators to help explain the impact of leverage trading on lead-lag
effects. I use price delay to capture the information diffusion channel, as well as the
illiquidity measure and intraday volatility to capture the cross asset learning channel.
The deleveraging channel is the direct effect that leverage trading has on lead-lag
effects. Ultimately, I find that information diffusion only explains a small proportion




8.1 Summary and Implications
In Chapter 5, I prove that common determinants of liquidity in the literature are
also determinants in the Chinese stock market. Stock trading activities like price and
trading volume are positively related to liquidity while volatility is negatively
correlated to liquidity. On the firm specific characteristic level, stocks with larger
firm size tend to have lower spreads and price impact measures but stocks with
higher ownership concentration seem to have lower liquidity. Moreover, I also prove
that whether stocks are index components, whether stocks hit the price limit and the
stocks’ trading status are also determinants of liquidity.
The evidence in Chapter 6 suggests that stocks eligible for margin-trading and
short-selling tend to have higher liquidity than ineligible stocks. The result from
event study further proves that lifting bans on margin-trading and short-selling
improves liquidity of eligible stocks. This finding is consistent with several literature
in which researchers argue that bans on short-selling is harmful to the liquidity
(Battali and Schultz, 2011; Marsh and Payne, 2012; Beber and Pagano, 2013; Alves,
Mendes and da Silva, 2016). When focusing on margin-trading and short-selling
activities using sub-sample that contains only stocks allowed for margin-trading and
short-selling, the results suggest that both the position and trading level of
margin-trading has a beneficial effect on liquidity. On the contrary, short-selling is
proved to be detrimental for liquidities. To explain this negative impact of
short-selling on liquidity, I argue that it is caused by the adverse selection. I prove
that short-sellers can predict the future return while margin-traders cannot. In
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addition, I also prove that short-selling has strongest impact among firms with
highest information asymmetry level. Then I also focus on the crisis period and
investigate whether the impact of eligibility and margin-trading and short-selling will
be different. The results suggest that stocks eligible for margin-trading and
short-selling actually have lower liquidity when market is under poor condition.
Moreover, opposite to their impact under normal market condition, margin-trading
hampers the stock’s liquidity while short-selling improves the liquidity. All results
have practical implications. First, findings that under extreme poor market condition,
short-selling actually improves the liquidity is consistent with several studies that
focus on the impact of short-sale bans during the financial crisis period (e.g. Marsh
and Payne, 2012; Beber and Pagano, 2013; Alves, Mendes and da Silva, 2016).
Prohibiting short-sale will not improve the liquidity during the market crash period.
However, from the regulators aspect, they believe that short-selling is harmful to the
stock’s liquidity is also understandable as the result using the whole sample period
suggests that short-selling decreases stock’s liquidity. Therefore, this study reconciles
the discrepancy between some literature and regulators.
In Chapter 7, by using the VAR estimations, I find lead-lag effects between
liquidities of eligible and ineligible stocks. Stocks allowed for margin-trading and
short-selling lead stocks that have bans on margin-trading and short-selling in both
liquidities and return. This lead-lag effect exists in all different market conditions,
even in both extreme market situations. Further robustness tests including event
study also justify that the lead-lag relations in liquidity and return between eligible
and ineligible stocks. Moreover, the lead-lag relation in liquidity could empirically
support the “liquidity spirals” model proposed by Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2009)
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which predicts that margin requirements destabilize the market in funding constrains
periods where stocks’ liquidities and funding liquidity would be mutually reinforcing.
When the funding liquidity is constrained, the lead-lag effect in liquidity is stronger
than that when funding is adequate. Apart from this “deleverage” channel that help
explain the impact of leverage trading on the lead-lag relationship in liquidity and
return, “information diffusion speed” and “cross asset learning” also explain the
impact.
8.2 Limitations and Future Research
One limitation of my thesis is the span of sample period. I end the sample period
at the end of 2016. In the future, longer time span could be added into the sample
period and more stocks can be included.
Another limitation derives from the special trading rules of the Chinese stock
market. When investigating the lead-lag effect in liquidity and return using
high-frequency data, it is hard to obtain estimates from VAR during the market crash
period as many stocks hit the price limit very soon after the opening leaving
insufficient number of observations to do any meaningful statistical analysis. As
explained in Chapter 5, when a stock hit the price limit, its liquidity will suddenly
dry up as lacking of buying/ selling orders. Thus, it is impossible to focus on the
crisis period using minute observations. For future research, comovement at daily
level could be investigated.
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